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The objective of this introduction is to provide an overall picture of this study. 
The arguments presented in this section are offered to show, in the first place, the 
importance of the topic on which this work relies, from an economic and a social 
perspective, as well as to offer a global overview of the extensive research on dividends 
policy in which the catering theory is framed. In second place, we describe the 
characteristics of different institutional environments and their impact on the catering 
effect. The arguments pointing to ownership structure as an essential element for the 
dividend policy and the main lines of previous research, as well the interaction effect 
between catering incentives and corporate ownership are described in the third place. 
Finally, we present our objectives and the structure of the study. 
 
I.2 Dividend policy and traditional theories 
 
Over the past decades extensive financial research has been carried out regarding 
the importance of factors determining corporate dividend policy, and despite the vast 
body of research on the topic, it remains an open subject to debate. In fact, since Miller 
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and Modigliani (1961) with their irrelevance proposition, many scholars have tried to 
give alternative explanations for dividends in imperfect markets.1  
There are many papers that investigate the important role played by a firm’s 
characteristics in shaping its dividend decisions; one of the most remarkable is by Fama 
and French (2001). The question as to why companies pay out dividends has given rise 
to different explanations, the most relevant ones stemming from the agency theory. 
According to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory, higher free cash flow should lead to 
higher dividend payments in order to prevent firms from overinvesting. Hence there is a 
positive relationship between a firm’s free cash flow and its payout ratio.2  
Financial literature also documents the role played by debt and dividends as 
agency-cost control mechanisms (see Ross, 1977; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jensen, 
1986; and Harris and Raviv, 1991 for debt; Lintner, 1956; Bhattacharya, 1979; Rozeff, 
1982 and Jensen, 1986 for dividends). This suggests that debt and dividend may be 
somehow related, although there is no consensus about the way they are related. On the 
one hand, the substitution hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between debt and 
dividends based on the minimization of agency conflicts without duplicating efforts (see 
Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, 1986; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen, Solberg and Zorn, 
1992; and Chen and Steiner, 1999). On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis points 
to the complementary use of these two mechanisms and consequently, to a positive 
relationship between them (see Jensen, 1989; Eckbo and Verma, 1994; and Zwiebel, 
1996). According to traditional theories, earnings are a fundamental factor that impact 
dividends decision. Lintner (1956) points to another important explanation of dividends. 
                                                 
1 In a recent study by Bhattacharya (2007), the question of why firms pay dividends has been examined 
using agency costs, signaling and clientele models. 
2 See, for instance, Fama and French (2001); DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004), and Li and Lie 
(2006). 
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He argues that firms seek to maintain the stability of dividends, and he finds that a 
firm’s earnings are probably the key factor to account for in order to get a stable 
dividend pattern. Consequently, a positive relationship between a firm’s earnings and its 
dividend payments will exist (see, in a recent research, Denis and Osobov, 2008). 
The nature of a firm’s assets has also been documented as a determinant of 
dividends (see, for instance, Allen and Michaely, 2003; Aivazian, Booth and Cleary, 
2003). According to Scott (1977), firms with a high proportion of tangible assets are 
more leveraged, which will in turn positively or negatively affect dividend payments, 
depending on whether there is a substitution or a complementary relationship between 
debt and dividends. Size has also been traditionally considered among the determinants 
of dividend policy, and previous evidence seems to agree that larger firms pay higher 
dividends (see, for instance, Fama and French, 2001; and Denis and Osobov, 2005, 
2008). 
 
I.3 Investors’ sentiments and the catering theory of dividends 
 
Recent literature points out that the characteristics of the firms paying dividends 
(that is, their levels of free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets and size) 
should not be separately analyzed from certain psychological components, in that an 
important part of the decision to pay dividends may be due to a firm’s desire to satisfy 
investors’ expectations. In fact, in agreement with the recent trends in the theory of 
financial behavior, time-varying catering incentives also appear to shed light on the 
“disappearance” of dividends by Fama and French (2001). One of the most recent 
arguments explaining the dividends decision is based on the behavioral financial 
literature, and according to this trend, behavioral finance investors’ psychological 
The catering theory of dividends: the moderating role of firm characteristics, corporate governance factors and corporate ownership 
 4
characteristics influence conduct in financial markets. In fact, models of behavioral 
finance (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001) explain the excess volatility and 
predictability of stock market prices by breaking with the complete rationality 
hypothesis underlying traditional finance.  
Within this context, some of the most prominent explanations (see Barberis, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998, 2001; Hong 
and Stein, 1999; Zhang, 2006; Coval, Stein and Baker, 2008; Han, 2008; Kurov, 2008, 
among others) are based on investors’ sentiments. Explanations for the tendency to pay 
dividends in equilibrium clientele theory were first offered by Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) and Black and Scholes (1974). This theory suggests that changes in dividend 
policies correspond with changes in investor demand for dividends. In this context, 
some of the most prominent explanations are based on the investors’ sentiments. Thus, 
an important alternative explanation for the decline in the payment of dividends has its 
roots in the catering theory of dividends proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a). In 
accordance with this new theory, these authors provide empirical evidence that changes 
in the amount that companies pay on dividends can be explained by what they 
denominate “catering incentives”; that is, a measure of the market demand for dividend-
paying stocks. The catering theory holds that firms adjust their dividend payouts largely 
in response to their investors’ demand for dividend-paying stocks. According to the 
catering theory, when investors’ demand for payouts increases, firms are more likely to 
increase payouts. 
The growing interest raised by this new theory of dividends, the catering theory, 
in the financial literature of the last years is our main motivation for this work, trying to 
show that a new variable, capturing psychological factors, should be included in the 
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traditional models of dividends. In fact, several researchers have studied this issue, 
although there is not a consensus as to why some firms pay dividends and some do not 
and why some investors prefer dividends and some do not. However, one of the most 
recent arguments that cast doubt on shareholders being indifferent about receiving 
dividends is based on the behavioral finance literature. According to this literature, 
investors’ psychological characteristics influence the conduct in financial markets, and 
investors’ irrational behavior limits the effectiveness of arbitration actions.  
Recent studies (see, among others, Brown and Cliff, 2004, 2005; Lai, 2004; 
Denis and Osobov, 2005; Fairchild and Zhang, 2005; Gemmil, 2005; Hsieh and Wang, 
2006; Cohen and Yagil, 2008; Han, 2008; Hoberg and Prabhala, 2009) show the 
growing interest in this new theory, and they suggest that investors’ sentiments can be 
decisive in the resolution of the dividend puzzle. 
In fact, the growing interest in this new theory suggests the need to understand 
its implications and to integrate the investors’ sentiments in explanatory models of 
dividends. With this need in mind, this study relies on the assumptions of the catering 
theory and attempts to empirically validate this strand of the literature in Eurozone 
member countries. In this sense, it is necessary to highlight four important contributions 
to the literature of dividends. First, we offer new evidence of the determinants of 
dividends, extending the traditional analyses by means of a new variable capturing the 
catering effect. Second, we investigate whether the relationship between the dividends 
and the investors’ sentiments is conditioned by certain characteristics of the firm, such 
as its liquid assets, its investment opportunities and its free cash flow. Third, we analyze 
the moderating role of the institutional factors characterizing the different corporate 
governance systems around the world in the extent to which a firm caters to their 
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investors’ sentiments. Finally, we go into one of these institutional factors, the 
ownership structure, in depth and learn how corporate ownership moderates catering 
incentives. 
With these purposes in mind, we propose a new empirical approach that allows 
us to measure investor sentiment at the firm level. Specifically, we use the error term of 
a valuation model to obtain a proxy for the catering effect on dividend payments. 
Assuming that a firm’s market value is mainly explained by its investment, financing 
and dividend decisions, our view is that the residual value captured by the error term of 
the valuation model should be a measure that serves as a proxy for the firm’s investors’ 
sentiment. This variable, measured in an original way and representing the catering 
effect, is then entered into a dividend model in which the payout variable, once solved 
for the problem of censure, is explained by traditional factors such as free cash flow, 
leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets and size. 
In line with our view, Fama and French (2001) find that the decline in the 
proportion of dividend-paying US firms is not satisfactorily explained by changes in 
their characteristics and, consequently, that the dividend decision is not entirely 
explained by the individual characteristics of the firm. 
 
I.4 The impact of institutional factors on the catering theory of dividends 
 
After controlling for the traditional determinants of dividends, such as the free 
cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets, and size, we go a step further and 
we investigate whether or not different institutional characteristics moderate the catering 
effect of dividends. Specifically, we argue that the extent to which firms cater to their 
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investors’ sentiments changes according to the institutional environment in which the 
firm operates. 
Recent analyses studying the financing patterns around the world emphasize the 
importance of institutional differences across countries for the dividend policy (La Porta 
et al., 2000a; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001; Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002; 
Aivazian, Booth and Cleary, 2003, among others). Closely related literature has also 
shown that the access to external financing is shaped by the country’s legal and 
financial environment (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002). A direct implication of these studies is that in 
countries with weak legal and financial systems, firms obtain less external financing and 
have lower payouts. 
The agency theory proposes a number of corporate governance mechanisms that 
are designed to reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and 
control (see, for instance, Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Their purpose is to align shareholders’ and managers’ interests. Governance 
mechanisms can be split into two categories: internal and external. Internal mechanisms 
include, among others, the effectiveness of boards and corporate ownership. Among the 
external mechanisms we can highlight the legal protection of investors, the orientation 
and development of the financial systems and the contestability of the market for 
corporate control. 
The legal origin influences dividends, and it is a very important question in the 
corporate governance research. However, evidence on the role played by investors’ 
legal protection in determining a firm’s payout ratio is somewhat mixed, and even 
confusing. For example, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) find a positive relationship 
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between the degree of protection of investors and the payout ratio for Anglo-Saxon 
firms. In contrast, in accordance with the substitute pattern proposed by La Porta et al. 
(2000b), Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) find that in countries with weak legal 
protection the allotment of dividends is higher as a measure to limit the minority 
shareholders’ expropriation. The development of the capital markets and the orientation 
of the financial systems have been used thoroughly to establish institutional differences 
across countries (see, for instance, Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Beck and Levine, 2002, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; and Levine, 2002). The financial literature 
offers arguments that justify that dividends differ when there is an active market for 
corporate control or not (see, for example, Bebchuk, Cohen and Allen, 2005; or 
Cremers and Nair, 2005). 
Regarding internal mechanisms, we also focus our investigation on the 
differences in the ownership concentration for the different countries, expecting 
dividends to be higher in firms with more ownership concentration, because this 
mechanism is a supervisory device of managerial discretion. We also expect higher 
dividends in firms with independent boards and two-tier structures, in that it is assumed 
that they supervise managers to a larger extent in the interests of shareholders. 
Despite the lack of previous evidence, there are strong arguments that lead us to 
argue that investors’ preference for dividend-paying stocks changes according to the 
above-mentioned institutional characteristics. Within this context, the focus of our 
analysis is the argument that when companies belong to different institutional 
environments and the nature of existing agency problems also differs, there will also be 
differences in the relationship between dividend policy and the catering effect. To learn 
which of these institutional variables are more likely to influence the firm’s dividend 
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policy, we examine the payout of the following countries: United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan and the Eurozone countries, which represent a great variety of 
institutional environments. Hence we offer a study of the impact of several institutional 
factors on the investors’ sentiment that supports the catering theory of dividends. As far 
as we know, our work differs from existing literature in that it tries to answer several 
unanswered questions about the dividends policy from the perspective of catering 
incentives around the world. There is no prior evidence supporting this view, and 
providing empirical support to this issue is thus one of the major contributions of this 
research. 
 
I.5 The impact of different ownership structure on catering theory of dividends 
 
Despite decades of researchers studying dividends, we have not completely 
understood the factors that influence this important decision and the way in which these 
factors interact. Despite dividend irrelevance proposition by Miller and Modigliani 
(1961), the finance literature offers theoretical and empirical insights into how managers 
are prone to approach the issue of dividend policy (see, for instance, Baker, Powell and 
Veit, 2002a, for managerial perspective on dividend policy). One of the central 
assumptions in Miller and Modigliani (1961) is that managers take steps in the best 
interests of the owners of the firm and, therefore try to maximize shareholders’ wealth. 
Agency theory suggests that managers, who work as ‘agents’ for shareholders, are not 
necessarily motivated to work in the shareholders’ best interests (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  In fact, in the context of the agency theory, the importance of the separation 
between ownership and control is well known (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman 
and Hart, 1980 and Fama and Jensen, 1983). Within this context, the discussion about 
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the ownership structure and its influence in the dividends policy focuses on the 
importance of the level of the managerial ownership and the degree of ownership 
concentration. 
With respect to the managerial ownership, the financial literature reveals that for 
lower levels of managerial ownership, the ownership of shares by the manager of the 
firm leads to the alignment of his/her interests with those of external shareholders, 
usually resulting in a high dividend payout. In the other hand, for higher levels of 
managerial ownership, the ownership of shares by managers can lead to distortions in 
the operating decisions that they make (entrenchment hypothesis). Conventional 
literature suggests that managers dislike dividends because dividend payments reduce 
their ability to pursue personal perquisites, and consequently, firms are less likely to pay 
dividends when managers become more entrenched. Rozeff (1982) reports that dividend 
payout ratios are significantly negatively associated with insider ownership. In contrast, 
Brown, Liang and Weisbenner (2007) show that firms are more likely to increase 
dividends if executives own a large fraction of outstanding shares. 
However, the relationship between insider ownership and dividend payouts may 
not be monotonic. Schooley and Barney (1994), Farinha (2003), Correia da Silva, 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004), and Thomsen (2005) present evidence consistent with 
a U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and dividends. 
In respect to ownership concentration and its effect on the dividend policy, 
previous studies show that corporate governance is poorer in most countries where 
ownership concentration is very high. In these cases, the appropriation of private 
benefits by controlling shareholders is easier. As shown by La Porta et al. (2000a), in 
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Continental Europe, where ownership structures are generally more concentrated, 
dividend payouts are lower and more flexible than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Since this institutional factor is so important, the next chapter will deepen the 
knowledge of the ownership structure on the catering effect of dividends. 
As pointed out in the previous section, ownership concentration works as a 
control mechanism for agency problems between shareholders and managers. Following 
the agency arguments and focusing on civil law countries (Eurozone countries except 
Ireland), the conflict of interests is not between shareholders and managers but between 
controlling owners and minority shareholders, who are less protected by law.  
It is worth pointing out that very little is published about ownership structure and 
dividend payouts across Europe. The most recent studies we find are single-country 
analyses and, as far as we know, there is no literature on the relation between corporate 
ownership and the catering incentives. 
In this context, we go a step further and we investigate whether or not the 
ownership characteristics moderate the catering effect of dividends. Specifically, we 
analyze the interaction of insider ownership and ownership concentration with the 
catering effect of dividends, all of them considered as agency cost control mechanisms. 
To reach this objective, we take into account the convergence of interests and 
entrenchment effects in the case of insider ownership, as well as the monitoring and 
expropriation effects in the case of ownership concentration. We argue that the way in 
which investors appreciate dividend payments for firms in Eurozone member countries 
depends on the firm’s level of managerial ownership, the level of ownership 
concentration by the largest shareholder, the joint effect of the first and second largest 
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shareholder, and the joint effect of the first and second largest shareholder, depending 
on whether there is contestability or collusion between them. 
 
I.6 Objectives and Structure of the study  
 
One of the more puzzling issues in corporate finance involves dividends. 
Finance researchers have advanced some principal paradigms to explain this dividend 
puzzle, and one of the most prominent explanations for dividends has its roots in 
catering theory of dividends. Our research tries to contribute to the solution of the 
dividend puzzle with new pieces, by showing that psychological factors influence the 
decision to pay; that is, that investors’ sentiments explain to some extent the decision to 
pay in accordance with the catering theory. 
The first objective of this research provides a test of the predictions of the 
catering theory of dividends by proposing a new approach for analyzing the effect that 
investors’ sentiments exert on corporate dividend policy of Eurozone firms. 
Accordingly, a traditional dividend model is extended to incorporate an original 
measure of the catering effect at the firm level, proxied by the error term of a market 
valuation model. 
 Most of the finance theory on dividend policy starts with the behavior of 
shareholders. The empirical financial literature on this topic either studies share price 
reactions or surveys corporate executives for their opinions. No one has either 
theoretically or empirically tested the impact of different institutional factors on catering 
dividends. The second main objective of this work tries to fill this gap by examining 
how the different institutional environments impact catering effect. The basis of our 
argument is that when companies belong to different institutional environments and the 
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nature of existing agency problems also differs, there will also be differences in the 
relationship between dividend policy and the catering effect. In fact, we base our 
research on a number of external and internal disciplining mechanisms that firms may 
face in their efforts to reduce the underlying agency costs. We used as external 
mechanisms the legal origin of the country in which the firm operates, the level of 
protection to the minority shareholders, the orientation of the financial systems and the 
contestability of the market for corporate control. Additionally, we consider as internal 
mechanisms the ownership in hands of the three largest shareholders and the 
effectiveness of boards of directors. We propose an extension of our dividend model 
that incorporates the interaction of our measure of catering with the different 
institutional factors mentioned above. 
The financial literature emphasizes that ownership structures influence dividend 
payouts. Within this context, we try to offer evidence on the way in which different 
corporate ownership characteristics influence the extent to which firms cater to their 
investors’ sentiments. Despite the lack of prior evidence on the matter, the focus of our 
analysis is the argument that when companies present different levels of managerial 
ownership and ownership concentration, and the nature of existing agency problems 
also differs, there will also be differences in the relationship between dividend policy 
and the catering effect. In this study, we intend to evaluate how the ownership structure 
affects the tendency to adjust payouts to investors’ sentiments. To achieve this aim, we 
establish a link between ownership structures across Eurozone countries and catering 
variables constructed at firm level. 
After previous arguments and considerations, the present research has been 
carried out with the intention of clarifying the importance of certain psychological 
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factors for a firm’s dividend policy, in that an important part of the decision to pay 
dividends may stem from a firm’s desire to satisfy investor expectations. Then, the 
growing interest in this new catering theory of dividends suggests the need to 
understand its implications and to integrate the investors’ sentiments in explanatory 
models of the dividends.  
Therefore, we can to split this general objective into the following purposes: 
1. To show empirically the validity of the catering theory as an explanation of the 
dividends payout in two ways: on the one hand, by analyzing the determinants 
of corporate dividends policy, focusing attention on a novel measure of the 
investors’ sentiments at firm level; on the other hand, by showing the influence 
exerted by certain characteristics of the company (such as liquid assets, 
investment opportunities and free cash flow) on catering incentives. 
2. To obtain evidence that supports the argument that when companies belong to 
different institutional environments and the nature of existing agency problems 
also differs, there will also be differences in the relationship between dividend 
policy and the catering effect. Moreover, we attempt to provide empirical 
findings relating investors’ sentiments with the quality of corporate governance 
mechanisms across Eurozone countries, US, UK, Canada and Japan. 
3. To contribute new evidence on the relationship between ownership patterns and 
investors’ demand for dividend payment. Therefore, we believe that not only 
dividend payouts are important to understand managers’ catering behavior but 
also the firm’s ownership structure.  
Overall, in this thesis, we examine whether the catering theory contributes to an 
explanation of dividend choices of companies across countries. The potential 
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contribution of our propose is showing that investors’ sentiments impact dividend 
payout and that this impact differs depending on certain characteristics of the company, 
the institutional environment in which the firm operates and the characteristics of 
corporate ownership. 
It is worth pointing out that all previous objectives are connected and that the 
study of the dividend decision can find in this thesis a solid base for future research, 
validating the inclusion of the catering variable in the explanatory models of dividends. 
With our objectives clearly delimited, the remainder of this work is organized as 
follows: 
In Chapter II we offer the most important contributions of previous research to 
the debate on the determinants of the dividend decisions, and we propose our 
hypotheses concerning these traditional theories of dividends. We next discuss the key 
arguments of the catering theory of dividends, which leads us to our hypotheses about 
the effect of a firm’s investor sentiment on its payout ratio. In Chapter II we also define 
data, variables and methodology used in our models. Additionally, we give one more 
step and investigate whether or not certain firm characteristics moderate the catering 
effect of dividends. Finally, we explain our results and conclude. 
In Chapter III we first describe the main legal and institutional factors 
characterizing the corporate governance systems and summarize previous literature and 
empirical evidence on this matter, which leads us to pose our hypotheses. We next 
describe the data and our model of dividends and discuss the estimation method. Finally 
we discuss our results and our conclusions. 
Chapter IV contains background to the study of ownership structure on 
determining dividend payout. We also document some literature relating to this matter 
The catering theory of dividends: the moderating role of firm characteristics, corporate governance factors and corporate ownership 
 16
and catering incentives and in accordance, we propose our hypotheses. To proceed, we 
next describe the data and our model of dividends and discuss the estimation method. 
Finally we explain our results and put forward a number of conclusions. 
This research culminates with an exhibition of the conclusions that will allow us 
to defend the thesis proposed in this work: “Dividend policies are driven to some extent 
by investors’ sentiments, and this catering effect is moderated by the firm’s financial 























Corporate dividend policy has long been an issue of interest in the financial 
literature and, despite the vast body of research on the topic, it remains a subject open to 
debate. In fact, since the Miller and Modigliani (1961) irrelevance proposition, 
according to which dividend policies are all equivalent and there is no a particular 
policy that can increase shareholder wealth in perfect capital markets, many scholars 
have offered alternative explanations for dividends in imperfect markets. Despite the 
vast and mainly US-based literature on this issue,3 there is no definitive answer as to 
why investors demand dividends. 
One of the most recent arguments that casts doubt on shareholders being 
indifferent about receiving dividends is based on the behavioral finance literature. 
According to this literature, investors’ psychological characteristics influence conduct in 
financial markets, and investors’ irrational behavior limits the effectiveness of 
arbitration actions. In fact, models of behavioral finance (see, for example, Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 2001) explain the excess volatility and predictability of stock market prices 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Fama and French (2001); Allen and Michaley (2003); DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (2004); Koch and Sun (2004); Brav et al. (2005); DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006, 2007); 
Boudoukh et al. (2007); Skinner (2008). 
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by breaking with the complete rationality hypothesis underlying traditional finance. 
Within this context, some of the most prominent explanations (see Barberis, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998, 2001; Hong and Stein, 
1999; Zhang, 2006; Coval, Stein and Baker, 2008; Han, 2008; Kurov, 2008, among 
others) are based on investor sentiment. Explanations for the tendency to pay dividends 
in equilibrium clientele theory were first offered by Miller and Modigliani (1961), and 
Black and Scholes (1974). This theory suggests that changes in dividend policies 
correspond with changes in investor demand for dividends. 
Furthermore, firms have become less likely to pay dividends beyond what could 
be expected given the changes in their characteristics such as size, profitability and 
growth opportunities. In fact, Fama and French (2001) find that the decline in the 
proportion of dividend-paying US firms is not satisfactorily explained by changes in 
their characteristics and, consequently, that the dividend decision is not entirely 
explained by the individual characteristics of each firm. Several authors propose 
alternative explanations for this decline in the propensity to pay dividends. For instance, 
Banerjee, Gatchev and Spindt (2007) argue that transaction cost–based clientele effects 
account for a significant part of the decline in the propensity to pay dividends. Amihud 
and Li (2006) also document the phenomenon called “disappearing dividends” by Fama 
and French (2001), which describes the decrease in the information content of dividends 
since the mid 1970s, making firms less willing to incur the costs associated with 
dividend signaling. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) base their explanation of 
the disappearing dividends phenomenon on the concentration of dividends in top payers 
among US firms, as well as on the decline in the frequency of special dividend 
payments over the last two decades. Brav et al. (2005) find that the higher flexibility of 
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stock repurchases led managers to favor them over dividends, a result corroborated by 
Skinner (2008). 
Interestingly, recent non-US based evidence confirms patterns of dividend 
payments found in the US. For instance, Denis and Osobov (2008) examine the 
dividend policies of firms headquartered in the US, the UK, Canada, France, Germany 
and Japan, and find a declining propensity to pay dividends in all these countries. Von 
Eije and Megginson (2008) also find that dividend payments in European Union 
member countries are similar in many ways to those of American firms. In fact, the 
fraction of European firms paying dividends has declined in recent years, whereas total 
real dividends paid have increased significantly, as has occurred in US. Additionally, 
the propensity of European firms to pay cash dividends has declined continuously with 
time, as Fama and French (2001) document for US listed firms. 
The most innovative and pioneering explanation for the decline in the payment 
of dividends has its roots in the catering theory of dividends proposed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a). These authors provide empirical evidence that changes in the amounts 
that firms pay in dividends can be explained by what they term “catering incentives,” 
that is, a measure of market desire for dividend-paying stocks. The catering theory holds 
that firms adjust their dividend payouts largely in response to investor demand for 
dividend-paying stocks. The growing interest in this new theory of dividends suggests 
the need to better understand its implications and to integrate investor sentiment into 
dividend models. In fact, whether there is a catering effect on a firm’s payout ratio is, as 
far as we know, an unresolved question, and research on investor sentiment carried out 
in the last decade yields mixed results in this regard. 
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For example, Baker and Stein (2003) find that investor sentiment measures are 
highly correlated with, and have predictive power for, future market returns. Lai (2004) 
relies on the catering theory to explain the well-documented ‘analyst bias’. He suggests 
that analysts are heavily influenced by investors, and he builds a theory showing how 
analysts cater to investor beliefs. Gemmill (2005) examines split-capital, closed-end 
funds in the UK, and finds empirical support for the catering theory. Wang, Keswani 
and Taylor (2006) detect influence from market returns as well as from volatility on 
future values through sentiment measures. Kumar and Lee (2006) rely on the clientele 
model derived by Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) to test the effect of individual 
investor sentiment on groups of stocks, and find that the returns of individual stocks 
capture the divergent sentiments of various important investor groups. Li and Lie (2006) 
further extend and provide support for the catering theory of dividends, and Ferris, Sen 
and Yui (2006) find that catering incentives have an important influence on the 
propensity to pay dividends in the UK.4 
Very little research has yet been published on the catering model of dividends in 
Europe, and the empirical evidence found is somewhat in conflict with that of the US. 
For instance, Denis and Osobov (2008) find a declining propensity to pay dividends in 
France and Germany, which is entirely explained by firm size, profitability, growth 
opportunities, and the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. They conclude that this 
result supports the agency cost model over the catering theory model. Similarly, Von 
Eije and Megginson (2008) find no systematic effects from a country-specific catering 
variable in the 15 countries of the European Union, which suggests that catering “a 
priori” is not an important factor influencing European payout policies. These authors 
                                                 
4 More evidence on the relevance of investor sentiment in various contexts is provided in Edmans, Garcia 
and Norli (2007), Tetlock (2007), Puri and Robinson (2007), and Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2008). 
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conclude, however, that further research “that goes into the intricacies of measuring 
catering effects more deeply than we are able to do here” (Von Eije and Megginson, 
2008, footnote 26) is required to learn whether the catering theory is relevant in 
European countries. 
With this need in mind, this chapter relies on the assumptions of the catering 
theory, and attempts to empirically validate this strand of the literature in Eurozone 
member countries. In this way, this study advances the dividend literature in four 
directions. First, we offer new evidence on the determinants of corporate dividend 
policy by focusing on the catering effect associated with investor sentiment. Given the 
controversy surrounding this matter, it is of interest to further investigate and make 
clear the role of catering incentives in dividend policies. Second, we investigate how the 
dividend-catering relationship is moderated by particular firm characteristics, such as 
the level of liquid assets, investment opportunities, and free cash flow. Third, the choice 
of Eurozone countries as the base of our study is significant because previous research 
on this topic is mainly US-based and, in general, offers support to the catering theory of 
dividends (see references above).  However, recent Eurozone evidence (Denis and 
Osobov, 2008; Von Eije and Megginson, 2008) is somewhat conflicting in that it 
suggests a lack of a catering effect in European firms’ dividend policies. Our research 
thus investigates whether firms in the Eurozone cater to their investors’ sentiments, as 
their US counterparts are shown to do. Additionally, studying dividend policies in 
Europe is interesting in itself for several reasons, as pointed out by Von Eije and 
Megginson (2008) in their European Union study.5 Finally, we avoid obtaining biased 
                                                 
5 They mention, for instance, the largely segmented corporate governance systems, taxation regimes and 
financial markets among these countries, and the fact that, despite most of them sharing a civil foundation 
of their laws, some of them (such as Ireland in our sample) have common law codes. Note that there is a 
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results in our study by solving the problem of censure of the dependent variable in our 
model. Note that the payout ratio is a censured variable in that some firms pay 
dividends, whereas others do not, a problem that is overcome by estimating a Tobit 
model that yields a prediction of the payout ratio. 
We propose a new empirical approach that allows us to measure investor 
sentiment at the firm level. Specifically, we use the error term of a valuation model to 
obtain a proxy for the catering effect on dividend payments. Assuming that a firm’s 
market value is mainly explained by its investment, financing and dividend decisions, 
our view is that the residual value captured by the error term of the valuation model 
should be a measure that serves as a proxy for the firm’s investor sentiment. This 
variable representing the catering effect is then entered into a dividend model built on 
the main contributions from previous research. 
This chapter is presented in five sections. Section II.1 introduces a theoretical 
framework that takes account of the existing literature and the empirical evidence on 
traditional explanations of dividends, as well as on the catering theory, and presents our 
hypotheses. Section II.2 describes the data and variables used in our analysis. In Section 
II.3, we present our model of dividends and discuss the estimation method. The results 






                                                                                                                                               
difference between their study and ours, since some European Union members retain their own currencies 
throughout their study period while all the Eurozone member countries adopted the euro after 1999. 
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II.1 Theories and hypotheses 
 
In this section, we first summarize the main contributions from previous 
research to the debate on the determinants of dividend payments, and we propose our 
hypotheses concerning these traditional theories of dividends. We next discuss the key 
arguments of the catering theory of dividends, which leads us to our hypothesis about 
the effect of a firm’s investor sentiment on its payout ratio. 
 
II.1.1 Traditional theories of dividends 
 
According to Jensen`s (1986) free cash flow theory, if a firm has cash flow not 
consumed by positive net present value (NPV) projects, it is better to return the excess 
cash to shareholders in order to maximize their wealth and to reduce the possibility of 
these funds being wasted by managers in negative NPV projects. This theory thus 
predicts that higher free cash flow should lead to higher dividend payments in order to 
prevent firms from overinvesting.6  The positive relationship between dividends and free 
cash flow is supported by, for instance, Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993), and Holder, 
Langrehr and Hexter (1998). More recently, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) 
show that overinvestment processes worsen in firms that accumulate high proportions of 
cash and distribute low dividends. In the same vein, Miguel, Pindado and de la Torre 
(2005) document the role played by dividends in controlling overinvestment processes 
in firms with high levels of free cash flow. Consistent with Jensen’s (1986) theory and 
subsequent empirical evidence, the following hypothesis is posed: 
                                                 
6 The overinvestment hypothesis has been confirmed from different perspectives in, for instance, Lang, 
Ofek and Stulz (1996); Chen and Ho (1997); Lamont (1997); Chakraborty, Kazarosian and Trahan 
(1999), Del Brio, Perote and Pindado (2003), and Morgado and Pindado (2003). 
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Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between a firm’s free cash flow and its 
payout ratio. 
The financial literature widely supports the role played by debt and dividends as 
agency-cost control mechanisms, as they solve the conflict of interest between owners 
and managers (see Grossman and Hart, 1980, and Jensen, 1986 for debt; Rozeff, 1982 
and Jensen, 1986 for dividends), and they mitigate asymmetries of information between 
firms and potential investors (see Ross, 1977, and Harris and Raviv, 1991 for debt; 
Lintner, 1956, and Bhattacharya, 1979 for dividends). This literature suggests that debt 
and dividends may be somehow related, although the literature in general is not 
unanimous about the way in which they are related. On the one hand, the search for a 
trade-off between costs and benefits leads to a substitution hypothesis based on the 
minimization of agency conflict without duplicating efforts (Easterbrook, 1984; John 
and Senbert, 1998). In others words, this hypothesis holds that high leverage makes 
dividends less valuable, and vice versa.7 On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis 
points to the complementary use of several mechanisms as the most effective solution to 
a firm’s inefficiencies, because no one of them can be a satisfactory solution in itself 
without generating additional costs (Jensen, 1989).8 
These two opposing arguments lead us to pose the following two alternative 
hypotheses about the relationship between debt and dividends: 
Hypothesis 2a: A negative relationship between a firm’s leverage and its payout ratio is 
expected (considering debt as a substitute for dividends). 
                                                 
7 Subsequent empirical evidence on the substitutability of debt and dividends as cash flow commitments 
can be found in Moh´d, Perry and Rimbey (1995, 1998), and Von Eije and Megginson (2008), who 
assumed that leverage may help control agency costs, thus reducing the need to distribute cash to 
shareholders through dividends. According to this view, leverage and cash distributions will be 
substitutes and a negative relationship between cash dividends and debt ratios is predicted. 
8 Consistent with this hypothesis, the results in Eckbo and Verma (1994) show a positive and significant 
relationship between debt and dividends and, more recently, Zwiebel (1996), and Douglas (2001) confirm 
that firm value is optimized only when debt and dividends are simultaneously used. 
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Hypothesis 2b: A positive relationship between a firm’s leverage and its payout ratio is 
expected (considering debt and dividends as complementary mechanisms). 
Linter’s research (1956), is one of the most relevant studies on the determinants 
of dividends Lintner argues that firms seek to maintain dividend stability, and he finds 
that a firm’s earnings are probably the key factor to account for in order to follow a 
stable dividend pattern. Accordingly, regular dividends represent an ongoing 
commitment to distribute cash and, more importantly, a commitment that managers are 
especially loathe to break (Lintner, 1956; Brav et al., 2005). Consistent with Lintner’s 
arguments, Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) find that changes in dividends are 
highly correlated with past and current changes in earnings. Along the same line of 
reasoning, Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) argue that managers need to explain the 
reasons for their actions to shareholders, and must base their explanations on simple and 
observable indicators, particularly the level of earnings. More evidence on earnings 
being a determinant of dividends can be found in, for instance, Nissim and Ziv (2001), 
Brav et al. (2005), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004), Koch and Sun (2004), 
Denis and Osobov (2008), and Skinner (2008). Accordingly, we expect firms to adjust 
their payout ratios to sudden unexpected increases in earnings, and the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the earnings, the higher the payout ratio. 
Consistent with the literature (Allen and Michaely, 2003; Aivazian, Booth and 
Cleary, 2003), the nature of a firm’s assets influences its dividend policy. Specifically, 
gross, regular, and non-regular dividend payments are found to be positively related to 
asset tangibility on the basis that greater tangibility of a firm’s assets facilitates its 
access to public markets, and it thus increases the likelihood that the firm follows 
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Lintner’s pattern of dividend policy. Specifically, Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) 
show that the probability that a firm pays dividends increases with the tangibility of its 
assets. Additionally, as Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) point out, the nature of a 
firm’s assets affects both its financing decision making and its dividend policy. Firms 
with tangible assets can generally more easily access the long-term debt market due to 
the existence of collateral and the consequent ability to secure debt (Scott, 1977). One 
would therefore expect firms with a high proportion of tangible assets to be more 
leveraged, which in turn would affect dividend payments negatively if Hypothesis 2.a 
holds, or positively if Hypothesis 2.b is supported. Therefore, two alternative 
hypotheses concerning the effect of the nature of a firm’s assets on its payout ratio 
should be posed: 
Hypothesis 4a: Firms with a high proportion of tangible fixed assets have lower payout 
ratios (relying on the substitution effect predicted in Hypothesis 2.a). 
Hypothesis 4b: Firms with a high proportion of tangible fixed assets have higher payout 
ratios (relying on the complementarity effect predicted in Hypothesis 2.b). 
Finally, a firm’s size has traditionally been considered among the determinants 
of its dividend policy, and previous evidence seems to confirm that larger firms pay 
higher dividends. There are several arguments justifying the positive relationship 
between size and payout ratio. For instance, larger firms enjoy better access to the 
capital markets and, consequently, are less financially constrained, which allows them 
to pay higher dividends (see, for instance, Holder, Langrehr and Hexter, 1998; Twite, 
2001). Additionally, larger firms are usually mature firms with limited growth 
opportunities that are prone to paying more dividends in order to avoid overinvestment 
(see, for instance, Barclay, Smith and Watts, 1995). Accordingly, Fama and French 
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(2001) show that the largest US firms have higher payout ratios. More recently, Denis 
and Osobov (2008) provide evidence of the positive relationship between the likelihood 
of paying dividends and size. This leads to our next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The larger the firm the higher the payout ratios. 
 
II.1.2 The catering theory of dividends 
 
The characteristics of firms that pay dividends (that is, their levels of free cash 
flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets, and size) should not be separately 
analyzed from certain psychological components, in that an important part of the 
decision to pay dividends may stem from a firm’s desire to satisfy investor expectations. 
This psychological component of dividends is explicitly accounted for in the clientele 
theory. For instance, Shefrin and Statman (1984) extend the work of Thaler and Shefrin 
(1981), and develop the “behavioral life cycle” theory of dividends that relies on 
psychological reasons to explain why investors prefer dividends over capital gains. 
Allen and Michaely (2003) argue that the clientele effects are the very reason for the 
presence of dividends because, as found by Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000), firms 
paying dividends attract relatively more institutional investors and perform better. Polk 
and Sapienza (2004), and Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) also rely on behavioral 
explanations when analyzing the clientele effect. 
The fact is that theoretical and empirical dividend models are increasingly 
incorporating the principles of behavioral finance. Relying on behavioral arguments, 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a) develop a theory according to which firms cater to their 
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investors’ preferences9 such that they pay dividends when dividend payers trade at a 
premium, and do not pay dividends when dividend payers trade at a discount.10 These 
authors find an answer as to why no consensus has been reached in the literature about 
dividends. Specifically, they argue that while the dividend decision may be very 
important, it is even more important to base the direction of this decision on the 
prevailing investor sentiment. This argument strongly supports the catering theory of 
dividends, a new theory according to which investors have sentiments about dividends. 
Providing empirical support for this theory, Baker and Wurgler (2004b) show 
that changes in payout ratios can be explained in terms of what firms denominate as 
“catering incentives,” that is, a measure of market desire for dividend-paying stocks. 
Specifically, they find a connection between the tendency to pay dividends and catering 
incentives. These authors use a market-level variable, the “dividend premium,” as a 
proxy for the value that the market places on dividends (i.e., the premium that investors 
are willing to pay for dividend-paying stocks). The impact of this variable on the 
decision to initiate dividend payments shows that changes in a firm’s dividend policy 
may capture changes in investors’ sentiments about dividend-paying firms relative to 
their sentiment about nonpaying firms. Based on this finding, these authors develop a 
behavioral model, according to which the stock price premium carried by dividend-
payers explains the decision on whether to pay dividends.11 
                                                 
9 According to Baker and Wurgler (2004a), the catering theory and the clientele theory differ in that 
dividends had never been explored via investor sentiment before. Another difference is that the catering 
theory focuses more on the global level of dividends as the result of the demand for shares that pay 
dividends. 
10 Allen and Michaely (2003) provide a comprehensive survey of payout policy research in which 
catering arguments are implicit. 
11 See Li and Lie (2006) for additional evidence on dividend changes being dependent on the dividend 
premium. 
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Baker and Wurgler (2004b) measure relative investor sentiment about dividend-
paying firms by using the difference between the logarithm of the book-value-weighted 
average market-to-book ratio for dividend payers, and the book-value-weighted average 
market-to-book ratio for non-payers. They find a positive relationship between the 
catering incentives, captured by the dividend premium, and the change in firms’ 
propensity to pay dividends. Relying on this new view of dividends, we take a step 
forward and propose a measure of catering incentives at the firm level (see Section 
II.2.3 for more details about the construction of this variable). Therefore, our last 
hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 6: A firm’s payout ratio is positively driven by catering incentives. 
 
 




To test the hypotheses posed in the previous section, we use data from several 
Eurozone countries. We selected an international database, Worldscope, as our source 
of information. Additionally, international data such as the growth of capital goods 
prices, the rate of interest on short-term debt, and the rate of interest on long-term debt, are 
extracted from the Main Economic Indicators published by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
For each country, we construct an unbalanced panel of nonfinancial firms12 
whose information is available for a least six consecutive years from 1986 to 2003. This 
                                                 
12 We restrict our analysis to non-financial firms because financial firms have their own specificity. 
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strong requirement is a necessary condition since we lose one year of data in the 
construction of some variables (see, for instance, Appendix C), we lose another year of 
data because of the estimation of the model in first differences, and four-consecutive-
year data is required in order to test for second-order serial correlation, as Arellano and 
Bond (1991) point out. We must test for second-order serial correlation because our 
estimation method, the GMM is based on this assumption. 
Three of the twelve Eurozone countries13 are excluded from our analysis for 
various reasons. As in La Porta et al. (2000b), Luxembourg is removed from our sample 
because there are only a small number of firms listed on Luxembourg’s stock exchange. 
Greece is excluded because dividends are mandatory in that country. Finally, Finland 
had to be excluded because no sample with the abovementioned requirements could be 
selected. The structure of the samples, by number of firms, and number of observations 
per country, is provided in Table II.1. As shown in Table II.2, the resultant unbalanced 
panel comprises 635 firms and 6,451 observations. Using an unbalanced panel for a 
long period (18 years) is the best way to correct for the survival bias caused by some 








                                                 
13 The Eurozone currently comprises twelve countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 

















Germany 110 17.32 1,153 17.87 
France 107 16.85 1,081 16.76 
Netherlands 91 14.33 943 14.62 
Spain 88 13.86 999 15.49 
Belgium 83 13.07 907 14.06 
Portugal 44 6.93 406 6.29 
Ireland 42 6.61 435 6.74 
Austria 38 5.98 309 4.79 
Italy 32 5.04 218 3.38 
Total 635 100.00 6,451 100.00 
The table shows extracted data from firms for which information is available for at least five 
consecutive years between 1986 and 2003. After removing the first-year data, used only to 
construct several variables (see, for instance, Appendix C), the resultant samples comprise 
110 firms (1,153 observations) for Germany, 107 firms (1,081 observations) for France, 91 
firms (943 observations) for the Netherlands, 88 firms (999 observations) for Spain, 83 firms 
(907 observations) for Belgium, 44 firms (406 observations) for Portugal, 42 firms (435 
observations) for Ireland, 38 firms (309 observations) for Austria and 32 firms (218 


































Structure of the panel 
 
 











18 4 0.63 72 1.12 
17 6 0.94 102 1.58 
16 42 6.61 672 10.42 
15 35 5.51 525 8.14 
14 56 8.82 784 12.15 
13 47 7.40 611 9.47 
12 46 7.24 552 8.56 
11 49 7.72 539 8.36 
10 57 8.98 570 8.84 
9 54 8.50 486 7.53 
8 63 9.92 504 7.81 
7 47 7.40 329 5.10 
6 60 9.45 360 5.58 
5 69 10.87 345 5.35 
Total 635 100.00 6,451 100.00 
Data from firms for which information is available for at least five consecutive years 
between 1986 and 2003 were extracted. After removing first-year data, used only to 
construct several variables (see, for instance, Appendix C), the resultant unbalanced panel 
comprises 635 firms (6,451 observations). 
 
Finally, Table II.3 provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum) of the variables used in the construction of the dependent and 

















Panel A. Tobit model to solve dividends censure 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
PRit .38363 .34093 0.0000 1.0000 
(I/K)it .05651 .08761 -1.14290 .66487 
(CF/K)it .03952 .06031 -.72767 .40246 
(ΔD/K)it .01271 .10017 -1.74563 .64275 
(ΔS/K)it .00433 .02516 -.15017 .87898 
Panel B.Value model to predict catering 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
(V/K)it .63668 .68147 .01405 9.2732 
Dit .09959 .10990 .0000 .82617 
(I/K)it .05651 .08761 -1.14290 .66487 
(CD/K)it .01399 .02217 0 .47295 
Panel C. Catering model of dividends 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
FCFit .05140 .11449 -1.9768 1.1084 
Dit .09959 .10990 .0000 .82617 
NIit .02834 .06211 -.78456 .52176 
TANGit .28850 .18704 .00006 .98799 
SIit 12.6993 1.7785 8.4109 18.5011 
The table provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum) of the variables 
used in the construction of the dependent and explanatory variables. PRit denotes payout ratio, (I/K)it denotes 
investment, (CF/K)it is cash flow, (ΔD/K)it and (ΔS/K)it stand for the increment of debt and shares, 
respectively, (V/K)it is the firm’s value, Dit represents debt ratio, (CD/K)it denotes common dividends, FCFit is 
the free cash flow, NIit denotes net income, TANGit denotes tangible fixed assets, and SIit is size.  
 
II.2.2 Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable in our model is the payout ratio, which is a censured 
variable in that some firms pay dividends, whereas others do not. Note that if we took 
into account only the firms paying dividends, our results would be biased. To solve this 
problem, we predict the payout ratio using an explanatory model for this variable. We 
follow the model provided by Auerbach and Hasset (2003), which is based on the 
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equality of sources and uses of funds, and we obtain the following Tobit model that 
provides us with a prediction of the payout ratio for each period from 1986 to 2003 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itititititit KSBKBKCFKICPR μββββ +Δ+Δ+++= //// 43210                     (1) 
 with PRit = CPRit  if  CPRit >0 
          PRit = 0 if CPRit   ≤ 0 , 
where CPRit is a latent variable observed only when it is positive, whereas we know 
only that it is negative in the remainder of the cases. The explanatory variables for the 
payout ratio are: investment (Iit/Kit), cash flow (CFit/ Kit), increment of debt (ΔBit/Kit), 
and increment of shares (ΔSit /Kit). All explanatory variables are scaled by the 
replacement value of total assets (Kit), calculated as explained in Appendix A.14 
Taking into account that CPRit follows a normal distribution with mean µ and 
variance σ2, and letting 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) βμββββ itititititit XKSBKBKCFKI ′=+Δ+Δ+++ //// 43210  , 






































σπ  , 
where the first term picks up the observations for which PRit> 0 (that is, observations 
for which the payout ratio is observable and, consequently, the density function is 
known), and where the second term refers to the remainder of the observations for 
which the payout ratio is unobservable, and we assume that the function Φ(.) is 
distributed as N (0, 1). 
Table II.4 provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum) of the payout ratios obtained by the maximum likelihood estimation of the 
                                                 
14 The subscript i refers to the firm and t refers to the time period. 
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Tobit model in (1). In addition, the estimation of a Probit model including the same set 
of explanatory variables allows us to check the capacity of prediction of the model in 
(1). As shown in the last column of Table II.4, the percentages of correct classification 
are similar to those reported in previous studies. Additionally, the last row of the table 
displays the summary statistics of the new variable, CPRit, for which the problem of 




Summary statistics of the estimated payout ratios 
 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Correct 
classification 
CPR86 .13018 .42393 -.57906 .72013 100.00 
CPR87 .30365 .17033 -.37441 .53203 87.50 
CPR88 .32129 .10967 .03271 .98574 83.66 
CPR89 .32494 .08542 -.35601 .52085 85.31 
CPR90 .38818 .07495 .05319 .68173 87.63 
CPR91 .40585 .04784 .07295 .58586 84.68 
CPR92 .45219 .13128 -.97013 .66520 82.51 
CPR93 .40188 .25357 -4.1673 .98977 75.29 
CPR94 .28988 .15638 -1.5087 .65421 77.16 
CPR95 .30949 .14072 -1.3781 .72779 77.46 
CPR96 .34289 .13198 -.84888 .77060 78.96 
CPR97 .28807 .08769 -.47661 .46076 79.80 
CPR98 .27967 .09732 -.64811 .50091 78.63 
CPR99 .27442 .12663 -1.9449 .39907 77.27 
CPR00 .27979 .06908 -.29269 .47720 76.36 
CPR01 .38725 .15393 -1.0219 .94066 78.72 
CPR02 .35177 .41456 -5.1497 .60144 78.45 
CPR03 .35567 .22063 -2.2385 .89890 77.73 
CPR total .34023 .17056 -5.14974 .98977  
This table reports summary statistics of the estimated payout ratios. CPR03, for instance, is the payout ratio estimated by using a 
Tobit model for the year 2003 in order to solve the censure problem. Correct classification stands for the percentage of correct 
classification arising from a Probit model that includes the same set of explanatory variables. 
 
II.2.3 Explanatory Variables 
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According to the theories discussed in Section II.1.1, the explanatory variables 
to be entered into our basic model are: free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed 
assets, and size. To capture the potential benefits of dividends as a mechanism to reduce 
the conflicts of interest between owners and managers with respect to the allocation of 
the firm’s free cash flow, our model incorporates a free cash flow index (FCFit), 
obtained from the interaction of cash flow with the inverse of the investment 
opportunities.15 We compute a firm’s cash flow as CFit=NIAPDit+DEPit, where NIAPDit 
denotes net income after preferred dividends, and DEPit represents book depreciation 
expense. Investment opportunities are measured by means of Tobin’s q, calculated as 
qit= (Vit+PSit+MVLTDit+BVSTDit)/Kit, where Vit is the market value of common stock, 
PSit is the value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, MVLTDit represents the market 
value of the long-term debt (see Appendix B), and BVSTDit stands for the book value of 
short-term debt. 
To investigate whether there is a substitution, or a complementary relationship 
between debt and dividends, the debt ratio also enters our model. The debt ratio is 
defined as Dit=MVLTDit/(Vit+PSit+BVSTDit+MVLTDit). We use in the numerator the 
long-term debt, since most arguments in financial theory are related to this type of debt 
(see, for instance, DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006). 
To test Lintner’s (1956) predictions about the relevance of a firm’s earnings for 
its dividend policy, we include the firm’s net income, NIit, in our model, measured as 
NIit=(PIit-ITXit)/Kit, where PIit encompasses all income before taxes, and ITXit, 
represents all taxes levied on income. 
                                                 
15 Details about the interpretation of this index can be found in Miguel and Pindado (2001). 
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Finally, tangible fixed assets (TANGit) are computed as the net book value of 
property, plant, and equipment, scaled by the replacement value of total assets, and size 
(SIit) is the natural logarithm of the replacement value of total assets. 
In accordance with our aims, our model incorporates a variable capturing 
investor sentiment. Specifically, we propose the construction of a variable capturing 
investors’ sentiments at the firm-level that acts as a proxy for this catering effect. 
However, it is difficult to find a variable that captures and measures investor sentiment 
in an objective or definitive way, since sentiment is inherently subjective.16 Given this 
limitation, our measure should be regarded as a firm-level alternative to the variable 
originally proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2004b). 
The starting point for the calculation of this new variable is the following value 
model 
( ) ( ) ( ) itititit KCDIVDKIKV it εαααα ++++= 3210 ,                                                     (2) 
where Iit represents investment (calculated as described in Appendix C), and CDIV it 
common dividends. Assuming that a firm’s market valuation is mainly explained by its 
investment, debt, and dividend decisions, the error term, εit, captures what cannot be 
explained by these three financial decisions and, consequently, is our proxy for the 
firm’s investor sentiment. 
This variable represents our major contribution to the strand of literature 
pioneered by Baker and Wurgler (2004b). Note that these authors propose a measure of 
the market desire for dividend-paying stocks or, in other words, a measure at market-
level of the investor sentiment. Alternatively, we propose a measure of catering 
                                                 
16 Baker and Wurgler (2006, p. 1655) affirm that, “There are no definitive or uncontroversial measures for 
investor sentiment”. 
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incentives at the firm level. Assuming that investor sentiment cannot be objectively 
measured because of its strong psychological component, our proposal is intended to 
overcome this limitation by proxying catering incentives through a variable built upon 
the residue of a value model. In this way, a firm’s market value is expected to be the 
result of its main financial decisions, as well as its investor sentiment regarding 
dividends. 
Table II.5 provides summary statistics for the resultant catering variable for all 
years, obtained by cross-sectionally estimating the model in (2). The last row of the 
table displays the summary statistics of the resultant catering variable, CATit, which will 



















Summary statistics of the estimated catering variable 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CAT86 .0000 .00741 -.33190 .33741 
CAT87 .0000 .04132 -.51434 2.7364 
CAT88 .0000 .09847 -1.2738 3.9961 
CAT89 .0000 .11973 -1.3468 4.4887 
CAT90 .0000 .14999 -1.7954 7.5654 
CAT91 .0000 .12923 -.638263 4.9983 
CAT92 .0000 .10002 -.674895 3.1729 
CAT93 .0000 .09917 -1.1421 2.6332 
CAT94 .0000 .12363 -1.4792 4.4738 
CAT95 .0000 .15705 -2.1455 7.9613 
CAT96 .0000 .18841 -2.2141 5.2106 
CAT97 .0000 .17873 -1.8571 5.4364 
CAT98 .0000 .19392 -2.1252 6.9161 
CAT99 .0000 .23339 -1.8219 8.1605 
CAT00 .0000 .18831 -1.0222 7.6399 
CAT01 .0000 .12530 -1.0556 4.6773 
CAT02 .0000 .09525 -2.5362 3.4662 
CAT03 .0000 .10524 -3.2830 3.7791 
CAT total .0000 .59634 -3.2830 8.1605 
This table summarizes statistics of the resultant catering variable for all years, obtained by cross-sectionally 
estimating the value model in (2). The last row of the table displays the summary statistics of the resultant 
catering variable, CATit, which will enter our dividend model. Note that the catering variable comes from the 
error term of an explanatory value model, and therefore its mean is always zero. 
 
 
II.3 Empirical model and estimation method 
 
Using the dependent variable obtained as explained in Section II.2.2, and the 
traditional explanatory variables described in Section II.2.3, our basic model is as 
follows: 
ititititititit SIZETANGNIDFCFCPR εγγγγγγ ++++++= 543210 ,                             (3) 
where εit is the random disturbance. 
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The basic model in (3) can be easily extended to investigate the existence of the 
catering effect by including the variable CATit, leading to the following extended model: 
itititititititit CATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR εγγγγγγγ +++++++= 6543210 ,             (4) 
Our models are estimated by the panel data methodology. Two issues are 
considered in making this choice. First, unlike cross-sectional analysis, panel data allow 
us to control for individual heterogeneity. This point is crucial in our study because the 
dividend decision is very closely related to the specificity of each firm. In fact, each 
firm has a different propensity to pay dividends, which could be regarded as unobserved 
heterogeneity. Therefore, to eliminate the risk of obtaining biased results, we control for 
such heterogeneity by modeling it as an individual effect, ηI, which is then eliminated 
by taking first differences of the variables. Consequently, the error term in our models, 
itε , is split into four components. First, the above mentioned individual or firm-specific 
effect, ηi. Second, dt measures the time-specific effect by the corresponding time 
dummy variables, so that we can control for the effects of macroeconomic variables on 
the dividend decision. Third, since our models are estimated using data from several 
countries, we also include country dummy variables (ci). Finally, vit  represents the 
random disturbance. 
The second issue we address by using the panel data methodology is the 
endogeneity problem. The endogeneity problem is likely to arise in as far as the 
dependent variable (payout ratio) explains some explanatory variables. For instance, the 
payout ratio may explain leverage on the basis of arguments used to justify reverse 
causality (see Section II.1.1). In fact, Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992), and Moh’d, 
Perry and Rimbey (1998), among others, document a significant effect from dividends 
on debt. Additionally, there are reasons to expect size to be endogenous, since, as Ferris, 
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Sen and Yui (2006) point out, large dividend payers have continued to increase in size 
over the last 10 years. Consequently, endogeneity may be a problem in our models that 
must be controlled for. That is why our models have been estimated using instruments. 
Specifically, we use all the right-hand-side variables in the models lagged from t-1 to t-
4 as instruments for the equations in differences, and t-1 for the equations in levels, as 
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest, when deriving the system estimator used in this 
piece of work. 
Finally, we check for potential misspecification of the models. First, we use the 
Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions in order to test for the absence of 
correlation between the instruments and the error term. Tables II.6 and II.7 show that 
the instruments used are valid. Second, we use the m2 statistic, developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), in order to test for lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-
difference residual. Tables II.6 and II.7 show that there is no problem of second-order 
serial correlation in our models (see m2). Note that although there is first-order serial 
correlation (see m1), this is caused by the first-difference transformation of the model 
and, consequently, it does not represent a specification problem of the models. Third, 
the results shown in Tables II.6 and II.7 provide good outcomes for the following three 
Wald tests: z1 is a test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients; z2 is a test of 










Estimation results of the basic and extended models 
 
 I II 
Constant -.05732* (.018832) -.02273** (.01367) 
FCFit .38534* (.01989) .44124* (.01211) 
Dit .23181* (.01269) .22471* (.00937) 
NIit .22608* (.03379) .07396* (.02011) 
TANGit .21719* (.01167) .21248* (.00925) 
Sit .01955* (.00165) .01682* (.00121) 
CATit   .01781 (.00103) 
z1 431.30 (5) 769.21 (5) 
z2 1277.31 (16) 2250.85 (16) 
z3 35.27 (8) 64.34 (8) 
m1 -3.41 -3.40 
m2 -1.24 -0.98 
Hansen 428.51 (397) 505.19 (510) 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table II.2. The 
variables are defined in Table II.3. The remainder of the information needed to 
read this table is as follows: i) Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard 
error in parentheses. ii) *,**, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively; iii) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance 
of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies, and of the country dummies, 
respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, 
with degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a serial correlation test of order i 
using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation; v) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation 















Estimation results of the moderating role of certain firm characteristics 
 
 
              I     II III 
Constant .0484*** (.02764) -.06136** (.02651) .08452 (.02806) 
FCFit .40301* (.01329) .39978* (.01285) .41178* (.01399) 
Dit .23441* (.01239) .37364* (.01391) .21581* (.01224) 
NIit .10179* (.02114) .13973* (.02194) .05817* (.02238) 
TANGit .27127* (.01118) .27764* (.01167) .25512* (.01145) 
Sit .02595* (.00220) .03002* (.00219) .02414* (.00227) 
CATit  .00446 (.00273) -.13649* (.00584) .01104* (.00135) 
CATitDVit .02325* (.00330) .18262* (.00647) .06480* (.06480) 
t  25.07 14.75 
z1 618.18 (7) 586.61 (7) 411.58 (7) 
z2 1702.17 (16) 1674.44 (16) 1552.86 (16) 
z3 146.34 (8) 131.17 (8) 166.17 (8) 
m1 -3.39 -3.42 -3.39 
m2 -.80 -0.43 -1.09 
Hansen 483.96 (502) 481.59 (502) 475.67 (502) 
The regressions are performed using the panel described in Table II.2. DVit is a dummy variable that takes the 
following values: a) 1 if the level of liquid assets is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise in Column I; b) 1 if 
Tobin’s q is higher than unity, and 0 otherwise in Column II; c) 1 if the free cash flow is above the sample median, 
and 0 otherwise in Column III. The remainders of the variables are defined in Table II.3. The remainder of the 
information needed to read this table is as follows: i) Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in 
parentheses. ii) *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; iii) t is the t-statistic 
for the linear restriction test under the null hypothesis of no significance; iv) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint 
significance of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies, and of the country dummies, respectively, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, with degrees of freedom in parentheses; v) mi is a 
serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
of no serial correlation; vi) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under 














In this section, we first present the results of our basic model in equation (3), 
which includes the explanatory variables that have been traditionally considered 
determinants of a firm’s payout ratio. We then extend this basic model by incorporating 
a variable capturing investor sentiment into model (4). Finally, we test the implications 
of the catering theory by means of several firm characteristics, three in particular: liquid 
assets, investment opportunities, and free cash flow. 
 
II.4.1 Results of the basic and extended models 
 
The results for the GMM estimation of our basic model in (3) are provided in 
Column I of Table II.6. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the level of a firm’s free cash 
flow positively affects its payout ratio. Therefore, consistent with Jensen’s (1986) 
theory, we find that firms with higher levels of free cash flow are encouraged to pay 
more dividends as a way to restrain manager discretion, and to prevent them from 
overinvesting. In agreement with Jensen (1989), the coefficient of leverage is positive, 
and suggests that debt and dividends are complementary agency-cost control 
mechanisms. Therefore, our evidence supports Hypothesis 2b, according to which a 
new issue of debt requires a higher dividend payment in order to limit managerial 
discretion over the new funds and, consequently, to avoid overinvestment in the firm. 
The positive relationship between a firm’s earnings and its payout ratio predicted in 
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed by our results. Consistent with Lintner (1956), firms in our 
sample increase their payout ratios when their earnings rise, in order to get a stable 
pattern of dividends and to avoid dividend cuts. Regarding the nature of the firm’s 
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assets, Hypothesis 4b holds, which supports the above-mentioned results concerning the 
complementary relationship between debt and dividends. That is, firms with more 
tangible fixed assets are more leveraged and, consequently, maintain larger payout 
ratios as a way to control the new funds. Finally, and as expected, the positive 
coefficient on size supports Hypothesis 5, according to which larger firms pay higher 
dividends. 
Column II of Table II.6 presents the results of the GMM estimation of Model 
(4). As shown in this table, the signs of the coefficients of the variables included in the 
basic model remain identical once the catering effect, CATit, is entered into the model. 
In short, a firm’s payout ratio is positively affected by its level of free cash flow, its 
leverage, its net income, its level of tangible fixed assets, and its size. Regarding the 
influence of a firm’s investor sentiment on its payout ratio, the positive coefficient of 
the catering variable confirms Hypothesis 6. Consistent with Baker and Wurgler 
(2004b), this finding highlights the link between the propensity to pay dividends and 
catering incentives. In other words, our result suggests that firms cater to their investors’ 
preferences such that they are more prone to increase payout ratios when investors 
exhibit preference for dividend-paying stocks. This evidence provides empirical support 
for the catering model previously documented in US firms by Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a, b), and Li and Lie (2006), among others. Moreover, this result confirms that, as 
suggested by Von Eije and Megginson (2008), delving into the intricacies of measuring 
the catering effect may lead the catering theory to become as relevant in European 
countries as it is in the US. 
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II.4.2 The moderating role of some firm characteristics 
 
After corroborating the existence of a catering effect with our results, we go a 
step further, and investigate whether certain firm characteristics moderate this effect. 
We then propose a test of the moderating role played by three features – namely, liquid 
assets, investment opportunities, and free cash flow. It is worth noting that, as far as we 
know, there is no prior evidence supporting this view, and providing empirical support 
for this issue is thus one of the major contributions of this research. Despite the lack of 
previous evidence, there are strong arguments that lead us to contend that investor 
preference for dividend-paying stocks changes in accordance with the above-mentioned 
characteristics. 
First, Pinheiro, de Paula and Igan (2006) extend the model of Fama and French 
(2001) by adding a measure of liquid assets, and they find that firms are more likely to 
pay dividends if they have more liquid assets. Furthermore, these authors’ results 
indicate that the decision to pay dividends depends directly on how much importance a 
firm’s managers attach to shareholder preferences and on the firm’s level of liquid 
assets. This leads us to expect that a firm’s liquid assets and its investor sentiment about 
dividends could be related. Specifically, we expect investor preference for dividend-
paying stocks to increase with a firm’s liquid assets. 
Second, it has been widely documented that dividends convey information about 
a firm’s future prospects (see, for instance, Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 
1985; Miller and Rock, 1985). According to signaling arguments, investors are 
optimistic about firms initiating or increasing dividends in that they interpret such a 
decision as meaning that there are valuable investment opportunities that guarantee the 
future distribution of such funds. Additionally, the managerial discretion associated 
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with a high level of intangibles in the firm may make dividends more desirable for 
investors, as a way to control for such discretion. Overall, this leads us to expect 
investor preference for dividends to be stronger for firms with valuable investment 
opportunities. 
Third, as commented on in Section II.1.1, the free cash flow theory proposes that 
dividends lessen the agency costs deriving from the conflicts of interest between 
managers and owners with respect to a firm’s free cash flow. This theory suggests a 
positive relationship between dividends and the level of free cash flow, a relation that is 
confirmed by the results presented in the previous section. Based on this result, and 
given the proven role of dividends in controlling for overinvestment processes, we 
expect investor preference for dividends to be stronger for firms with high levels of free 
cash flow. 
To investigate whether these firm characteristics moderate the catering effect, 
we propose the following model to be estimated: 
( ) ititititititititit DVCATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR ελγγγγγγγ ++++++++= 6543210 ,       (5) 
where DVit is a dummy variable constructed according to the firm’s level of liquid 
assets, investment opportunities, and free cash flow. It is worth noting that in all cases 
whenever the dummy variable equals one and both parameters (γ6 and λ) are significant, 
a linear restriction test is needed in order to know whether their sum (γ6+λ) is 
significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis to be tested in these cases is the 
hypothesis of no significance, H0: γ6+λ=0. 
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Column I of Table II.7 reports the results of the model, including the interaction 
of catering with liquid assets.17 In this case, DVit takes value 1 if the firm’s level of 
liquid assets is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. In this way, the coefficient of 
the catering variable is γ6 for firms with low levels of liquid assets (since DVit takes 
value zero), and γ6+λ for firms with high levels of liquid assets (since DVit takes value 
one). As shown in the table, there is no effect from a firm’s investor sentiment on its 
payout ratio when the firm has low liquid assets (γ6 not significantly different from 
zero). However, the effect is positive and significant for firms with high levels of liquid 
assets (γ6+λ=λ=0.02325, significantly different from zero), which confirms that, as 
expected, investor preference for dividend-paying stocks increases with liquid assets. 
That is, our evidence suggests that investor demand for dividends translates into higher 
payout ratios only in those firms with high liquid assets, whereas firms with low liquid 
assets do not seem to cater to investor preferences. 
The interaction of the catering effect and investment opportunities is tested in 
the model presented in Column II of Table II.7. In this model, DVit takes value 1 if the 
firm’s Tobin’s q is higher than one, and 0 otherwise. As shown in the table, the catering 
effect is negative in firms with non-valuable investment opportunities (γ6=-0.13649), 
whereas this effect turns positive for firms with valuable investment opportunities 
(γ6+λ=0.04613, significantly different from zero, see t). These results point out that the 
expected catering effect clearly manifests itself when there are future prospects for the 
firm, which affords managers the opportunity to exploit the potential divergence 
between inside and market expectations, and which makes dividends more valuable to 
                                                 
17 This variable stands for money available for use in the normal operations of the firm, scaled by the 
replacement value of total assets; it represents the most liquid of all of the firm’s assets. 
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investors. In contrast, non-valuable investment opportunities prevent firms from 
catering to investor sentiment about dividend-paying stocks, probably because the lack 
of positive NPV projects may lead to not being able to maintain high payout ratios in 
the future. 
Finally, we investigate the interaction between the catering effect and the free 
cash flow by estimating the model presented in Column III of Table II.7. In this case, 
DVit takes value 1 if the firm’s free cash flow is above the sample median, and 0 
otherwise. As can be seen in the table, the coefficient of the catering variable is higher 
for firms with high levels of free cash flow (γ6+λ=0.07584, significantly different from 
zero, see t) than for firms with low levels of free cash flow (γ6=0.01104). Therefore, it 
seems that catering incentives (i.e., investor preference for dividend-paying stocks) 
manifests more strongly in firms with high levels of free cash flow, in which dividends 
are much more valuable as an agency-cost control mechanism. This evidence again 
supports Jensen’s (1986) theory. 
Overall, this evidence provides an excellent robustness check for the results of 
the basic and extended models, since the sign of the coefficients of both the traditional 
explanatory variables, and the catering variable remain identical once we control for the 











This study provides a test of the predictions of the catering theory of dividends 
by proposing a new approach for analyzing the effect that investor sentiment exerts on 
corporate dividend policy. Accordingly, a traditional dividend model is extended to 
incorporate an original measure of the catering effect at the firm-level, proxied by the 
error term of a market valuation model. 
Our results show that investor sentiment impacts payout ratios in Eurozone 
member countries after controlling for traditional determinants of dividends, such as the 
free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets, and size. This finding seems to 
indicate that dividend policies are driven to some extent by investor sentiment, thus 
revealing the desire of firm managers to cater to such preferences. Therefore, our 
evidence provides empirical support for a psychological component in the decision to 
pay in Eurozone firms, and it thus provides empirical support for the catering model 
previously documented in US firms. 
Furthermore, this study contributes to an understanding of the implications of 
catering incentives for dividend policies by examining the moderating role played by 
certain firm characteristics. This idea has not been accounted for in previous studies, 
either theoretically or empirically, but our findings corroborate that the way in which 
investors appreciate dividend payments depends on the firm’s liquid assets, investment 
opportunities, and free cash flow. First, investor preference for dividend-paying stocks 
translates into higher payout ratios only in those firms with high liquid assets. Second, 
investor sentiment positively impacts the payout ratio of only those firms with valuable 
investment opportunities, for which investors manifest stronger expectations about 
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receiving higher dividends. Finally, a firm’s free cash flow is a driving force behind 
investor preference for dividend-paying stocks, which is stronger in firms with higher 
levels of free cash flow in that dividends are probably much more valuable as a 






























One of the most important financial decisions that a firm’s managers make is the 
amount and stability of dividends. That is why the dividend policy has long been an 
issue of interest in the financial literature and, in spite of the vast research on the topic, 
it is still an open matter. In fact, dividends have always been a bit of a puzzle in the 
theory of the firm. According to Baker, Powell and Veit (2002b, p. 255), “despite a 
voluminous amount of research, we still do not have all the answers to the dividend 
puzzle.” 
Since Miller and Modigliani (1961) and their proposition of irrelevance in 
perfect capital markets, the financial research has made great efforts to find alternative 
explanations of dividends in imperfect markets. Within this strand of literature, there are 
many works that investigate the important role played by a firm’s characteristics in 
shaping its dividend decision; one of the most remarkable is by Fama and French 
(2001). The question as to why companies pay out dividends has given rise to different 
explanations, the most relevant ones stemming from the agency theory. 
The overinvestment problem that is likely to appear in firms with free cash flow 
is one of the offered explanations for dividends. In this context, the literature shows that 
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more profitable firms pay more dividends,18 while firms with more investment 
opportunities pay less,19 which is consistent with the propositions of Easterbrook (1984) 
and Jensen (1986) about the role of dividends in controlling the agency costs of free 
cash flow. Specifically, Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory states that higher free 
cash flow should lead to higher dividend payments in order to prevent firms from 
overinvesting. Hence there is a positive relationship between a firm’s free cash flow and 
its payout ratio.20 
Agency problems call not only for higher dividends but for more debt, as well. 
In fact, financial literature documents the role played by debt and dividends as agency-
cost control mechanisms (see Ross, 1977; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1986; and 
Harris and Raviv, 1991 for debt; Lintner, 1956; Bhattacharya, 1979; Rozeff, 1982 and 
Jensen, 1986 for dividends). This suggests that debt and dividend may be somehow 
related, although there is no consensus about the way they are related. On the one hand, 
the substitution hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between debt and dividends, 
based on the minimization of agency conflicts without duplicating efforts (see Rozeff, 
1982; Jensen, 1986; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Jensen, Solberg and Zorn, 1992); and 
Chen and Steiner, 1999). On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis points to the 
complementary use of these two mechanisms and consequently, to a positive 
relationship between them (see Jensen, 1989; Eckbo and Verma, 1994; and Zwiebel, 
1996). 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Lintner (1956), Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992), Fama and French (2001), 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004), and Li and Lie (2006). 
19 See, for instance, Wang, Erickson and Gau (1993), or Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995). 
20 The positive relationship between dividends and free cash flow is confirmed by, for instance, 
Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993) and Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998). More recently, Gaspar, Massa 
and Matos (2005) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) document the role played by dividends in 
controlling for overinvestment processes in firms with high levels of free cash flow.  
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Lintner (1956) points to another important explanation of dividends. He argues 
that firms seek to maintain the stability of dividends, and he finds that a firm’s earnings 
are probably the key factor to account for in order to get a stable dividend pattern. 
Consequently, a positive relationship between a firm’s earnings and its dividend 
payments will exist.21 
The nature of a firm’s assets has also been documented as a determinant of 
dividends (see, for instance, Allen and Michaely, 2003; Aivazian, Booth and Cleary, 
2003). According to Scott (1977), firms with a high proportion of tangible assets are 
more leveraged, which will in turn positively or negatively affect dividend payments, 
depending on whether there is a substitution or a complementary relationship between 
debt and dividends. 
Size has also been traditionally considered among the determinants of dividend 
policy, and previous evidence seems to agree that larger firms pay higher dividends 
(see, for instance, Fama and French, 2001 and Denis and Osobov, 2005, 2008). 
More recently, there is the argument that the characteristics of the firms paying 
dividends (that is, their levels of free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets 
and size) should not be separately analyzed from certain psychological components, in 
that an important part of the decision to pay dividends may be due to a firm’s desire to 
satisfy investors’ expectations. In fact, in agreement with the recent trends in the theory 
of the financial behavior, time-varying catering incentives also appear to shed light on 
the “disappearance” of dividends by Fama and French (2001).22 This new explanation 
of dividends has its origin in the catering theory proposed by Baker and Wurgler 
                                                 
21 More evidence on earnings being a determinant of dividends can be found in, for instance, Nissim and 
Ziv (2001), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004), Koch and Sun (2004), Brav et al. (2005), Denis 
and Osobov (2008), and Skinner (2008). 
22 For recent research on disappearing dividends, see for instance, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 
(2004); Amihud and Li (2006), Denis and Osobov (2008), or Hoberg and Prabhala (2009). 
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(2004a), according to which the changes in the amount that companies pay on dividends 
can be explained by what they call “catering incentives”, that is, a measure of the 
market desire for dividend-paying stocks. According to this new theory, when investors’ 
demand for payouts increases, firms are more likely to increase payouts (via either 
dividends or repurchases23). Recent studies (see, among others, Brown and Cliff, 2004, 
2005; Lai, 2004; Denis and Osobov, 2005; Fairchild and Zhang, 2005; Gemmil, 2005; 
Hsieh and Wang, 2006; Cohen and Yagil, 2008; Han, 2008; Hoberg and Prabhala, 
2009) show the growing interest that is lending to this new theory and they suggest that 
investors’ sentiments can be decisive in the resolution of the dividend puzzle. 
There is also literature, although not as much, that refers to the importance of the 
different institutional factors for a firm’s payout. For example, La Porta et al. (2000a) 
obtain empirical evidence that confirms that the corporate dividend policy varies 
according to the legal system, in such a way that stronger legal protection of investors 
leads to higher dividend payouts. 
This evidence is confirmed by Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), who suggest that 
better-protected investors expect more of their firms’ profits to come back to them, 
instead of being expropriated by the entrepreneur who controls the firm. 
There are other institutional factors besides investor protection that have been 
found to be linked to firms’ dividend decisions. For instance, in Zwiebel (1996), 
managers voluntarily pay dividends in order to avert challenges for control, and Pan 
(2007) shows an association between the propensity to pay dividends and measures of 
                                                 
23 In our work we didn't include repurchases because the difficulty of some markets in this type of 
transaction would bias the sample differently from our purpose. As documented by Farinha and López de 
Foronda (2009), historically stock repurchases in most of the European countries have not been a frequent 
event, and most of the stock repurchases up to 1998 happened in the UK. 
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managerial entrenchment based on indices of anti-takeover charter provisions.24 
Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) find that in countries where the stock market is not 
so important in financing firms, changes in dividend payouts are more usual, and they 
document that firms in emerging markets have more unstable dividend payments than 
their US counterparts. The financial literature proposes two different ownership 
concentration systems, revealing a much more concentrated ownership for Continental 
European countries than for the Anglo-Saxon ones. The results in Schooley and Barney 
(1994) and Farinha (2003) point out that there is a relationship between dividends and 
ownership concentration that may change along with the increase of ownership 
concentration, leading to a non-linear relationship between them. Faccio, Lang and 
Young (2001) find evidence on the structure of ownership and control influencing 
dividend policies in European and East Asian firms and show that firms that exhibit a 
wider discrepancy between ownership and control paying higher dividends. 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) claim that dividend payouts decrease with the 
control stake of the largest shareholder, whereas the size of the second-largest 
shareholder is positively related to dividend payouts. Finally, Brennan and Thakor 
(1990), and Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) find that higher dividends lead to a 
higher fraction of shares held by institutional investors, whereas Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005) find that larger institutional ownership does not lead to higher payouts in that 
institutional investors, in contrast to individual investors, tend to prefer a payout policy 
based on stock repurchase rather than on dividend payments.25 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Claessens et al. (2002); Farinha (2003); Hu and Kumar (2004); John and Knyazeva 
(2006), among others, for the relationship between managerial entrenchment and payout policy. 
25 For a review between institutional ownership and corporate dividend policy see, for instance, Han, Lee 
and Suk (1999); Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002), or Ravi (2007). 
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All this research reveals that institutional characteristics, such as investor 
protection, development of capital markets, contestability of the market for corporate 
control, the level of ownership concentration and the effectiveness of boards of 
directors, as well as corporate governance system, are relevant for a firm’s dividend 
decision. This chapter tries to provide broader empirical evidence by examining whether 
these institutional factors shape the implications of the key dividend theories by 
determining managers’ incentives to behave according to their predictions. Note that in 
respect to the catering theory of the dividends, Baker and Wurgler (2004b) claim that 
institutional factors cannot explain the decision of dividends through this theory because 
such factors explain the existence of the clientele effect. More recently, Hsieh and 
Wang (2006) examine empirically the possible impact of the different legal 
environments and the investors’ preferences on the dividend decision. Their results, 
however, do not support the catering theory of dividends, although they show a new 
piece in the construction of the dividend puzzle. 
To analyze all these implications, the focus of our research is to study in-depth 
how the institutional context affects firms’ dividend policies. This analysis rests on the 
premise that the institutional disparity, and the subsequent differences in the nature of 
existing agency problems, leads to differences on the relationship between dividends 
and one of their key and more innovative determinants-that is, the catering incentives. 
In fact, given the growing interest in the new catering theory of dividends, our 
main purpose in this chapter is to investigate how different institutional factors affect 
the evaluation that investors make of the firms and of who decides the allotment of 
dividends and what would lead to differences in the catering effect of dividends in 
different institutional contexts. 
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Hence we offer a study of the impact of several institutional factors on the 
investors’ sentiment that support the catering theory of dividends. As far as we know, 
our work differs from existing literature in that it tries to answer to several unanswered 
questions about the dividends policy from the perspective of catering incentives around 
the world. There is no prior evidence supporting this view, and providing empirical 
support to this issue is thus one of the major contributions of this piece of this work. 
The literature more thoroughly known on these subjects portrays the relationship 
between dividends and institutional variables, almost always for countries usually 
belonging to common law. 
In this context, the aim of our study is to explain how the different institutional 
factors in different corporate governance systems26 affect dividends decisions according 
to a firm’s desire of satisfying investors’ sentiments. Despite the lack of previous 
evidence, there are strong arguments that lead us to argue that investors’ preference for 
dividend-paying stocks changes according to the above-mentioned institutional 
variables. 
The results from the estimation of the model by using the Generalized Method of 
Moments provide interesting results. Consistent with the predictions of the catering 
theory, we find that companies in Eurozone countries and the US, UK, Canada and 
Japan cater to their investors’ sentiments. More interesting, our findings show an 
interaction effect between catering and institutional factors, particularly the legal 
protection of investors, development of capital markets and the orientation of the 
financial systems, the effectiveness of the market for corporate control, the level of 
                                                 
26 We consider Corporate Governance to be a result of several institutional and legal factors: the legal 
protection of investors, the development of capital markets, the role of the market for corporate control, 
the level of ownership concentration and the effectiveness of boards. 
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ownership concentration and the effectiveness of boards of directors. We find a 
substitute effect of external corporate governance mechanisms on catering dividends. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: First, we describe the 
main legal and institutional factors characterizing the corporate governance systems and 
summarize previous literature and empirical evidence on this matter which leads us to 
pose our hypotheses. Section III.2 describes the data and our model of dividends and 
discusses the estimation method. The results are discussed in section III.3 and, finally, 
the concluding remarks are presented in Section III.4. 
 
 
III.1 Institutional features: previous evidence and hypothesis 
 
In what follows, we describe the key institutional factors that may influence a 
firm’s dividend policy and review previous evidence on the matter in order to pose our 
hypotheses about the role played by the institutional context in moderating the 
implications of the main dividend theories. 
 
III.1.1 The legal protection of investors 
 
One of the most widely accepted explanations for the different patterns of 
corporate finance across countries is based on the role played by laws in protecting 
investors. The new institutional economics that has come to be called the Law and 
Finance approach (see La Porta et al., 1998) assumes that the quality of law across 
countries depends on their legal origin. In this way, two legal traditions are identified: 
civil law and common law. On the one hand, civil law has its origin in Roman law and 
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is prevalent in most Continental European countries and in Japan. On the other hand, 
common law is English in origin and includes the UK, the US and Canada, among 
others. According to the results in La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000b, 2002), common 
law countries protect investors better than those with civil law. This piece of evidence 
has given rise to an extensive literature on the efficiency of laws in protecting investors 
(both shareholders and creditors) and on their enforcement across countries (see, for 
instance, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Johnson and Shleifer, 
1999; Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001). 
There are several previous studies revealing that the discussion of the dividend 
policy cannot be separated from legal features. La Porta et al. (2000b) provide evidence 
that the stronger the protection of minority shareholder, the higher the dividend payouts. 
This evidence is consistent with the so-called outcome agency model of dividends, 
according to which firms operating in countries where shareholders’ protection is weak 
pay lower dividends because of the higher agency problems between managers and 
shareholders, whereas in countries where shareholders are more protected, more 
dividends are paid because shareholders are enabled to force managers to disgorge cash. 
This result is corroborated by Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002). However, the dividend 
policy can also be seen as a substitute for the legal protection of investors. According to 
the substitute model, insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends in 
order to establish a reputation for a decent treatment of minority shareholders. 
Supporting this model, Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) find that in countries with weak 
investor protection the allotment of dividends is higher, as a way to limit the 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003) also 
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find significantly higher cash disgorgements in countries where shareholders have little 
legal protection. 
In short, the influence of laws on dividends is a matter of record. However, 
previous evidence on the role played by the legal protection of investors in shaping a 
firm’s dividend policy is somewhat mixed, or even perhaps confusing. For the whole 
exposed literature, we know that payout ratio is systematically related to the degree of 
shareholders’ legal power. To shed light on this matter, we analyze the differences in 
payout ratios across different legal contexts to learn whether the outcome or the 
substitute model applies. On the basis that the different legal features of a country will 
shape managers’ incentives to accommodate payout ratios to the firm characteristics and 
the investors’ sentiments, we pose our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: The degree of investor’s protection will influence the extent to which 
firms cater to their investors’ sentiments.  
To test this hypothesis, we have constructed several indices. The first one, Legal 
Origin index, classifies the countries under analysis according to their legal origin, and 
it takes value 1 if the country is a common law country27 and 0 if it is a civil law one.28 
Within this law-driven approach, additional indices have been proposed to assess the 
effectiveness and quality of enforcement of laws across countries. The second one, 
Anti-director Rights, measures how strongly the legal system favors minority 
shareholders over managers or dominant shareholders.29 Like other previous papers, 
such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999, 2002); Beck et al. (2001) and Leuz, 
                                                 
27 US, UK, Canada and Ireland are common law countries in our study. 
28 Áustria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain are 
civil law countries in our study. 
29 For example, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003), and Hope (2003) find that the presence of strong anti-director 
rights provides an effective deterrent against the manipulation of financial reports because managers 
would be aware that investors might sue them for losses.  
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Nanda and Wysocki (2003), we follow La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) in the construction 
of this index, which results from adding up the scores of six indices referring to the 
protection of minority shareholders.30 The third index, Creditor Rights, is obtained 
following Pindado and Rodrigues (2004), who provide a deeper analysis of the 
insolvency law than La Porta et al. (1998) and also correct some of their indices.31 The 
fourth index proxies for the degree of enforcement of a country’s laws (see La Porta et 
al., 1998; Beck and Levine, 2002; Beck, Demirguç-Kunt and Levine, 2003; Giannetti, 
2003, and Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003) and is constructed through the average of 
Law and Order and Efficiency of Judicial System. The last two indices, Protection of 
Investors and Effective Protection of Investors, are constructed by using the previous 
ones to reinforce the underlying idea.32  
 
III.1.2 Capital Markets 
 
The development of capital markets and the orientation of the financial systems 
are the two main features of capital markets that have been broadly used to establish 
institutional differences across countries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) were the first to 
establish the dichotomy between bank-oriented and market-oriented financial systems 
and since then, a lot of empirical studies on the matter have been developed (see, for 
                                                 
30 Proxy by mail allowed, shares not blocked before meeting, cumulative voting or proportional 
representation, oppressed minorities mechanism, pre-emptive rights, and percentage to call an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. Note, however, that the score of Germany in the Proxy by Mail 
Allowed index and the score of the US in the Cumulative Voting or Proportional Representation index 
reported by La Porta et al. (1998) have been corrected following Miguel, Pindado and de la Torre (2005). 
First, although German shareholders are not allowed to vote by mail, most of them follow this practice, 
when necessary; through their bank (see Vagts, 2002). Second, cumulative voting is not mandatory in 
Delaware corporate law, and it is rarely observed by American firms (Roe, 2002). 
31 Specifically, the score of the United States in the Absolute Priority and Reorganization with Creditors’ 
Consent indices, and the score of Spain in the Absolute Priority index, have been corrected according to 
their respective insolvency laws.  
32 The Protection of Investors index is measured through the average of the Anti-director rights index and 
Creditor rights index; the Effective Protection of Investors is measured by averaging the indices of 
Protection of Investors and Enforcement.  
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instance, Beck and Levine, 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; and Levine, 
2002). Market-oriented systems, such as the ones of the US, the UK and Canada, are 
characterized by well-capitalized stock markets. In contrast, the banking sector is of 
great importance in financing firms, and financial markets are usually small in bank-
oriented countries, such as Continental European countries and Japan. The influence of 
the development of capital markets on the dividend decision has received scarce 
attention in the literature. On the one hand, according to Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1996), in countries with developed stock markets there is a substitution of 
equity for debt financing. This reliance on equity financing makes managers more 
concerned with aligning interests with those of shareholders in order to maintain a good 
reputation in the capital market.  Dividend payments may be a solution to the conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984), hence 
firms operating in developed capital markets are expected to pay higher dividends as a 
way to keep shareholders satisfied and consequently, have their market value increased. 
Asymmetric information problems are also critical for firms in developed stock 
markets. According to signaling theories, higher information asymmetry between 
managers and shareholders leads firms to be more willing to incur costs associated with 
dividend signaling, in that dividends convey management’s confidence about the future 
profitability of a firm and consequently, about dividend stability (e.g., Bhattacharya, 
1979; Talmor, 1981; Miller and Rock, 1985; Bar-Yosef and Huffman, 1986; Nissim and 
Ziv, 2001). All this suggests that dividend distributions enable firms to obtain equity 
financing on favorable terms (John and Williams, 1985), and thus higher dividends are 
expected in market-oriented systems. On the other hand, agency and asymmetric 
information problems in a bank-oriented system are likely to be resolved by internal 
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channels between the firm and its creditors.33 In this context, managers’ bigger concern 
is to be on good terms with the firm’s creditors to be able to obtain future financing. 
Given that dividends cause a transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders, debt 
contracts usually restrict the distribution of dividends in the firm, thus downgrading the 
importance of the dividend decision. Except in La Porta et al. (1998),34 previous 
evidence supports this argument. For instance, Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) 
consider dividends as a substitute for the direct communication between the firm and its 
external investors and find that institutional structures prevalent in developing countries 
make corporate dividend policy a less viable mechanism for signaling future earnings 
and reducing agency costs than in countries with developed capital markets, such as the 
US. Dewenter and Warther (1998) make a similar point by arguing that stable dividend 
payments may not be as important for Japanese that are part of a keiretsu, due to the 
close ties between managers and investors in this kind of bank-based structure. Similar 
results are found by Correia da Silva, Goergen and Renneboog (2005) for the German 
case. They document a smaller signaling role of dividends in Germany, where firms 
with banks as their major shareholders are more willing to omit or cut their dividends 
than firms controlled by other types of shareholders. 
In short, dividend payments are expected to be higher in firms operating in 
market-oriented systems than in firms operating in bank-oriented systems. To go further 
in the effect of capital markets’ development on a firm’s dividend policy, we pose our 
second hypothesis:  
                                                 
33 For example, Roe (1994) finds that in a bank-oriented system, such as the ones in Japan and Germany, 
banks own controlling stakes and play a central role in monitoring and supplying information. Also, 
Gorton and Schmid (2000) find evidence supporting the notion that banks are an important part of the 
corporate governance mechanism in Germany. 
34 La Porta et al. (1998) document that the lack of transparency, inadequate legal infrastructure, and weak 
investor protection in emerging markets all enhance the role of dividends as a reputation mechanism, and 
make the payment of dividends a necessary mechanism to attract capital. 
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Hypothesis 2: Market-oriented systems encourage managers to cater to a larger extent 
to investors’ dividend demand.  
Following Beck et al. (2001) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), we 
have constructed a Market index that takes value 1 if the country is classified as a 
market-oriented system and 0 if it is considered a bank-oriented system. We provide 
four additional indices of capital market development (see Beck and Levine, 2002).The 
first one, Stock Market Capitalization relative to GDP, captures the importance of stock 
markets in the financial system. The second index, Total Value Traded to GDP, is a 
measure of the capital market’s liquidity. Note that common law countries are 
characterized by higher market capitalization and liquidity than those with civil law. 
The last two indices, index of market development and index of banking development, 
were constructed by us using the previous ones to reinforce the underlying idea.35  
In sum, at the macro level, King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), 
and Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) show that financial development promotes growth 
and that differences in legal systems could explain most differences in financial 
development.  
 
III.1.3 Contestability of the market for corporate control 
 
The concept of the market for corporate control as a control mechanism was 
originally suggested by Marris (1963) and Manne (1965), and subsequently, the 
financial theory has traditionally held the assumption that the takeover market plays an 
important role in disciplining management by aligning the interests of owners and 
                                                 
35 The index of market development is measured by the average of the market capitalization to GDP with 
Total Value Traded to GDP, and index of banking development is the average of the ratio of the sum of 
bank liquid liabilities, bank assets and deposit bank domestic relative to GDP. 
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managers.36 First, even the widespread threat of a takeover places the management 
under greater discipline by institutionalizing an evaluation mechanism of corporate 
decision-making. Second, when the threat of an acquisition is not enough to guarantee 
managers' efficiency in the construction of value, the threat is carried out and 
management in charge is substituted. Consistent with previous arguments, the financial 
literature supports the effectiveness of the market for corporate control in resolving 
shareholder-manager conflicts (see, among others, Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Brickley, 
Lease and Smith, 1988, 1994; Jarrell, Brickley and Netter, 1988; Franks and Mayer, 
1996). 
Berglof (1990) and Franks and Mayer (1997) find that one of the biggest 
institutional differences among G-7 countries is the contestability of the market for 
corporate control. Berglof and Burkart (2003, p. 173) affirm that, “while increased 
contestability of control is desirable hostile takeovers are a rather blunt instrument for 
regulation and the market for corporate control is only one of many corporate 
governance mechanisms to be honed in order to promote corporate restructuring in 
Europe.” 
On the one hand, market-based systems are generally characterized by highly 
active markets for corporate control. Specifically, a market for corporate control is 
usually associated with the US and the UK (see Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell, 
Brickley and Netter, 1988 for the US; Franks and Mayer, 1997 for the UK),37 where 
firms’ stock rights are highly decentralized and shareholders have limited influence over 
                                                 
36 See Becht, Bolton and Roell (2003) for a comprehensive review of the conventional corporate 
governance mechanisms that include market for corporate control. 
37 In fact, there is evidence on a substantial number of takeovers in the US and the UK, particularly during 
the nineties (see, for instance, Conn and Connell, 1990; Hopt et al., 2000; and Goergen and Renneboog, 
2004), and although most of the takeovers in these countries are non-aggressive bids, the fraction of 
unfriendly bids is not negligible (approximately 47% for the US, see Cottner, Shivdasani and Zenner, 
1997; and 25% for the UK, see Franks and Mayer, 1996). 
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companies’ operations and management. Something different occurs in the case of 
Canada. Attig and Gadhoum (2003) report that more than 80% of Canadian listed firms 
have controlling shareholders, which make hostile takeovers more difficult. On the 
other hand, an active market for corporate control is virtually absent in bank-based 
systems. As Renneboog (2000, p. 2) argues, whereas in Anglo-Saxon countries 
managerial performance is maintained by the complementary intervention of both 
internal and external control mechanisms, the disciplinary function of the  takeover 
market in Belgium, and in most other Continental European countries, is limited. For 
instance, in countries such as Japan and Germany, the market for corporate control is by 
no means dynamic since stock rights are highly concentrated. Actually, in Germany the 
market for corporate control has not played a significant role in the post-war period 
(Höpner and Jackson, 2001), and only three hostile takeovers occurred during the years 
1945 and 1995 (Franks and Mayer, 1998). In Japan, the influence of banks and the 
strength of cross-shareholdings typical of keiretsus represent the main structural barriers 
to takeovers.38 39 In Japan the ownership concentration is plenty high and the banks are 
the main shareholders being also common the big participations inter-companies 
(Prowse, 1992; Berglof and Perotti, 1994). The market for corporate control is quite 
inactive in this country. In Spain, a weak market for corporate control is dominant. 
Traditionally, the market for corporate control among Spanish firms was practically 
non-existent because of high ownership concentration of quoted firms and poor 
minority shareholder rights. Perotti and Von Thadden (2006) argue that a society with 
                                                 
38 Holmstom and Kaplan (2001), Köke (2004); Grullon, Kanatas and Weston (2004), and Kini, Kracaw 
and Mian (2004) provide more detailed discussions on the market for corporate control.  
39 Morck and Nakamura (1999) point out that the post-war US occupation imposed a dispersed ownership 
structure on Japanese firms. In response to the hostile takeovers and greenmail payments that took place 
in the 1960s and 1970s, a rapid growth of intercorporate equity holdings occurred. For evidence on the 
takeover market in Japan, see Kester (1991), and Kaplan and Minton (1994).  
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more diffused financial wealth should exhibit developed equity markets, strong minority 
protection, and a market for corporate control. They show for a sample of 13 OECD 
countries that in 1970, stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP was highest 
in Britain, Canada, and the US, and lowest in Austria, France, Germany, and Italy, 
closely followed by Belgium. Our results also show that with information for 13 OECD 
countries, given the available information, it seems that Japan, Austria, and Belgium are 
close to Germany and France, while Canada  are closer to the US and the UK.40 
The influence of the market for corporate control contestability on firms’ 
dividend policy is scarcely documented in the literature. Zwiebel (1996) proposes a 
model in which managers voluntarily pay dividends when they are under a constant 
takeover threat. Pan (2007) shows that firms choose a combination of governance 
provisions and dividend policy to maximize value, and that dividend payment that 
reduces a firm’s cash holdings can be used to deter hostile takeovers. De Jong (1997) 
shows empirically, using the 100 larger European companies between 1991 and 1994, 
that firms in countries with active markets for corporate control tend to pay higher 
dividends, while companies in countries where hostile takeovers do not exist pay a 
higher part of net value added in wages. 
This previous evidence suggests higher dividends when there is an active market 
for corporate control, which is consistent with the role played by this market as an 
external control mechanism, capable of bringing down agency costs and mitigating 
                                                 
40 For recent literature, Bebchuk, Cohen and Allen (2005), and Cremers and Nair (2005) examine one 
important dimension of corporate governance, namely, the market for corporate control. They show a 
negative relation between various indices of antitakeover provisions and both firm value and long-run 
stock return performance. However there are authors, for instance, Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), that 
question the exact channels of antitakeover provisions that negatively affect shareholder value.  
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conflicts between shareholders and management. Our third hypothesis relies on this 
assumption and predicts the following:  
Hypothesis 3: In countries with active markets for corporate control, firms will cater to 
a larger extent to their investors’ sentiments.  
We have constructed the Corporate Control variable, which accounts for the role 
played by this market in corporate governance, in order to test this hypothesis. This 
index takes value 1 in countries where an active market for corporate control exists and 
0 otherwise. Note that the coincidence between this index and the Market variable 
defined in the previous section is complete, with the exception of Ireland. In fact, the 
usefulness of the market for corporate control is based on the premise that stock prices 
reflect managerial inefficiencies, thus creating the threat of a takeover.  
 
III.1.4 The level of ownership concentration 
 
With the increased separation of ownership from control, managers frequently 
face very little supervision. In this context, a commitment to a high dividend policy 
attenuates managerial opportunism and forces the firm to frequently intersect with the 
capital markets.  
The separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation has given 
rise to the well-known principal-agent problem, which is the basis of corporate 
ownership being a key governance feature. In fact, financial literature proposes 
ownership structure as one of the main corporate governance mechanisms, especially 
helpful in solving the conflicts of interests between owners and managers and in 
minimizing the associated agency costs. Actually, the interesting point for corporate 
governance is that in an environment of highly dispersed ownership, the individual 
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shareholder has little or no incentive to monitor management. Hence a concentrated 
ownership is considered one of the key mechanisms of corporate governance in that 
larger stakes provide shareholders with enough capability and incentives to undertake 
monitoring activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).  
There are significant differences in corporate ownership patterns across 
countries. These broad differences are documented through different perspectives. For 
instance, La Porta et al. (1998) argues that the extent of investors’ legal protection is 
one of the most important determinants of the choice between concentrated and 
dispersed ownership of corporate shares. In common law countries investor protection 
is reinforced by stronger law enforcement, whereas in countries with weaker investor 
rights higher ownership concentration is needed. Therefore, a relatively high ownership 
concentration in many developed and developing economies may be an equilibrium 
response to a low level of protection of minority shareholders.41 The results in La Porta 
et al. (1998) support this argument and show that the stronger the legal protection of 
shareholders’ rights, the lower the ownership concentration. The concentration of 
corporate ownership is also closely related to questions surrounding stock market 
participation that have attracted considerable interest in the recent literature, for 
example, Ferreira, Ornelas and John (2005), studying the impact of the ownership 
structure of a corporation on the characteristics and efficiency of the market for 
corporate control. These authors explain the operation of the market for corporate 
control and how the structure of ownership affects efficiency. Perotti and Von Thadden 
(2006) show that over the long term, politics drives the development of the equity 
                                                 
41 Recent theoretical and empirical studies relating ownership and payout include, among others, Eckbo 
and Verma (1994); Lucas and McDonald (1998); Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000); Fenn and Liang 
(2001); Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002); Denis and McConell (2003); Farinha (2003); Gugler (2003); 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Perez-Gonzalez (2003), Brav et al. (2005), Grinstein and Michaely (2005), 
Mancinelli, and Ozkan (2006), or Baker et al. (2007), among others. 
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market. Kaustia and Torstila (2008) show a causal link from increased stock ownership 
to increased voting for right-of-center parties, and it is possible that governments use 
this to manipulate the electorate to their own advantage. In fact, the rate of share 
ownership has also been the subject of a large body of literature on stock market 
participation and another example is that by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) that with our 
work shows that the limited participation may be a cause of the equity premium puzzle 
and finds that (nonfinancial) income positively affects the likelihood of participation.42 
As a result, the question as to what facilitates and propels ownership diffusion remains a 
central research question in corporate finance and dividends policy.43 Additionally, 
Pagano and Lombardo (1999), Pagano and Volpin (2001), and Roe (2006) argue that 
political determinants primarily explain differences in ownership concentration. 
However, it is clear that significant differences exist in ownership structures within the 
European Union (Barca and Becht, 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002, and Gugler and 
Yurtoglu, 2003). Moreover, those last authors find that the role of financial institutions 
is scarcely relevant in Spain, France and Italy, because those countries have families 
that usually control most of the firms. In fact, Faccio and Lang (2002) showed that in 
countries in Continental Europe (Civil Law tradition) insider ownership is mostly 
associated with large shareholders who control, through many varied mechanisms such 
as corporate networks or family links. 
The financial literature traditionally distinguishes between two types of 
ownership concentration systems (see, for instance, Moerland, 1995; Kaplan, 1997; 
Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998; Mayer and Sussman, 2001). On the one hand, the so-
                                                 
42 For example, Kothare (1997), and Pham, Kalev and Steen (2003) find that a less concentrated 
ownership structure contributes to market liquidity. 
43 See, for instance, Gugler (2003) on the different impact of government-controlled or shareholder- 
controlled ownership structures on dividend policies.  
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called Anglo-Saxon legal system, prevalent in the US, the UK, and Canada, among 
others, is characterized by dispersed shareholdings and a high level of institutional 
ownership.44 On the other hand, the Continental European model, dominant not only in 
continental European countries but also in Japan, is characterized by concentrated 
ownership, which usually belongs to families and banks. For example, Becht and Mayer 
(2002) report that in more than 50% of European companies there is a single voting 
block of shareholders that commands a majority of shares. In contrast, in the UK and 
US, it is less than 3%.45 
Previous research has focused on the role of corporate ownership in shaping the 
dividends decision. For instance, Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) examine the structure 
of ownership and control, and they find evidence of systematic expropriation of outside 
shareholders’ interests by controlling owners in European and East Asian firms. They 
then try to find how this phenomenon is related to firms’ dividend behavior. What they 
find is that a second large shareholder mitigates agency conflicts in European firms by 
increasing dividend payments, whereas multiple controlling shareholders intensify the 
conflicts of interest in East Asian firms, because they tend to collude in expropriating 
minority shareholders by paying lower dividends. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) claim 
that dividend payouts decrease with the control stake of the largest shareholder, whereas 
the size of the second-largest shareholder is positively related to dividend payouts. More 
                                                 
44 For instance, Morck et al. (2004) review the evolution of corporate ownership in Canada during the 
twentieth century. 
45 These differences between Anglo-Saxon and Continental European countries are corroborated by 
Franks and Mayer (1997). Faccio and Lang (2002) reveal the same results; moreover, they found that the 
role of financial institutions is scarcely relevant in Spain, France and Italy, where families usually control 
most of the firms. See too, Becht and Roel (1999), Mayer and Sussman (2001), Volpin (2002), and 
Aganin and Volpin (2003). 
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recently, Khan (2006) obtains results consistent with dividends being a substitute for 
poor monitoring by a firm’s shareholders.46 
We focus on the differences in ownership concentration levels across countries 
and expect higher dividends in firms with more concentrated patterns, on the basis of 
ownership concentration being a monitoring device of managerial discretion. This 
monitoring effect leads us to pose our fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The higher a firm’s ownership concentration, the larger the extent to 
which firms cater to their investors’ sentiments. 
In our study we have constructed, following La Porta et al. (1998), an index 
measuring Ownership Concentration.47 This index reveals a high level of ownership 
dispersion in common law countries, whereas ownership is much more concentrated in 
those with civil law, except for Japan. 
 
III.1.5 The effectiveness of boards of directors 
 
The function of the board of directors in the corporate governance is to protect 
shareholders’ interest and discipline management. If the board succeeds in carrying out 
its implementation and ratification roles, it will ensure that shareholder interests are 
safeguarded. However, if the functioning of this internal control mechanism is weak or 
inadequate, shareholder interests will become of secondary importance and managers’ 
discretionary activity will increase. Thus, if boards of directors fail, shareholders suffer 
                                                 
46 In the same vein, Fenn and Liang (2001) report that firms with low managerial stock-option holdings 
have significantly higher dividend and total payout ratios (including repurchases). This result could be 
due to the lack of “dividend protection” afforded by most executive stock option contracts (Lambert, 
Lanen and Larker, 1989).  
47 Some recent papers by Carlin and Mayer (2003), and Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) also used the 
same index. 
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because of the combined effects of costly discretionary behavior, poor financial 
performance and a falling stock market valuation.  
In short, this internal control mechanism represents an alternative way of 
restricting potential conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders. There 
seems to be no disagreement on the need for monitoring and control by boards of 
directors; however, their effectiveness differs considerably across countries, which 
allows us to establish institutional differences according to two key features: the 
composition of the board and its internal structure. In fact, several academic studies 
show that board composition varies with firms’ characteristics and the institutional 
environment (for example, Brickley and James, 1987; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; 
and Denis and Denis, 1994) and suggest a homogeneous composition, therefore that 
may be optimal for some firms but not for others.48 The composition of the board is 
critical to its efficacy in that the more independent the board members, the greater its 
effectiveness in monitoring management. In this context, a considerable body of the 
ongoing debate in the US and the UK deals with the optimal composition of the board 
of directors.49 Actually, Anglo-Saxon boards have been generally considered a 
competent control mechanism because of their independence of management, since the 
designation of independent or non-executive directors constitutes a widespread practice 
in these countries.50 In contrast, the role of boards of directors in most Continental 
European countries may be questioned, given the lack of clear regulation.51 
                                                 
48 See Bhagat and Black (1999, 2002); Denis and Sarin (1999); Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), and 
Raheja (2005) for an extensive review of board structure and function. 
49 See, for instance, for a recent research on corporate boards, Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008), 
although in another perspective, of value. They find that firm value is positively correlated with the 
fraction of directors unaffiliated with dominant shareholders, especially in countries with weak legal 
protection for minority shareholders. 
50 More details can be found in Prowse (1995) and Morck (2004). 
51 In a recent and interesting study, Adams and Ferreira (2007) show a theory of friendly boards from 
cross countries variation on board structure. They argue that shareholders should be allowed to choose 
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In fact, given the diversity of board structure among several countries in our 
study, we used the term board in a broad sense; in other words, as an internal 
mechanism of corporate governance with either management, monitoring or supervisory 
functions. We should stress that the obvious difficulty of classification of the “boards” 
in the different countries is attested by the fact that they do not always adjust their 
characteristics to legal systems or guidelines and principles accepted and globally 
recognized.52 
Where shareholdings are highly concentrated, as occurs in Continental European 
countries and Japan, non-executive directors may be considered as a mechanism to 
control majority shareholders, but without them being able to actively take part in the 
firm’s decision-making process. This is why boards are rarely composed of independent 
directors in these countries. Although boards in most European counties are evolving 
towards an effective governance mechanism thanks to the various Codes of Best 
Practice,53 they are still far from this concept because the greater presence of controlling 
                                                                                                                                               
between board structures (sole board system or dual board system) and their model illustrates that 
shareholders are always at least slightly better off if the board has an advisory role. 
52 The diversity of board structures among IOSCO members and the OECD Principles' recognition that 
there are potentially many differences, and in that measured the studies on this matter should cover non-
executive board members of companies with unitary boards; members of supervisory (i.e., non-executive) 
boards of companies with dual board structures; and members of the board of auditors elected by 
shareholders (which exist, for example, in Italy, Japan and Portugal): See IOSCO (2002), and OECD 
(2004). 
53 As documented by Ho Chi-Kun (2005, p 212), internationally, many corporate governance guidelines 
and codes of best practices have been published by supra-national agencies, for example: the 
Commonwealth Guidelines (CACG, 1999); the OECD (1999) Principles; the World Bank Framework for 
Implementation, 1999), national regulatory bodies (e.g. the French Vienot Commission’s 
Recommendations (AFG-ASFFI, 1998 and amended 2001); the German Code (GPCG, 2000); the 
Japanese Principles (CGFJ, 1997 and revised 2001); the UK Combined Code of Best Practice (CCGUK, 
2000)), and non-regulatory institutions (e.g. the CalPERS (1997 and revised 1999) Principles and 
Guidelines; the TIAACREFF (2000) policy statement; the European Shareholders Association’s 
Guidelines (ESA, 2000); the International Corporate Governance Network’s Statement (ICGN, 1999); the 
Business Roundtable (1997) Statement). The website of European Corporate Governance Institute 
(http://www.ecgi.org) provides a full list of these international guidelines, among others. 
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shareholders there makes it difficult to comply with these Codes’ voluntary 
requirements. 
Besides composition, the internal structure of the board is also fundamental for 
the effectiveness of this mechanism in corporate governance. In this sense, the existence 
of a one-tier or a two-tier board structure plays a key role in guiding and supervising a 
company. Firms in Anglo-Saxon countries (specifically the US, the UK and Canada 
(Hopt and Leyens, 2004; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; and Dargenidou, Mcleay and 
Raonic, 2007) and in most European countries except Germany, the Netherlands 
(Renneboog, Franks and Mayer, 2001 and Chirinko et al., 2004), and Denmark have 
adopted the unitary board structure, which implies that all board members are 
considered to be in the same position since they manage the company and also 
supervise its activity. There is thus no distinction between managing and supervisory 
functions. In contrast, the two tier structure is characterized by the existence of two 
bodies, an executive board and a supervisory board, which guarantees that the last is 
separated from and independent of management. In fact, although in general both the 
unitary board of directors and the supervisory body in the two-tier structure are elected 
by shareholders, and that there is usually a supervisory function and a managerial 
function under both structures, the distinction between these two functions is indeed 
more formalized in the two-tier structure. 
There is not previous empirical evidence, as far as we know, on the structure and 
composition of boards being determinants of a firm’s dividend policy. However, given 
that there is no disagreement on the key role played by this mechanism in protecting 
shareholders from managers’ abuses, higher dividends are likely to be found in firms 
with independent and two-tier structures in that they are assumed to better monitor 
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managers in shareholders’ interests. This argument leads us to pose the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: Independent boards and two-tier boards will lead managers to better fit 
their dividends to investors catering incentives.  
To consider the role played by boards of directors in our analysis, we have 
constructed the Board variable: a score of 1 is assigned to a country with a predominant 
two-tier board structure or when non-executive directors represent a significant 
proportion on boards,54 and 0 otherwise. The control over the behavior of managers will 
be more effective when there is a clearer distinction between the 'supervisor' and those 
being 'supervised'.  
 
III.1.6 Corporate Governance 
 
Research on corporate governance has identified a number of mechanisms 
intended to insure that management acts in the best interests of shareholders, and these 
can include external and internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
In fact, the relationship between corporate governance and dividend policy has 
recently been emphasized by La Porta et al. (2000a); Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), 
Holmstom and Kaplan (2003), and Correia da Silva, Goergen and Renneboog (2004), 
among others. La Porta et al. (2000a) explain for 33 countries the economic basis for 
testing for a relationship between dividends and quality of governance, highlighting two 
considerations with opposite implications for the sign of this relationship. On one side, 
these authors describe an outcome model that leads to the prediction of a positive 
relationship between dividends and the quality of governance. They interpret their 
                                                 
54 Both rules prevent those supervised from being supervisors, and thus lead to independent boards of 
directors. In fact, an outside-dominated board can be considered as coming close to the two-tier board 
regime (Wymeersch, 1998; and Hopt et. al., 2000). 
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evidence of higher dividends in well-governed firms as a result of effective pressure by 
minority shareholders on insiders to release cash. On the other hand and in opposition of 
the outcome model, the substitute view expected a negative relationship; that is, weak 
governance increases the need to pay out cash as dividends in order to overcome agency 
problems.55 Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) find large negative effects of announced 
dividend changes in German companies where corporate insiders have more power. 
Correia da Silva, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find a U-shaped relationship such that 
dividends first decrease and then increase with the voting share of the largest owner. In 
fact, most theoretical and empirical corporate governance studies use U.S data. We can 
see an exception in Denis and McConnell (2003), who provide a most comprehensive 
international literature review on corporate governance, and the lack of cross-country 
European studies is quite evident. Faccio and Lang (2002) is another exception, as they 
examine ownership structure throughout Europe. 
More recently, John and Knyazeva (2006) show evidence that dividends and 
total payouts (i.e., the sum of dividends and repurchases) are significantly higher when 
internal and external governance measures indicate weak governance. So we understand 
the type of monitoring mechanism is relevant for predicting dividends payouts.  Those 
authors find that firms with weak corporate governance on average pay higher 
dividends. Managers faced with a high takeover threat (external monitoring) are more 
likely to repurchase and tend to repurchase more on average. On the other hand, strong 
internal governance (board) allows more accurate following of managerial actions and 
is associated with fewer cash distributions. They also find that the incidence of payouts 
is significantly lower among firms with better governance because these firms face 
                                                 
55 See, for instance, the traditional models of Rozeff’s (1982), and Jensen’s (1986) with managers versus 
shareholder agency conflict. 
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lower agency costs of free cash flows and conclude that in the presence of high agency 
costs, governance plays a greater role in determining corporate payout. 
In the same line of reasoning, Tse (2004) questions the logic of the relationship 
between agency costs and dividend policy in the outcomes model – if well-governed 
firms are more likely to pay dividends as La Porta et al. (2000a) suggest, then 
shareholders shouldn’t need to rely on the payment of dividends to reduce the agency 
costs of free-cash-flow, because such costs should already be low for well-governed 
firms. 
Other authors such as Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003); Cremers and Nair 
(2005); and Yermack (2006) show that companies with weak corporate governance 
have lower security returns than companies with strong corporate governance. The 
results of Giannetti and Simonov (2006), also find that investors expect lower returns 
from companies with weak corporate governance. The several arguments given above 
by the literature described lead us to pose our last hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 6: Governance characteristics will moderate the extent to which firms cater 
to their investors’ sentiments. 
To test the hypotheses posed we construct a joined index of corporate 
governance that is measured by averaging the indices of ownership by three largest 














To test the hypotheses posed in the previous section, we use data from several 
Eurozone countries, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan, which represent 
a great variety of institutional environments. 
We have thus used an international database, Worldscope, as our principal source 
of information. Additionally, international data such as the growth of capital goods prices, 
the rate of interest of short term debt, and the rate of interest of long term debt, have been 
extracted from the Main Economic Indicators published by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Since our study is intended to present a wide variety of institutional environments, 
we selected fifteen representative countries and for each country we constructed an 
unbalanced panel of non-financial companies from 1990 to 2003.  
Three countries have been excluded from our analysis for different reasons. As 
occurs in La Porta et al. (2000b), Luxembourg has been removed from our sample 
because there are just a few firms listed in Luxembourg’s stock exchange, and Greece 
because dividends are mandatory in this country. Finally, Finland had also to be excluded 
because no sample with the above-mentioned requirement could be selected. The 
structure of the samples by number of companies and number of observations per country 
is provided in Table III.1. As shown in Table III.2, the resultant unbalanced panel 
comprises 3000 companies and 20,395 observations.  






Structure of the samples by countries 
 







Germany 427 14.23 4,263 20.90 
France 391 13.03 3,812 18.70 
Netherlands 137 4.57 1,412 6.92 
Spain 99 3.3 1,046 5.13 
Belgium 83 2.77 841 4.12 
Portugal 43 1.43 366 1.80 
Ireland 43 1.43 438 2.15 
Austria 57 1.9 561 2.75 
Italy 135 4.5 1,316 6.45 
US 535 17.83 2,140 10.49 
UK 560 18.68 2,240 10.98 
Canada 79 2.63 316 1.55 
Japan 411 13.7 1,644 8.06 
Total 3,000 100.00 20,395 100.00 
Data of companies in Eurozone countries and US, UK, Canada and Japan were extracted. The 
resultant samples comprise 427 companies (4,263 observations) for Germany, 391 companies 
(3,812 observations) for France, 137 companies (1,412 observations) for the Netherlands, 99 
companies (1,046 observations) for Spain, 83 companies (841 observations) for Belgium, 43 
companies (366 observations) for Portugal, 43 companies (438 observations) for Ireland, 57 
companies (561 observations) for Austria,  135 companies (1,316 observations) for Italy, 535 
companies (2,140 observations) for US, 560 companies (2,240 observations) for UK, 79 





























Structure of the panel 
 











14 327 10.90 4,578 22.44 
13 99 3.30 1,287 6.31 
12 99 3.30 1,188 5.83 
11 93 3.10 1,023 5.02 
10 119 3.97 1,190 5.83 
9 135 4.50 1,215 5.95 
8 159 5.30 1,272 6.24 
7 129 4.30 903 4.43 
6 124 4.13 744 3.65 
5 131 4.40 655 3.21 
4 1,585 52.80 6,340 31.09 
Total 3,000 100.00 20,395 100.00 
Data from firms for which information is available for at least five consecutive years between 
1990 and 2003 were extracted. After removing first-year data, used only to construct several 
variables, the resultant unbalanced panel comprises 3000 companies (20,395 observations). 
 
Table III.3 provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and 






Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
FCFit .04239 .11581 -1.1651 1.9621 
Dit .10094 .11518 .0000 .89555 
NIit .02199 .07218 -.84731 .62594 
TANGit .27837 .18929 .00008 .99679 
SIit 13.0143 1.9605 8.4024 20.3265 
CATit .0000 .74661 -6.0792 8.8978 
The table provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum) of the variables 
used in our analysis. FCFit , is the free cash flow, NIit denotes  net income, TANGit denotes tangible fixed assets, 
and SIit is the size 




III.2.2 Empirical model and estimation method 
 
Using the dependent variable, payout ratio, obtained as explained in previous 
chapter in Section II.2.256, and the traditional explanatory variables mentioned in 
Section II.2.357, as well as the catering variable obtained through the value model 
(explained in the same chapter, in section II.2.3) our basic model is as follows: 
itititititititit CATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR εγγγγγγγ +++++++= 6543210 ,             (1) 
 
Additionally, and in accordance with the aim of our study, we investigate 
whether or not several institutional characteristics moderate the catering effect, and for 
that we propose the following model to be estimated: 
 
( ) ititititititititit DVCATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR ελγγγγγγγ ++++++++= 6543210 ,     (2) 
where DVit is a dummy variable constructed according to the institutional characteristics 
of legal protection of investors; development of capital markets and/or market-oriented 
financial system and bank-oriented, active markets for corporate control; the level of 
ownership concentration; effectiveness of boards of directors, and corporate 
governance. It is worth noting that in all cases whenever the dummy variable equals one 
and both parameters (γ6 and λ) are significant, a linear restriction test is needed in order 
to know whether their sum (γ6+λ) is significantly different from zero. The null 
hypothesis to be tested in these cases is the hypothesis of no significance, H0: γ6+λ=0. 
In fact, in our study we have constructed different indices, in accordance with Section 
III.1, that we can see in Table III.4. 
                                                 
56 Once the dependent variable is a censured variable in that some companies pay dividends whereas do 
not, we predicted a Tobit model following Auerbach and Hasset (2003). 
57 For more details about measures used, see once more, the previous chapter in Section II.2. 




































Germany 2.00 3.00 7.32 2.50 6.10 0.24 0.28 0.48 0.94 0.48 0
France 3.00 0.00 6.89 1.50 3.45 0.33 0.17 0.34 0.85 0.34 0
Netherlands 2.00 2.00 8.00 2.00 5.33 0.69 0.43 0.61 0.95 0.39 0
Spain 4.00 1.00 5.78 2.50 4.81 0.30 0.23 0.40 0.80 0.51 0
Belgium 0.00 2.00 7.85 1.00 2.62 0.36 0.05 0.23 0.81 0.54 0
Portugal 3.00 1.00 5.99 2.00 3.99 0.13 0.05 0.17 0.68 0.52 0
Austria 2.00 3.00 7.85 2.50 6.54 0.12 0.08 0.25 1.03 0.58 0
Italy 1.00 2.00 6.19 1.50 3.10 0.17 0.08 0.22 0.64 0.58 0
Japan 4.00 3.00 7.49 3.50 8.74 0.79 0.28 0.55 1.46 0.18 0
Ireland 4.00 1.00 6.53 2.50 5.44 0.26 0.14 0.30 0.39 0.39 0
U.K. 5.00 5.00 7.29 5.00 12.14 1.13 0.55 0.82 1.09 0.19 0
U.S. 4.00 1.00 8.00 2.50 6.67 0.80 0.62 0.75 0.66 0.20 0
Canada 5.00 1.00 7.78 3.00 7.78 0.59 0.29 0.49 0.66 0.40 0
Sample 
average 3.00 1.92 7.15 2,46 5.90 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.84 0.41 0
The resultant table of institutional factors comprises a different index constructed in accordance with section III.1. Anti-director Rights measures how strongly the legal system favors minority 
shareholders over managers or dominant shareholders; Creditor Rights, is obtained following Pindado and Rodrigues (2004); the third index, proxy the degree of enforcement of a country’s laws 
constructed through the average of Law and Order and Efficiency of Judicial System. The last two indices, protection of investor and effective protection of investor were constructed by us using the 
previous ones to reinforce the underlying idea. We provide four additional indices of capital market development (see Beck and Levine, 2002). The first one, Stock Market Capitalization relative to 
GDP, captures the importance of stock markets in the financial system. The second index, Total Value Traded to GDP, is a measure of the capital market’s liquidity. The last two indices, index of 
market development and index of banking development, were constructed by us using the previous ones to reinforce the underlying idea. Following La Porta et al. (1998), we constructed an index 
measuring Ownership Concentration. Finally we constructed a corporate governance index. 
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All our models have been estimated by using the panel data methodology. Two 
issues have been considered in making this choice. First, unlike cross-sectional analysis, 
panel data allow us to control for individual heterogeneity and to eliminate the risk of 
obtaining biased results because of such heterogeneity (Moulton, 1986, 1987).  This 
point is crucial in our study because the dividend decision is very closely related to the 
specificity of each company. Specifically, we have controlled for heterogeneity by 
modeling it as an individual effect, ηi, which is then eliminated by taking first differences 
of the variables. Consequently, the error term in our models, itε , has been split into four 
components: first, the above-mentioned individual or firm-specific effect, ηi. Second, dt 
measures the time-specific effect by the corresponding time dummy variables, so that 
we can control for the effects of macroeconomic variables on the dividend decision. 
Third, since our models are estimated using data of several countries, we have also 
included country dummy variables (ci). Finally, vit  is the random disturbance. The 
second issue that we can deal with by using the panel data methodology is the 
endogeneity problem. The endogeneity problem is likely to arise in that the dependent 
variable (payout ratio) may also explain some of the explanatory variables.  Finally, we 
have checked for the potential misspecification of the models. First, we use the m2 
statistic, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991), in order to test for lack of second-
order serial correlation in the first-difference residual. Tables III.5, III.6, III.7, and III.8 
show that there is no a problem of second-order serial correlation in our models (see 
m2). Note that although there is first-order serial correlation (see m1), this is caused by 
the first-difference transformation of the model and consequently, it does not represent a 
specification problem of the models. In second place, our results in Tables III.5, III.6, 
III.7, and III.8 provide good results for the following three Wald tests: z1 is a test of the 
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joint significance of the reported coefficients; z2 is a test of the joint significance of the 





Estimation results of the basic model 
 
 I 
Constant -.36405* (.01820) 
FCFit .12729* (.02933) 
Dit .00847 (.01817) 
NIit .20477* (.05143) 
TANGit .03098** (.01202) 
Sit .00398* (.00146) 
CATit  .01436* (.00268) 
z1 63.08 (6) 
z2 669.39 (12) 
z3 10.88 (11) 
m1 -5.37 
m2 -0.65 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table 
III.2. The variables are defined in Table III.3. The rest of the 
information needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity 
consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) *,** and *** 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) 
z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients, of the time dummies and of the country dummies, 
respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; iv) mi is a serial 
correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, 














Estimation results of the moderating role of the legal protection of investors 
 
 I II III IV V VI 
Constant -.3679* (.01495) -.3599*(.01563) -.3859* (.01575) -.3608* (.01675) -.3596* (.01615) -.3557* (.01645) 
FCFit .06793* (.01945) .12132* (.02411) .13536 * (.02740) .13873* (.02679) .10148* (.02534) .12884* (.02588) 
Dit .03071* (.00987) .02842*** (.01526) .01258 (.01574) .00541 (.01663) .01507 (.01623) .00769 (.01637) 
NIit .37866* (.01736) .29814* (.03813) .19761 * (.04509) .25902* (.04492) .32389* (.04306) .27232* (.04278) 
TANGit .01139 (.00997) .01225 (.00941) -.00669 (.00976) .01887*** (.01663) .02429** (.01038) .02441** (.01063) 
Sit .00393* (.00118) .00437* (.00125) .00320 * (.00126) .00449* (.00134) .00446* (.00128) .00469* (.00131) 
CATit  .01316* (.00234) .01444 *(.00242) .00856 ** (.00357) .03954* (.00420) .01605* (.00238) .02157* (.00252) 
CATitDVit -.00794* (.00269) -.01916* (.00418) .01219 * (.00426) -.03863* (.00470) -.00747** (.00379) -.02078* (.00377) 
t 3.66 -1.34 7.91 .378 2.61 .255 
z1 237.24 (7) 60.77 (7) 50.14 (7) 76.78 (7) 68.34 (7) 67.01 (7) 
z2 1001.58 (12) 776.19 (12) 794.46 (12) 736.00 (12) 748.03 (12) 771.93 (12) 
z3 14.05 (11) 17.15 (11) 10.83 (11) 9.20 (11) 11.23 (11) 8.69 (11) 
m1 -5.33 -5.35 -5.31 -5.36 -5.34 -5.35 
m2 -.66 -.65 -.60 -.58 -.66 -.65 
 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table III.2. DVit is a dummy variable that takes the following values: a) 1 for common law countries 
and 0 for civil law countries in Column I; b) 1 if the index of anti-director rights is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in Column II; c) 1 if the index of 
creditor  rights is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in Column III; d) 1 if the index of enforcement is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in Column IV; 
e) 1 if the index of protection investor is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in Column V; f) 1 if the index of effective protection investor is above the sample 
mean, and 0 otherwise in Column VI. Note these indices are defined in Table III.4. The remainder of the variables is defined in Table III.3. The rest of the 
information needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively; iii) t is the t-statistic for the linear restriction test under the null hypothesis of no significance; iv) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint 
significance of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies and of the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; v) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under 
the null of no serial correlation.  
 





Estimation results of the moderating role of the development of capital markets and the contestability of market for corporate control 
 
              I II III IV V VI 
Constant -.3484* (.01595) -.3512* (.01587) -.3613* (.01582) -.3555* (.01679) -.3905* (.01657) -.3377* (.01949) 
FCFit .11946* (.02248) .12954* (.02284) .10996* (.02705) .13621* (.02608) .15493* (.02696) .09933* (.03591) 
Dit .01376 (.01609) -.00014 (.01592) .00484 (.01598) .00696 (.01632) .01134 (.01668) -.00503 (.02066) 
NIit .31572* (.03523) .27864* (.03616) .24288* (.04599) .26625* (.04458) .27255* (.04340) .27516* (.04952) 
TANGit .02397** (.01066) .02231** (.01051) .02082** (.01052) .02271** (.01077) .01625 (.01052) .02174*** (.01316) 
Sit .00550* (.00127) .00549* (.00125) .00442* (.00126) .00475* (.00135) .00222** (.00133) .00652* (.00157) 
CATit  .01677* (.00322) .02532* (.00344) .01989* (.00362) .02996* (.00380) .00186 (.00339) .01379* (.00354) 
CATitDVit -.01241* (.00321) -.02218* (.00342) -.01089* (.00409) -.02529* (.00422) .02015* (.00414) -.01087* (.00365) 
t 3.52 2.54 3.72 2.12 8.16 1.68 
z1 88.82 (7) 86.41 (7) 50.66 (7) 73.15 (7)  71.31 (7) 35.62 (7) 
z2 729.74 (12) 733.92 (12) 795.53 (12) 746.80 (12)  747.24 (12) 599.22 (12) 
z3 12.81 (11) 12.26 (11)  11.29 (11)  9.78 (11)   14.53 (11) 8.73 (11) 
m1 -5.37 -5.36 -5.29 -5.36 -5.39 -5.30 
m2 -.64 -.61 -.60 -.59 -.73 -.65 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table III.2. DVit is a dummy variable that takes the following values: a) 1 if the country is classified as a market-oriented 
system and 0 if it is considered a bank-oriented system in column I; b) 1 if the index of market capitalization to GDP is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in Column II; c) 1 if the 
index of total value traded to GDP  is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in Column III; d) 1 if the index of market development  is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in 
Column IV;  e) 1 if the index of banking development  is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in Column V;  f) 1 in countries where an active market for corporate control exists, 
and 0 otherwise in Column VI. Note these indexes are defined in the Table III.4. The remainder of the variables is defined in Table III.3. The rest of the information needed to read this 
table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) t is the t-statistic for 
the linear restriction test under the null hypothesis of no significance; iv) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies and of the 
country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, degrees of freedom in parentheses; v) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals 
in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 




Estimation results of the moderating role of certain institutional characteristics 
(ownership concentration, independent director of boards and corporate 
governance) 
 
 I II III 
Constant -.3672* (.01588) -.3583* (.01653) -.3521* (.01572) 
FCFit .14382* (.02653) .10286* (.02575) .10385* (.02473) 
Dit .01557 (.01538) .00411 (.01672) .01277 (.01554) 
NIit .20439* (.04186) .32892* (.04299) .28613* (.03674) 
TANGit .00343 (.01039) .03195* (.01079) .01077 (.01057) 
Sit .00444* (.00127) .00430* (.00131) .00554* (.00125) 
CATit  .00774* (.00178) .00329 (.00318) .01755* (.00287) 
CATitDVit .01097* (.00368) .01228* (.00370) -.01451* (.00294) 
t 5.62 6.28 2.31 
z1 51.83 (7) 67.20 (7) 60.92 (7) 
z2 746.82 (12) 749.29 (12) 780.82 (12) 
z3 11.39 (11) 10.55 (11) 12.31 (11) 
m1 -5.32 -5.35 -5.32 
m2 -.60 -.66 -.62 
The regressions are performed by using the panel described in Table III.2. DVit is a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if the index of ownership concentration is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in 
Column I. In column II, DVit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for countries with a predominant 
two-tier board or when non-executive directors represent a significant proportion on boards and 0 
otherwise. DVit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the index of corporate governance is above 
the sample mean, and 0 otherwise in Column III. The indexes of the column 1 and 3 are described in 
the Table III.4. The remainder of the variables is defined in Table III.3. The rest of the information 
needed to read this table is: i) Heteroskedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) 
*,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; iii) t is the t-statistic for the 
linear restriction test under the null hypothesis of no significance; iv) z1, z2 and z3 are Wald tests of the 
joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies and of the country dummies, 
respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no significance, degrees of freedom in 
parentheses; v) mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically 





In this section, we first present the results of model in equation (1), which 
includes the explanatory variables that have been traditionally considered as 
determinants of a firm’s payout ratio at the same time that they also incorporate a 
variable capturing investors’ sentiment, that is, the catering variable. We then extend 
this model, and we test the implications of the catering theory by means of some 
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institutional variables, particularly variables capturing investors’ protection, 
development of capital markets and the orientation of the financial systems, 
contestability of the market for corporate control, the level of ownership concentration, 
the effectiveness of boards of directors and corporate governance. 
 
III.3.1 Results of the basic and extended models 
 
The results of the GMM estimation of our basic model in (1) are provided in the 
Column I of Table III.5. The level of a firm’s free cash flow positively affects its payout 
ratio, consistent with Jensen’s (1986) theory. The coefficient of leverage is not 
significant. Consistent with Lintner (1956), the positive relationship between a firm’s 
earnings and its predicted payout ratio is confirmed by our results. Regarding the nature 
of the firm’s assets, our results show that firms with more tangible fixed assets have 
larger payout ratios. Finally, we find a positive coefficient on size, according to which 
larger companies pay higher dividends, consistent, for instance, with Fama and French 
(2001) or more recently, Denis and Osobov (2008). 
Regarding the influence of a firm’s investors’ sentiments on its payout ratio, the 
positive coefficient of the catering variable confirms the link between the propensity to 
pay dividends and catering incentives, consistent with Baker and Wurgler (2004b). Our 
result suggests that firms cater to their investors’ preferences, so that they are more 
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III.3.2 The moderating role of institutional variables 
 
Once the existence of a catering effect has been corroborated by our results, we 
go a step forward and investigate whether or not the institutional context moderates this 
effect. 
Columns I to VI of Table III.6 report the results of the model including the 
interaction of catering with investor protection. Column I shows the interaction of 
catering with a dummy variable, which takes value 1 for common law countries and 
value 0 for civil law countries. As can be seen, the catering effect in civil law countries 
(γ6=0.01316) is stronger than the one in common law countries (γ6+λ=0.0052, 
significantly different from zero, see t). This result corroborates that the stronger the 
legal protection of investors, the smaller the extent to which firms cater to their 
investors’ sentiments, supporting the substitute model by La Porta et al. (2000a).  
The results in columns II to VI confirm this finding by using other investor 
protection dummies, such as anti-director rights, creditor’s rights, enforcement, 
protection investor and effective protection investor.58  
The interaction of the catering effect and development of capital 
markets/market-oriented systems is tested in the models presented in Columns I to V of 
Table III.7. In this case, as shown in column I, DVit takes value 1 if the country is 
classified as a market-oriented system and 0 if it is considered a bank-oriented system. 
This way, the coefficient of the catering variable is γ6 for countries considered a bank-
oriented system (since DVit takes value zero), and γ6+λ for firms considered a market-
                                                 
58 Column II shows the interaction of catering with a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the index of 
anti-director rights is above the sample mean and 0 otherwise; column III shows the interaction of 
catering with a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the index of creditors rights is above the sample 
mean and 0 otherwise; column IV shows the interaction of catering with a dummy variable which takes 
value 1 if the index of enforcement is above the sample mean and 0 otherwise; column V shows the 
interaction of catering with a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the index of protection investor is 
above the sample mean and 0 otherwise and finally, the interaction of the catering effect and effective 
protection investor is tested in the model presented in Column VI of Table III.6  with a dummy variable 
which takes value 1 if the index of effective protection investor is above the sample mean and 0 
otherwise. 
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oriented system (since DVit takes value one).  As can be seen, the catering effect in 
countries considered bank-oriented systems (γ6=0.01677) is stronger than the one in 
countries considered market-oriented systems (γ6+λ=0.0044, significantly different 
from zero; see t). As shown in the column I of Table III.7, our evidence does not 
support Hypothesis 2; however, our evidence suggests that in countries considered a 
bank-oriented system, managers are more encouraged to cater to a large extent to 
investors’ demand for dividends, confirming once more the substitute model by La 
Porta et al. (2000a). 
The results in columns II to V of Table III.7 corroborate the same conclusions by 
using other dummies of development of capital markets, such as market capitalization to 
GDP, total value traded to GDP, market development and banking development.59 
We next investigate the interaction between the catering effect and the 
contestability of market for corporate control by estimating the model presented in 
Column VI of Table III.7. In this case, DVit takes value 1 in countries with effective 
markets for corporate control, and 0 otherwise. As can be seen, the catering effect in 
countries where there is less contestability in market for corporate control (γ6=0.01379) 
is stronger than the one in countries where an active market for corporate control exists 
(γ6+λ=0.0029, significantly different from 0; see t). These results are very similar to 
those obtained for the previous hypotheses and corroborate that the more active the 
market for corporate control is, the smaller the extent to which firms cater to their 
investors’ sentiments.  
                                                 
59 Column II shows the interaction of catering with a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the index of 
market capitalization to GDP is above the sample mean and 0 otherwise; column III shows the interaction 
of catering with a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the index of total value traded to GDP is above 
the sample mean and 0 otherwise; column IV shows the interaction of catering with a dummy variable 
which takes value 1 if the index of market development is above the sample mean and 0 otherwise; the 
interaction of the catering effect and development of capital markets is tested in the model presented in 
Column V of Table III.7 with a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the index of banking development 
is above the sample mean and 0 otherwise. 
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Column I of Table III.8 reports the results of the model, including the interaction 
of catering with ownership concentration. Ownership concentration may be a 
monitoring mechanism, as it can be a bonding device triggering corporate control 
actions. Therefore, higher levels of ownership concentration may translate into higher 
dividends. As shown in column I, DVit takes value 1 if the index of ownership 
concentration is above the sample mean and 0 otherwise. As can be seen, the catering 
effect in countries with high levels of ownership concentration (γ6+λ=0.01871, 
significantly different from 0; see t) is stronger than the one in countries with low levels 
of ownership concentration. It seems that catering incentives (i.e., investors’ preference 
for dividend-paying stocks) manifest more strongly in firms with more concentrated 
patterns, corroborating the monitoring effect.  
The interaction of the catering effect and independent boards is tested in the 
model presented in Column II of Table III.8. In this case, DVit takes value 1 for 
countries with a predominant two-tier-board or when non-executive directors represent 
a significant proportion on boards and 0 otherwise. As shown in the table, there is no 
effect of a firm’s investors’ sentiments on its payout ratio when the firm has poor 
executive and supervisory boards (γ6 not significantly different from zero). However, 
the effect is positive and significant for firms with predominant two-tier-boards 
characterized by the existence of two bodies, which guarantees that the supervisory 
board is separated from and independent of management (γ6+λ=λ=0.01228, 
significantly different from 0; see t), which confirms that, as expected, the catering 
effect in countries with a predominant two-tier-board or when non-executive directors 
represent a significant proportion on boards is stronger than the one in countries where 
this monitoring device is poor. 
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These results point out that the expected catering effect clearly manifests itself 
when there are independent boards in the firm.  
Finally, we investigate the interaction between the catering effect and the 
corporate governance index by estimating the model presented in Column III of Table 
III.8. In this case, DVit takes value 1 if the corporate governance index is above the 
sample mean, and 0 otherwise. As can be seen in the table, the coefficient of the 
catering variable (γ6=0.01755) is larger for firms with weak corporate governance than 
the one for firms with stronger corporate governance (γ6+λ=0.00304, significantly 
different from 0). Our evidence suggests that investors’ demand for dividends translates 
into higher payout ratios in firms that operate in countries with weak governance. It is 
worth highlighting that the results of this aggregated index of corporate governance 
make the legal influence prevail. In other words, the substitute model is supported once 
again in that this last result suggests that the weaker the governance in a country, the 
higher the need to cater to investors’ sentiments regarding the payment of dividends. 
This evidence is consistent with the notion that firms adopt a policy of paying dividends 
under pressure to reduce agency costs, and is consistent with, for instance, Harford, 
Mansi and Maxwell (2008), who report that firms with weak governance (shareholders’ 
rights) hold lower cash reserves and are more likely to pay dividends.60 
Overall, this evidence provides an excellent robustness check for the results of 
the basic and extended models, since the sign of the coefficients of both the traditional 
explanatory variables and the catering variables remain identical once we control for the 
moderating role of certain institutional variables. 
 
 
                                                 
60 See also Hu and Kumar (2004), who find that the likelihood and level of dividend payouts is increasing 
when factors such as managerial and outside blockholder ownership, CEO compensation policy, and 
board independence indicate a high likelihood of managerial entrenchment and high agency costs.  




This piece of our study provides a test of the predictions of the catering theory of 
dividends by proposing a new approach for analyzing the effect that investors’ 
sentiments exert on corporate dividend policy. 
Our results show that investors’ sentiments impact the payout ratios in Eurozone 
countries, the US, the UK, Canada and Japan after controlling for traditional 
determinants of dividends, such as the free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed 
assets and size. This finding seems to indicate that dividend policies are driven to some 
extent by investors’ sentiments, thus revealing the desire of firms’ managers to cater to 
such preferences. Therefore, our evidence provides empirical support for the existence 
of a physiological component in the decision to pay, as proposed by the catering theory. 
Our analysis has several policy implications that are particularly relevant, 
allowing the possibility to better understand the implications of catering incentives for 
dividends by examining the moderating role played by certain institutional variables. 
This idea has not been accounted for in prior studies, either theoretically or empirically, 
but our findings corroborate that the way in which investors appreciate dividend 
payments depends on the internal and external corporate governance mechanisms. In 
fact, our research makes a further check to see which institutional variables moderate 
dividend payout to managers’ action to cater. 
We trace firm-level corporate governance practices in fifteen countries around 
the world, and in our empirical tests, we find that the higher a firm’s ownership 
concentration and independence of boards of directors, the better the fit of dividends to 
investors catering incentives. Our evidence also provides empirical support that external 
mechanisms are important to force firms to disgorge cash within the predictions of the 
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substitute model. This suggests that the dividend payout is more important to investors 
when their level of investor protections is low. 
According to our evidence and the substitute model, dividend payments can be a 
substitute for other characteristics because poorly-governed firms need alternative ways 
of establishing a reputation for acting in the interests of shareholders if they intend to 
raise capital from markets in the future; hence a policy of paying dividends is the most 
valuable at the margin to firms with agency problems. 
In fact, our results suggest the presence of a more general phenomenon of the 
catering effect in companies with a high quality of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms. It is important to recognize that this view relies on the assumption that 
managers are more encouraged to cater to a large extent to investors’ preferences for 
dividend-paying stocks in those firms with more efficiency and independence in the 
boards of directors and with higher ownership concentration by the three largest 
shareholders. Our evidence points out that the joined measure used in ownership 
concentration is in favor of a manager monitoring role for dividends. Therefore, the 
institutional context plays a key role in explaining managers’ catering behavior and 










OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CATERING THEORY OF 





Since the early 1980s a great number of papers have offered alternative 
explanations to disentangle the role played by corporate ownership structure in 
determining corporate dividend policy (see, for instance, Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 
2003). Dividends have been a bit of a puzzle in the theory of the firm since Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), and many scholars have tried to give alternative explanations for 
dividends in imperfect markets. In fact, existing research has had some success in 
explaining dividend payouts through a variety of market imperfections such as agency 
problems (see, for example, Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986; La Porta et al., 2000a; or 
Gugler, 2003), informational asymmetries (see, for example, Talmor, 1981; Miller and 
Rock, 1985; Dewenter and Warther, 1998; Baker, Stein and Wurgler, 2003), and taxes 
(see, for example, Lasfer, 1996; Amihud and Murgia, 1997; Bell and Jenkinson, 2002; 
Rau and Vermaelen, 2002; Oswald and Young, 2004 or Morck and Yeung, 2005).  
Our study asserts agency-cost explanations of corporate payout policy and 
behavioral considerations as a starting point for explaining the catering theory of 
dividends on different ownership structures across Eurozone countries.61 According to 
agency theories, those who control the firm are tempted to do what is in their own best 
                                                 
61 Prior studies have provided significant insights into how agency conflicts affect a firm’s payout policy. 
See, for instance, Fenn and Liang (2001), and Michaely and Roberts (2007) for US firms; and La Porta et 
al. (2000a), and Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) for cross- country analyses. 
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interests (Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2006, p. 2725). When corporate governance 
works well, managers are more likely to act in the interests of shareholders and pursue 
value-maximizing policies; that is, corporate decisions are made to increase 
shareholders’ wealth.  
In contrast, with poor corporate governance, the dominant shareholder has 
greater ability to expropriate resources that would have been otherwise shared with 
minority owners; that is, he can obtain substantial private benefits from control at the 
expense of minority shareholders (see, for instance, Nenova, 2003; Dyck and Zingales, 
2004, Dahya, Dimitrov and McConell, 2008). Several empirical studies have tried to 
determine the exact role played by ownership structures in the decision making process 
concerning corporate dividend policy. However, the evidence is mixed.62  The idea that 
dividends play a role in corporate governance is introduced by Easterbrook (1984) and 
Jensen (1986). Easterbrook (1984) argues that firms pay dividends to help reduce the 
agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control. In fact, managers 
prefer to retain earnings to increase private consumption, because by paying dividends 
they must raise funds more frequently in the capital markets, where they are subjected 
to the scrutiny and the disciplining effects of the market. Jensen (1986) advocates a 
similar agency-theory argument, according to which dividend payments reduce free 
cash flow under insiders’ discretion.63 Higher dividends achieve a cost-effective 
substitute to the shareholder. Rozeff (1982), Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Jensen, 
Solberg and Zorn (1992), and Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) provide empirical support 
for these agency explanations for paying dividends. As point out by Fama and French 
                                                 
62 Recently researchers have investigated the interaction between dividend policies and various ownership 
characteristics of public firms, and find mixed results. See, for example, Fenn and Liang (2001), Perez-
Gonzalez (2003), Grinstein and Michaely (2005), Graham and Kumar (2006), and Brown, Liang and 
Weisbenner (2007), among others. 
63 Baker, Powell and Veit (2002a) focus on the managerial perspectives dividend policy to show that 
managers of NASDAQ firms strongly believe that dividend policy matters. In other words, dividend 
policy influences stock prices. This result is inconsistent with the irrelevance proposition of Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), and is explained by the imperfections of the market. 
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(2001), the agency control function of corporate payout is linked to the severity of the 
manager-shareholder conflict. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986), among others, identify the importance of agency problems in analyzing the 
ownership structure and value of corporations. One dimension of conflict in a corporate 
setting is the link between insiders (i.e., managers) and outside shareholders. 
Rozeff (1982) was among the first to explicitly recognize the role of insiders as 
one of monitoring the managers.  Consistent with this view, the literature offers two 
competing hypotheses regarding this relationship: on one hand, managerial ownership 
can be used for the alignment of interests between managers and shareholders, however, 
the relationship between insiders and the alignment of shareholder and managerial 
interests may be non-monotonic, as suggested by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), 
Farinha (2003) or Pindado and de la Torre (2006). 64 This close link is not a monotonous 
relationship, since it may combine a convergence effect at lower levels of managerial 
ownership with an entrenchment effect at higher levels of manager ownership. 
The role of large owners in the economy is also one of the most important topics 
in recent research on the relationship between dividends and ownership around the 
world. In fact, the divergence of interests of managers and owners can be reduced 
through the monitoring exerted by large shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Maug, 1998). In short, large owners may play a valuable role 
in reducing the original agency problem between shareholders and managers because a 
concentrated ownership solves the free-riding problem characterizing dispersed 
structures. The relevant consequence of financial discipline is that fewer resources are 
consumed in low return projects and more cash flows can thus be distributed as 
dividends. However, recent research has emphasized that large blockholdings give rise 
                                                 
64 Studies for the UK show that there is a negative relationship between insider ownership and dividends. 
See, for instance, Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002); Farinha (2003), and Renneboog and Trojanowski 
(2006). 
The catering theory of dividends: the moderating role of firm characteristics, corporate governance factors and corporate ownership 
 100
to a second agency problem between controlling owners and minority shareholders.65 In 
this case the relationships between large shareholders and dividend decisions cannot be 
positive because the expropriation hypothesis predicts that the high level of ownership 
concentration increases the propensity for expropriation of minority shareholders by 
large shareholders. As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), when large shareholders 
gain nearly full control, they start generating private benefits of control that are not 
shared with minority shareholders. 
On the international front, La Porta et al. (2000a) provide a cross-country 
comparison from 33 countries and find that dividend differ consistent with a particular 
version of the agency theory of dividends. Specifically, they show that in Continental 
Europe where ownership structures are more likely to be concentrated, dividend payouts 
are generally lower and more flexible than in the Anglo-Saxon countries.66 However, 
despite the global importance of the European Union,67 very little published research 
has examined ownership structures and dividend payout across Europe. As far as we 
know, the most recent studies are single-country analyses, such as Crespi (1997) and 
Miguel, Pindado and de la Torre (2005) for Spain; Maury and Pajuste (2002) for 
Finland; Gugler (2003) for Austria; Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) for Germany; 
Ginglinger and L’Her (2006) for France; and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) for the 
Netherlands, among others.68 Building on the agency framework developed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), a number of authors suggest that a higher equity ownership by 
                                                 
65 See, for instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997),  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002), Becht, Bolton and Röell (2003), or 
Farinha (2003), who suggest that the relevant agency problem is not the one between corporate managers 
and shareholders but rather between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
66 This finding is supported by the lower cash holdings of better-governed firms reported in Dittmar, 
Mahrt-Smith and Servaes (2003), and more recently, in Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
67 Note that a considerable amount of research has examined the influence of ownership and control 
structures on firms’ financing decisions and performance in United States and United Kingdom. 
68 Some authors, for instance, La Porta et. al, (2000a), Thomsen (2005), Chay and Suh (2006), or 
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), Denis and Osobov (2008), and von Eije and Megginson (2008) 
study this subject for more than a country; however, for a reduced number of countries of Eurozone.  
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controlling shareholders enhances their interest in non-distortionary distribution of 
dividends (Filatotchev et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2000a).69 When expropriation of 
private benefits of control involves costs, an increase in the size of the equity stake of a 
large block shareholder would reduce the marginal benefits of expropriation (see 
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Claessens et al., 1999, for a discussion). Maury and 
Pajuste (2002) examine the relationship between controlling shareholders and dividend 
policy for Finnish listed firms, and they show that dividend payout ratio is negatively 
related to the control stake of the controlling shareholder. Their results suggest evidence 
for the existence of private benefits of control by strong blockholders.  Moreover, 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) argue that in countries characterized by high ownership 
concentration, the case of Eurozone countries in our study, the conflict between large 
and controlling owners and small outside shareholders is one of the main issues in 
corporate governance. An increase in dividends reduces the funds at the discretion of 
the controlling shareholder and increases the market value of the firm. A decrease in 
dividends potentially implies more severe rent extraction and expropriation of small 
shareholders.70 Concretely, they show for German firms that dividend payout ratios 
decrease in the equity share of the largest shareholder and report that lower dividend 
payout of majority controlled firms is related to the probability that controlling 
shareholders extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders; that is, an 
increase on dividends implies less cash available for expropriation and therefore a 
positive abnormal return.  
                                                 
69 Private benefits of control by dominant owners are the focus of Grossman and Hart (1988), Modigliani 
and Perotti (1997), Bebchuck (1999), Bebchuck, Kraakman and Triantis (2000), Shleifer and Wolfenzon 
(2002), Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006), among others. 
70 An example of one concrete industry is demonstrated for Hansen, Kumar and Shome (1994), who show 
that payout ratios of electric utilities respond in much the same fashion as unregulated firms when the 
concentration of ownership changes. Their findings suggest that as the concentration of ownership 
increases, the level of monitoring increases and the need for a higher dividend payout decreases.  
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Overall, this prior research reveals that ownership structures impact firms’ 
dividend decisions. 
Since the distribution of power within the company is reflected in a firm’s 
dividend policies, we expected that the investors’ perceptions of it impact payout ratio. 
In fact, recent developments in financial literature provide a new related theory of 
dividends, i.e., that dividend policy is related to catering towards investor demands 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). The propensity of firms to pay dividends seems to vary 
over time and these authors with their new explanation for dividends suggest that the 
time varying preferences of investors are the main driver behind this. According to this 
new theory, when investors’ demand for payouts increases, firms are more likely to 
increase payouts. 
Recent studies (see, among others, Brown and Cliff, 2004, 2005; Lai, 2004; 
Fairchild and Zhang, 2005; Gemmil, 2005; Ferris, Sen and Yui, 2006; Kumar and Lee, 
2006; Li and Lie, 2006; Zhang, 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008; and Hoberg and 
Prabhala, 2009) show that this new theory can be decisive in the resolution of the 
dividend puzzle through investors’ sentiments. Furthermore, a related strand of the 
recent behavioral literature focuses directly on developing measures of sentiment and 
relating these to expected stock return (see, for instance, Brown and Cliff, 2005; Baker 
and Wurgler, 2006, 2007; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006, or Qiu and Welch, 2006). 
There is also literature, although much scarcer and conflicting, which refers to the 
importance of the ownership characteristics for a firm’s payout. Richardson, Teoh and 
Wysocki (2001) find that earnings-guidance (a form of investor relations) is more 
prominent for firms whose insiders sell stocks from their personal accounts after 
earnings announcements; Ferris, Narayanan and Sanjiv (2008) show that catering is an 
important factor in explaining the differences in dividend policies across countries and 
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find that measures of shareholder empowerment, such as the level of anti-director rights 
and the extent of equity ownership concentration, influence dividend catering.  
Although there is no previous evidence, as far as we know, on what we are 
studying, there are strong arguments that lead us to argue that investors’ preference for 
dividend-paying stocks change according to the above-mentioned ownership 
characteristics. Under the influence of this prior research, we go a step further and we 
investigate whether or not a firm’s ownership characteristics moderate the extent to 
which firms cater to their investors’ sentiments. In this piece of work we provide new 
empirical evidence by examining whether corporate ownership shapes the implications 
of this theory by determining managers’ incentives to behave according to its 
predictions. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section IV.1, we 
describe the main ownership characteristics that impact on dividend payout and 
summarize previous empirical evidence on this matter; we also report evidence on 
catering theory of dividends and how we posed our hypotheses. Section IV.2 describes 
the data and our model of dividends and discusses the estimation method. The results 
are discussed in Section IV.3 and, finally, the concluding remarks are presented in 
Section IV.4.  
 
 
IV.1 Theories and hypotheses 
 
In this section, we first summarize the main contributions from previous 
research to the debate on the impact of ownership structures on dividend payments for 
better understanding the ownership structure on the catering theory of dividends. We 
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next discuss the key arguments of ownership structure on the catering theory of 
dividends and review previous evidence on the matter in order to pose our hypothesis. 
Note that to investigate this prediction empirically, and to get a step ahead of the 
intrinsic effect of investor sentiment, we start with a summary of the rises and falls of 
dividends payout with ownership characteristics, specifically managerial ownership, and 
ownership concentration. 
 
IV.1.1 Managerial Ownership and Dividend Payout 
 
Several earlier studies have argued, from an agency perspective, that corporate 
payout is generally viewed as a control device that helps reduce managerial discretion, 
and as such, it is part of the firm’s optimal monitoring. That is, the agency control 
function of dividend payout is linked to the severity of the manager-shareholder 
conflict. Rozeff (1982) reports that companies with more managerial participation pay 
fewer dividends. He shows that insider ownership provides direct incentives of 
alignment between managers and shareholders while dividends serve as a mechanism 
that reduces the managers' propensity to make unprofitable investments out of internal 
funds. The results of Lloyd, Jahera and Page (1985); Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995), 
and Holder, Langrehr and Hexter (1998) also show this negative relationship between 
dividends and managerial ownership.  
In fact, there is extensive theoretical and empirical research on how managerial 
ownership influences dividend decisions.71 For instance, the signaling models for 
paying dividends, developed by Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and 
Miller and Rock (1985), suggest that managers as insiders choose dividend payment 
levels and dividend increases to signal private information to investors. The traditional 
                                                 
71 See, for instance, Lambert, Lanen and Larcker (1989); Jolls (1998); Weisbenner (2000); Bettis, Bizjak 
and Lemmon (2001), Fenn and Liang (2001), Kahle (2002); Hu and Kumar (2004) or Brown, Liang and 
Weisbenner (2007), among others. 
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agency theories, such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen 
(1986), implicitly assume that any managerial entrenchment (more power to insiders) is 
undesirable because entrenched managers will always behave in ways that are costly to 
shareholder wealth.72 Jensen and Meckling (1976), for instance, suggest that managers 
have a natural tendency to allocate the firm’s resources in their own best interests; hence 
the payment of dividends reduced the agency problem between manager and 
shareholder by reducing the discretionary funds available to managers. Managers may 
opt not to use the firm’s resources in ways that increase shareholder returns, but 
squandering excess cash flow by investing in unprofitable projects, perquisites 
consumption, or other sort of value-destroying behavior.  
More recently, the evidence also suggests an inverse relation between 
managerial stock ownership and dividends. An increase in dividend payout will reduce 
the need for managerial ownership to control agency problems and it is expected that 
dividend payout ratio is inversely related to the level of managerial ownership.73 Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2003) find a large negative effect of announced dividend changes in 
German companies where corporate insiders have more power.  
In fact, if on one side managerial ownership can be used for the alignment of 
interests between managers and shareholders, on the other side, the augmentation of 
managerial ownership constitutes a means of empowerment of managers, giving them 
the opportunity to serve their personal interests, as it contributes to the reduction of the 
strict control imposed by shareholders; in other words, that is designated in the financial 
literature for management entrenchment hypothesis (see, for instance, Weston, 1979; 
                                                 
72 Stulz (1988, 1990); Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Claessens et al. (2002), and La Porta et al. (2002), 
show that ownership structures can affect corporate policies and firm value in the context of managerial 
entrenchment. 
73 See, for instance, Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992); Agrawal and Jayoraman (1994). They find that if 
the insider owners hold the major shares of the company then management naturally prefers not to declare 
more dividends, then, the level of managerial stock ownership has a negative impact on firms’ dividend 
levels. 
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Fama and Jensen, 1983 or Demsetz, 1983).74 As a result, dividend policy depends on the 
level of managerial ownership. In this vein of research, Schooley and Barney (1994) 
find a significant non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and dividends 
in US firms. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argue that when managers control a 
substantial fraction of the firm’s equity, the entrenched managers may be more inclined 
to consume perquisites. Also, Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) and Farinha (2003) show 
a strong U-shaped relationship between dividend payouts and insider ownership for UK 
firms. In a similar fashion, as documented by Pindado and de la Torre (2006), insiders 
may offset their lower potential of shirking by increasing the amount of dividends they 
receive through share ownership. Those authors also find that initial increases in insider 
ownership result in a convergence of interests, while higher levels of insider ownership 
result in managerial entrenchment, showing a quadratic relation between dividends and 
insider ownership. 
In fact, while the traditional agency theory suggests a uniformly negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and dividend payout ratio, the entrenchment 
theory proposes a non-monotonic relationship.75 Thanh and Heaney (2007) argue from 
37 countries around the world that firms are less likely to pay dividends and pay fewer 
dividends when the largest shareholder is an insider, suggesting that powerful insiders 
may impose low dividend policies upon the firm in order to increase the cash flow at 
their discretion.  Finally, as Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Stulz (1988) find 
when examining the relation between firm value and managerial ownership, perhaps the 
two hypotheses (alignment of interests and managerial entrenchment) interact, each one 
                                                 
74 For example, Grossman and Hart (1988) document that large insiders may have a preference for 
retained earnings over dividends for rent extraction. 
75 Alford et al. (1993) and Ali and Hwang (2000) show that managerial entrenchment and the subsequent 
abuses of minority shareholders are more relevant in Continental European countries where the legal 
protection of minority shareholders is weak and firms often adopt anti-shareholder devices that violate the 
one-share-one-vote rule (La Porta et al., 1998). Others studies report that weak shareholder protection is 
associated with more severe expected agency costs of managerial entrenchment (see, for instance, La 
Porta et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004). 
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dominating in different ownership levels.76 The relationship between dividends and 
managerial ownership may be positive across low levels of ownership, and this 
relationship could then turn out to be negative with higher levels of ownership. 
Generally, as a result of previous literature, it is expected that for lower levels of 
managerial ownership, the ownership of shares by managers leads to the alignment of 
their interests with those of external shareholders, resulting in a high dividend payout 
ratio. For higher levels of managerial ownership, however, the ownership of shares by 
managers can lead to distortions in the operating decisions that they make, resulting in 
lower payout ratio. 
 
IV.1.2 Ownership Concentration and Dividend Payout 
 
In most Eurozone countries, firms often have large controlling shareholders. 
Then, in firms with a concentrated ownership structure, a conflict of interest arises 
between large and small shareholders (Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Sinales and Shleifer, 1999). Controlling shareholders may be efficient 
monitors, but like managerial ownership, they may also keep payout levels low to 
expropriate minority shareholders. As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), large 
shareholders have a dual impact on firms, on one side, incentive to monitor 
management and on the other side, extract rents and enjoy private benefits of control.  
In the vein of these arguments, the literature offers two competing hypotheses 
regarding this relationship. On one side, the expropriation hypothesis predicts that the 
high level of ownership concentration increases the propensity for expropriation of 
minority shareholders by large shareholders and that controlling shareholders with 
                                                 
76 Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), and Stulz (1988) find a non-monotonic empirical relationship 
between management ownership and firm value. For studies on the relationship between ownership 
structures and firm value, see for example, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2006), and Adams and Ferreira (2008).  
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substantial power adopt a policy that retains a larger amount of earnings that they can 
expropriate, resulting in lower payout. The substitution hypothesis is based on the 
assumption that firms need to raise external funds, and in order to sustain outside equity 
in the firm, the controlling shareholders establish a reputation for not expropriating 
wealth from minority shareholders by paying out more dividends. That is, the benefits 
of large shareholding can be summarized in terms of monitoring hypotheses.  In 
agreement with these hypotheses, the largest shareholders make a basic paper in 
corporate governance by reducing agency costs. When a firm has free cash flows, 
managers cannot spend those amounts on unprofitable projects; they are forced to 
distribute these funds, resulting in higher dividend payouts. However, the presence of 
large shareholders with high stocks or controlling shareholders may be harmful to 
dividend payout. As discussed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), when large shareholders 
have great control, they start generating private benefits of control that are not shared 
with minority shareholders. Then, the more important agency problem is expropriation 
of outside shareholders by the controlling shareholder (Kouki and Guizani, 2009). In 
fact, firms with large controlling shareholders may channel corporate resources to 
projects that generate utility for the controlling owners but provide few benefits to 
minority owners. 
Based on the monitoring or expropriation hypotheses, there is much literature to 
show this relationship with the various financial decisions. Rozeff (1982) reports that 
companies with less dispersed ownership pay fewer dividends. Claessens et al. (2002), 
for instance, find stronger support for the view that firm value increases with cash-flow 
ownership of the largest shareholder.77  
                                                 
77 See, for instance, Lemmon and Lins (2003) for an important research on ownership structure and firm 
value in East Asia. Likewise, Laeven and Levine (2004) shows for 13 Western European countries that 
over forty percent of the public firms with one large shareholder have two or more owners holding more 
than 10 percent of the voting rights each. Moreover, they show that firm value increases with the equity 
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In contrast, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Grossman and Hart (1980) argue in 
favor of a positive relationship between ownership concentration and dividends, leaning 
on the preference for the allotment of these largest shareholders, habitually companies, 
for tax reasons.78 As suggested by Faccio, Lang and Young (2001), the presence of 
multiple owners might alleviate expropriation of minority shareholders by the 
controlling shareholder. However, they find that the presence of multiple large 
shareholders helps to limit the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders in European firms, but exacerbates agency problem in East Asian firms. 
This implies a negative rather than positive relationship between multiple owners and 
dividend payouts.79 
Maury and Pajuste (2002) examine the relationship between controlling 
shareholders and dividend policy for Finnish listed firms. They find that dividend 
payout ratio is negatively related to the control stake of the controlling shareholder. 
Moreover, their evidence supports the mitigating role of another large shareholder; they 
even report that the cumulative ownership of the three largest shareholders has a 
negative effect on dividend payout. They interpret this result as evidence for the 
existence of private benefits of control by strong shareholders.  
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) analyze dividend announcements and dividend 
payout from German firms, focusing upon the large-small shareholder conflict. They 
                                                                                                                                               
stake of a second large shareholder only if the gap in voting rights between the first and the second largest 
shareholder is small, as one would expect to occur in governance structures under shared control. These 
findings confirm the results by Volpin (2002), who document that 15 percent of the firms listed in the 
Milan Stock Exchange were controlled by large shareholders that entered into explicit agreements to vote 
as a block. More recently, and in the same vein of research, López-de-Foronda, López-Iturriaga and 
Bertin (2008) show, from 11 European countries, that existence of a controlling coalition in family-owned 
firms and the contestability of control of the largest shareholder affect the value of the family-owned 
firms 
78 For instance, Claessens et al. (1999) find that concentrated ownership contributes to higher profitability 
and market valuation. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) find a high correlation between ownership share of 
the largest owner and the closely held shares measure. 
79 Wolfenzon (1999), and Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) argue that the possibility for expropriation is 
larger when the corporation is affiliated to a group of corporations, everything controlled by the same 
shareholder. 
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present interesting results consistent with the rent extraction hypothesis. Their results 
show that the market reacts more negatively when large, uncontrolled shareholders 
reduce the dividends they are willing to pay out to minority shareholders. Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003) also report that payout levels decrease in the power of the largest 
shareholder but increase in the power of the second-largest shareholder. This evidence 
suggests on the one hand that, if the first shareholder is sufficiently powerful, it 
withholds dividends to expropriate minority investors for its private benefit; on the other 
hand, it points to a considerable monitoring function of large shareholders other than the 
largest shareholder. 
Correia da Silva, Goergen and Renneboog (2005) report that dividends should 
be lower in the presence of a large controlling shareholder, because they need not 
constitute an additional control device and would lead to unnecessary liquidity 
constraints. Studies by Khan (2006) indicate a similar negative relationship between the 
largest shareholder and dividends from UK firms using a dynamic panel data.80In 
contrast, Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) report in Dutch firms that target payout ratios 
and the extent of dividend smoothing increase rather than decrease in the equity interest 
of the largest shareholder. 
In general, the evidence is supportive of the hypothesis indicating that firms that 
have a strong controller tend to present lower payout ratios. This effect, for some 
authors, can be mitigated when there is a second block holder in the company.  
 
IV.1.3 Ownership structure and dividend policy on catering theory  
 
In the contemporary research concerning cross-section corporate governance, 
little has been said about the role which rapid fluctuations in investor sentiment can play 
                                                 
80 Renneboog and Trojanowski (2006) find that in the UK payout levels are lowest in firms controlled by 
individual investors. 
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in shaping corporate ownership structures. The dominant topic in the literature has 
traditionally been on legal matters. However, recent works provide evidence that 
investor sentiment has explanatory power for the cross-section of stock returns (see, for 
instance, Baker and Wurgler, 2006), and motivated by these findings, we go a step 
further and empirically investigate whether or not investors’ preferences for dividend-
paying stocks depend on the characteristics of corporate ownership. In this context, our 
study evaluates how the ownership structure affects the disposition of the firms to adjust 
their payouts to their investors’ sentiments, establishing a relationship between the 
ownership structure and a proxy capturing investors’ sentiments, which are built at firm 
level. 
In fact, the explanation that has received the most recent attention, for being 
pioneering, is Baker and Wurgler’s (2004a) catering theory. Consistent with their 
theory, those authors report empirical evidence that managers of U.S. firms attempt to 
cater to investor preferences and the aggregate dividend initiations are positively related 
to their measure of dividend premium. Baker and Wurgler (2004b) report that the 
dividend premium is related to the propensity to pay dividends, documented in Fama 
and French (2001). That is, these authors support the catering theory of dividends, 
which predicts that the time variation in dividends is driven by the demand from 
investors, according to which the changes in the amount that companies pay on 
dividends can be explained by what they denominate “catering incentives”, that is, a 
measure of the market desire for dividend-paying stocks. Specifically, Baker and 
Wurgler (2004b) argue that while the dividend decision may be very important, it is 
even more important to base the direction of this decision on the prevailing investor 
sentiment. 
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Previous literature on behavioral finance shows that investor sentiment does 
indeed influence future returns and plays a role in the formation of returns.81 For 
instance, De Long et al. (1990) suggest that the limited arbitrage is formed by the 
irrational noise traders. According to their research, irrational traders affect market price 
much more than the arbitrageurs. This result forms a basic assumption in behavioral 
finance, which is called limitation of arbitrage. This alternative model can explain the 
divergence of asset price. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) explain how individual 
investors underreact or overreact to past returns or fundamentals with a parsimonious 
model. More recently, Li and Lie (2006) extend the theory of Baker and Wurgler 
(2004a) and find support for the catering theory. They show that the dividend premium 
is positively related to the sign and magnitude of changes in dividends, and that this 
relationship is also manifested in the stock market reaction to these dividend changes. 
Their results suggest that the capital market rewards managers for considering 
investors’ demand for dividends when making decisions about the level of dividends.  
A natural question that arises when attempting to quantify the influence of 
sentiment on dividends decisions is how to measure the unobserved sentiment. 
Theoretical and empirical literature have used different proxies of investors’ 
sentiment.82 For instance, Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) introduced one of the most 
popular financial measures, the closed-end fund discount, and Neal and Wheatley 
(1998) also used the same measure. Also consistent with behavioral models of investor 
                                                 
81 See, for instance, De Long et al. (1990), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997), or Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) for models of investor sentiment, in which investors’ beliefs affect prices and returns. 
82 Existing studies distinguish between two fundamental methods of measuring investor sentiment: 
financial-based measures (or market-wide measures) and survey based measures. 
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overconfidence, Barber and Odean (2000) provide empirical evidence that households, 
which hold about half of U.S. equities, trade too much, on average.83 
Wang (2003) presented a sentiment index which is based on current net 
positions and historical extreme values and find that funds with higher sentiment 
sensitivities (larger potential discounts) have a greater incentive to adopt a target 
distribution policy. Moreover, researchers exploit many quantities, such as mutual fund 
flows (Frazzini and Lamont, 2005, or Chiu, 2006); initial public offering volume and 
initial premium, and trading patterns of insiders. Schmitz, Glaser and Weber (2005) 
deduced a new measure for sentiment from individual investors’ warrant transactions 
and reveal that returns have a negative influence on sentiment and the influence of stock 
market returns on sentiment is stronger than vice versa. Additionally, Bandopadhyaya 
and Jones (2006) suggest an equity market sentiment index which is based on the rank 
of daily return and the historical volatility. Baker and Wurgler (2006) built a sentiment 
composite index that is based on six proxies for sentiment. They show that investors’ 
sentiment may have significant effects on the cross section of stock prices. Kumar and 
Lee (2006) suggest a sentiment measure, which is based on the retail investors’ trading, 
and find that systematic retail explains return co-movement for stocks with high retail 
concentration.84 Baker and Wurgler (2007) show that the sentiment indicator is 
correlated in the expected way with the returns of portfolios sorted on volatility and also 
with the market. Finally, some studies use data from investor surveys, for instance, 
                                                 
83 See, for instance, Odean (1998) and; Coles, Suay and Woodbury (2000) who report a relationship 
between advisor fees and premium or discount; Khorana, Wahal and Zenner (2002) exploring the agency 
conflicts in closed-end funds by examining rights offerings, among others. 
84 Also, Lo and Lin (2005), or Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2006) denote investor sentiment as a fundamental 
factor on the price formation of assets. 
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Brown and Cliff (2005), or Qiu and Welch (2006),85 and Kamstra, Kramer and Levi 
(2003) employ investor mood.86  
In fact, there are a growing number of studies that examine the role of investor 
sentiment and its implications for financial markets and institutions. Essentially, a surge 
in research for investor sentiment demands concerns to the “legal matters”. However, in 
the contemporary discourse concerning the relationship between ownership structures 
and investors’ sentiments legality seems ill-explored and no consensus exists. For 
instance, Barclay, Holderness and Pontiff (1993) find a stable and significant 
relationship between discounts and concentration of ownership. They speculate that 
block-holders might align with management to resist open-ending, and their results are 
more with managerial entrenchment than incentive (convergence of interest) effects. 
Hong and Huang (2005) find that insiders have a strong incentive to allocate resources 
to enhance the liquidity of their own block of stocks because of potential liquidity 
needs. In contrast, they show that dispersed shareholders care little about market 
illiquidity because of their relatively small holdings, leading to a divergence of interest 
on investor-relations policies. They show that liquidity needs and size of equity stakes 
are important determinants of the extent of investors’ relations across firms.87 Ferris, 
Narayanan and Sanjiv (2008) show that catering is an important factor in explaining the 
differences in international decisions of dividend policy, and they show that catering is a 
much stronger phenomenon for firms operating in countries with low levels of 
                                                 
85 A survey-based measure was used also by Solt and Statman (1989); Lee, Jiang and Indro (2002), and 
Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2006). 
86 One strand of literature provides evidence that the optimism reflected in generic non-economic proxies 
of investor mood is positively correlated with the optimistic beliefs about future economic conditions 
(Conrad, Cornell and Landsman, 2002; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Edmans, Garcia and Norli, 2007, 
and Puri and Robinson, 2007). 
87 See, for example, Brennan and Tamarowski (2000) for a history and overview of investor relations. See 
also Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005), and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) for direct evidence that 
managers have discretion. 
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ownership concentration and consequently, less ability to exploit their minority 
shareholders. 
From the review above, we can say that previous literature offers several proxies 
for investors’ sentiments, all of them at the market level. We propose a new empirical 
approach that allows us to measure investor sentiment at the firm level. Specifically, we 
use the error term of a valuation model to obtain a proxy for the catering effect on 
dividend payments (see Chapter II).  
There is no evidence, as far as we know, regarding ownership structure and the 
catering incentives for dividends. However, we use the argument offered in the previous 
sections to pose our hypotheses. These arguments point to the convergence of interests 
and entrenchment hypotheses with respect to the managerial ownership. Regarding the 
effect of ownership concentration on catering incentives, we rely on arguments pointing 
to monitoring versus expropriation effects. Finally, we go into this issue in-depth and 
investigate interaction between the first and second-largest shareholders, taking into 
account whether there is collusion or contestability between them. 
Despite the lack of previous evidence, there are strong arguments that lead us to 
believe that investors’ preference is for dividend-paying stocks changes in accordance 
with the above-mentioned ownership characteristics. Hong and Huang (2005), for 
instance, find that insiders have a strong incentive to allocate resources to enhance the 
liquidity of their own block of stocks because of potential liquidity needs.  Ferris, 
Narayanan and Sanjiv (2008) are among the few authors that approach, although in a 
brief way, one of the pointed characteristics. They document that higher levels of 
ownership concentration would be associated with greater exploitation of minority 
shareholders; thus, if firms are generally characterized by high levels of ownership 
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concentration,88 then in their results the payment of dividends should be associated with 
increased value and this would be reflected in a higher dividend premium level (their 
catering measure). However, those authors do not support this hypothesis and they find 
that, although catering occurs within firms irrespective of ownership concentration 
levels, the coefficient for the dividend premium is significantly greater for firms in 
countries with lower ownership concentration levels. They document that catering is a 
much stronger phenomenon for firms operating in countries with low levels of 
ownership concentration and consequently less ability to exploit their minority 
shareholders. This leads us to expect that for our analysis, an ownership concentration 
and its investor sentiment about dividends could be related.  
According to the finance literature that has analyzed the payout questions, and 
following our objective, we expect that different ownership structures affect the catering 
incentives to dividends payout.  
In respect to managerial ownership, previous empirical evidence shows an 
unequivocal relation between managerial ownership and the firm’s payout policy (see 
section IV.1.1), and despite the fact that none of these authors studied investors’ 
sentiment on dividends, their work serves to justify our arguments and therefore this 
hypothesis. The arguments for this hypothesis are based in the convergence of interests 
or entrenchment effect (for instance, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). The incentive 
effect predicts that payout ratio will be higher when managers’ interests are better 
aligned with small shareholders’ interests. Therefore, a positive relation should exist 
between managerial ownership and catering incentives of dividends. On the other hand, 
the entrenchment effect predicts that a manager who controls substantial ownership may 
have enough voting power to determine policies which are beneficial to him at the 
                                                 
88 In their research, ownership concentration is the average ownership of the three largest shareholders in 
the 10 largest publicly traded companies. 
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expense of other shareholders. Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992), analyze the 
determinants of cross sectional differences in insider holdings and dividend policies of 
firms, and they find that if insider owners hold the major shares of the company then 
management naturally prefers not to pay dividends. This is consistent with Rozeff’s 
model. Based on the above discussion, from higher level of managerial ownership, it is 
expected that investor preference for dividend-paying stocks manifests to a smaller 
extent; according to this view, the following hypothesis is posed: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the managerial ownership, the smaller the extents to which 
firms cater to their investors’ sentiments. 
To test the relationship between the ownership by the largest shareholder and 
catering incentives of dividends, we use the arguments related to the literature that we 
showed previously based on the monitoring or expropriation effect.  
According to Grossman and Hart (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
management should be monitored, and this monitoring must be done by large 
shareholders. The presence of such shareholders mitigates the free rider problem of 
monitoring a management team and hence reducing the agency costs. Consistent with 
monitoring hypothesis, shareholders control managers’ discretion, and they cannot 
expend free cash flow on unprofitable projects and are forced to pay dividends. On the 
contrary, when the conflict between large and small shareholders is more outstanding, 
as in the case of civil law countries, ownership by the largest shareholder favors a 
potential risk of expropriation. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) document that dominant 
shareholders derive private benefits from corporate resources under their control. 
Accordingly, their preference is for lower dividend payments, which prevents minority 
investors from cashing out their share of the firm’s profits. 
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We rely on the intuition that the effect of the ownership by the largest 
shareholder on catering incentives should be according to the above theoretical 
arguments, i.e., monitoring and expropriation hypotheses. In fact, we expected that the 
stronger the control exerted by the first large shareholder, the lesser the extent to which 
the firm caters to the rest of investors’ sentiments under expropriation hypothesis (firms 
paying out less dividends when the controlling shareholders have substantial power to 
expropriate) because our sample is constituted fundamentally for civil law countries. 
These arguments lead us to pose the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2: The higher the ownership by the largest shareholder, the smaller the 
extent to which firms cater to their investors’ sentiments. 
Financial literature also offer other factors in determining dividend payout, such 
as the influence of large shareholders other than the largest one, that may influence the 
alignment of interests or the expropriation of wealth between shareholders 
In this line of research, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) suggest that controlling 
shareholders obtain private benefits from retaining resources inside the firms and 
refusing to satisfy the rest of shareholders’ preference for dividends. Moreover, their 
results also indicate a considerable monitoring function of large shareholders other than 
the largest shareholder, that is, those authors point out a positive relation between the 
existence of a second shareholder and dividends. Accordingly, we expect that when 
investors perceive the existence of another shareholder who can moderate the control 
over the largest one, the demand for dividend payments may increase, and the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 3: The existence of a second large shareholder moderates the extent to 
which firms cater to their investors’ sentiments. 
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In firms with more than the first largest shareholder, these large shareholders 
interact and the second shareholder can contest the power of the first or collude with the 
same interests, i.e., the influence of a second shareholder is twofold, depending on 
whether there is contestability or collusion between them. 
Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) report that dividend payouts are higher in 
Europe, but lower in Asia when there are multiple large shareholders. They find that the 
presence of multiple large shareholders dampens expropriation in Europe (due to 
monitoring), but exacerbates it in Asia (due to collusion). 
Based on this assumption, Maury and Pajuste (2002) find that the negative effect 
of ownership concentration on dividends is not driven by the concentration of only the 
largest shareholder’s voting power, but also the second largest shareholder’s stake. 
These findings propose that the largest and second largest shareholders might collude in 
generating private benefits that are not shared with minority shareholders, as indicated 
by the lower dividend payout levels. 
Maury and Pajuste (2005) document that on the one hand, by holding a 
substantial voting block, others besides the largest shareholder have the power and the 
incentives to monitor the largest shareholder and therefore the ability to reduce profit 
diversion. On the other hand, the second-largest shareholder can form a controlling 
coalition with other blockholders and share the diverted profit. Related to these 
arguments, those authors hypothesize that firm value is positively affected by the ability 
to challenge the largest block, i.e., by contestability, and negatively affected by the 
presence of blockholders, who, by colluding, can increase the efficiency of private 
benefit extraction. Accordingly, we admitted that with another large shareholder, the 
intention of expropriating by the first can be contested and that is reflected positively in 
investors’ demand for dividend paying stocks, and the last hypothesis is proposed: 
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Hypothesis 4: The joint effect of the first and second-largest shareholders on catering 
incentives will depend on whether there is contestability or collusion between them.  
 
 




To test the hypotheses posed in the previous section, we use data from several 
Eurozone countries. We selected an international database, Worldscope, as our principal 
source of information.89 Additionally, international data such as the growth of capital 
goods prices, the rate of interest on short-term debt, and the rate of interest on long-term 
debt, are extracted from the Main Economic Indicators published by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Since our study is intended to present a wide variety of ownership characteristics, 
we selected Eurozone countries and for each country we constructed an unbalanced panel 
of non-financial companies from 1990 to 2003. For each country, we constructed an 
unbalanced panel of nonfinancial firms whose information is available for at least six 
consecutive years This strong requirement is a necessary condition since we lose one 
year of data in the construction of some variables, we lose another year of data because 
of the estimation of the model in first differences, and four-consecutive-year data is 
required in order to test for second-order serial correlation, as Arellano and Bond (1991) 
point out. We must test for second-order serial correlation because our estimation 
method, the GMM, is based on this assumption. 
                                                 
89 We also obtained ownership data from the Worldscope database for the year-end closest to December 
31, 2003. 
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Three of the twelve countries have been excluded from our analysis for various 
reasons. As occurs in La Porta et al. (2000b), Luxembourg has been removed from our 
sample because there are just a few firms listed in Luxembourg’s stock exchange, and 
Greece because dividends are mandatory in this country. Finally, the Netherlands also 
had to be excluded because no sample with the above-mentioned ownership factors 
could be selected. The structure of the samples by number of companies and number of 
observations per country is provided in Table IV.1. As shown in Table IV.2, the 


















Germany 91 18.69 885 19.51 
France 79 16.22 721 15.90 
Belgium 67 13.76 693 15.28 
Spain 62 12.73 603 13.30 
Finland 60 12.32 528 11.64 
Portugal 44 9.03 362 7.98 
Ireland 39 8.01 394 8.69 
Austria 31 6.37 241 5.31 
Italy 14 2.87 108 2.38 
Total 487 100.00 4,535 100.00 
The table shows extracted data from firms for which information is available for at least five 
consecutive years between 1990 and 2003. After removing the first-year data, used only to 
construct several variables, the resultant samples comprise 91 firms (885 observations) for 
Germany, 79 firms (721 observations) for France, 67 firms (693 observations) for the Belgium, 
62 firms (603 observations) for Spain, 60 firms (528 observations) for Finland, 44 firms (362 
observations) for Portugal, 39 firms (394 observations) for Ireland, 31 firms (241 observations) 










Structure of the panel 
 
 











13 96 19.71 1,248 27.52 
12 50 10.27 600 13.23 
11 40 8.21 440 9.70 
10 39 8.01 390 8.60 
9 53 10.88 477 10.52 
8 59 12.11 472 10.41 
7 50 10.27 350 7.72 
6 58 11.91 348 7.67 
5 42 8.62 210 4.63 
Total 487 100.00 4,535 100.0 
Data from firms for which information is available for at least five consecutive years between 
1990 and 2003 were extracted. After removing first-year data, used only to construct several 




Finally, Table IV.3 provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, 






Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
FCFit .04878 .11942 -1.6551 1.2737 
Dit .10835 .12269 .0000 .83362 
NIit .02696 .06346 -.78456 .65152 
TANGit .43242 .18674 .00006 .98799 
SIit 12.6767 1.6982 7.7376 18.4956 
CATit .0000 .64772 -2.9818 8.0215 
The table provides summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum) of the variables 
used in the construction of the explanatory variables. Dit represents debt ratio, FCFit is the free cash flow, NIit 
denotes net income, TANGit denotes tangible fixed assets, SIit is size, and CATit denotes catering variable, 
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IV.2.2 Empirical model and estimation method  
 
Using the dependent variable, payout ratio, obtained as explained in chapter II, 
Section II.2.2 90, and the traditional explanatory variables as well as the catering variable 
obtained through the value model (explained in the same chapter, section II.2.3), we 
next present our models. In accordance with the aim of our study, we investigate 
whether or not several ownership characteristics impact the catering effect of dividends 
on firms across Eurozone countries, and for that we propose the following models to be 
estimated: 
( ) ititititititititit DVCATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR ελγγγγγγγ ++++++++= 6543210 ,         (1) 
where DVit takes value 1 if the firm’s level of managerial ownership is above the sample 
median, and 0 otherwise. In this way, the coefficient of the catering variable is γ6 for 
firms with low levels of insider ownership (since DVit takes value zero), and γ6+λ for 
firms with high levels of insider ownership (since DVit takes value one).  
In this first model we investigate the interaction between the catering effect and 
the level of managerial ownership, to evaluate the moderating role of managerial 
ownership on catering dividends, where, DVit is a dummy variable constructed 
according to the level of managerial ownership. 
It is worth noting that in all cases whenever the dummy variable equals one and 
both parameters (γ6 and λ) are significant, a linear restriction test is needed in order to 
know whether their sum (γ6+λ) is significantly different from zero. The null hypothesis 
to be tested in these cases is the hypothesis of no significance, H0: γ6+λ=0. 
We also investigate whether the ownership concentration in the hands of the first 
shareholder moderates the catering effect, by estimating the following model:  
( ) ititititititititit DVCATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR ελγγγγγγγ ++++++++= 6543210 ,  (2) 
                                                 
90 Once the dependent variable is a censured variable in that some companies pay dividends whereas do 
not, the authors predicted a Tobit model following Auerbach and Hasset (2003). 
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where DVit is a dummy variable constructed according to the level of ownership 
concentration by largest shareholder. In this model, DVit takes value 1 if the firm’s level 
of equity ownership concentration by the largest shareholder is above the sample mean, 
and 0 otherwise.91  
For testing the interaction between the first and second-largest shareholders with 
catering incentives, we propose the model that follows: 
( ) itititititititititit SVDVCATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR εαλγγγγγγγ +++++++++= 666543210 ,      (3) 
where DVit is a dummy variable constructed according to the level of ownership 
concentration of the largest shareholder and SVit is a dummy variable constructed 
according to the existence (with equity stock) of the second shareholder. In this case, 
DVit takes value 1 if the firm’s level of equity ownership concentration by the largest 
shareholder is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise. SVit takes value 1 if the second 
shareholder has equity stocks, and 0 otherwise. In this way, the coefficient of the 
catering variable is γ6 for firms with low levels of equity shares by the largest 
shareholder and at the same time for firms where the second shareholder doesn’t exist 
(since DVit and SVit takes value zero). The coefficient is γ6+λ6 for firms with high levels 
of equity ownership by the largest shareholder and at the same time the second 
shareholder doesn’t have equity shares (since DVit takes value one and SVit takes value 
zero). The coefficient is γ6+ 6α  for firms with low levels of equity ownership by the 
largest shareholder and at the same time the second shareholder exists (since DVit takes 
value zero and SVit takes value one). The coefficient is γ6+λ6+ 6α  for firms with high 
levels of equity ownership by the largest shareholder and at the same time the second 
shareholder exists (since DVit and SVit takes value one). 
                                                 
91 According to the Worldscope variable definition, major shareholders represent any individual or 
company that owns more than the local legal disclosure requirement of the outstanding shares of a 
company. 
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Finally, we investigate whether the joint effect of largest shareholder and the 
contestability or collusion of the second shareholder moderate catering effect and we 
estimate the following model: 
( ) itititititititititit CVDVCATSIZETANGNIDFCFCPR εαλγγγγγγγ +++++++++= 666543210 ,   (4) 
where DVit is the same dummy variable constructed according to the level of ownership 
concentration of the largest shareholder and CVit is a dummy variable constructed 
according to the contestability or collusion of the second shareholder relative to the first. 
In this case, DVit takes value 1 if the firm’s level of equity ownership concentration by 
the largest shareholder is above the sample mean, and 0 otherwise. CVit takes value 1 if 
there is contestability of the second shareholder and 0 if there is collusion.92 This 
dummy variable was constructed based on Maury and Pajuste (2005). On the one hand, 
by holding a substantial equity share, a second shareholder has the power and the 
incentives to monitor the largest shareholder and therefore the ability to challenge the 
largest block, i.e., by contestability. On the other hand, the second shareholder can form 
a controlling coalition with the first shareholder and share the diverted profit; in this 
case, by colluding, the presence of these two block holders, can increase the efficiency 
of private benefit extraction. 
Our models are estimated by the panel data methodology. Two issues are 
considered in making this choice. First, unlike cross-sectional analysis, panel data allow 
us to control for individual heterogeneity. This point is crucial in our study because the 
dividend decision is very closely related to the specificity of each firm. In fact, each 
firm has a different propensity to pay dividends, which could be regarded as unobserved 
heterogeneity. Therefore, to eliminate the risk of obtaining biased results, we control for 
such heterogeneity by modeling it as an individual effect, ηI, which is then eliminated 
                                                 
92  There are Contestability and dummy variables that take value 1 when the sum of equity stocks held by 
the two largest shareholders does not exceed 50% and each one of them has at least 10% of shares. There 
are Collusion and dummy variables that take value 0 otherwise. 
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by taking first differences of the variables. Consequently, the error term in our models, 
itε , is split into four components: first, the above-mentioned individual or firm-specific 
effect, ηi. Second, dt measures the time-specific effect by the corresponding time 
dummy variables, so that we can control for the effects of macroeconomic variables on 
the dividend decision. Third, since our models are estimated using data from several 
countries, we also include country dummy variables (ci). Finally, vit represents the 
random disturbance. 
The second issue we address by using the panel data methodology is the 
endogeneity problem. The endogeneity problem is likely to arise insofar as the 
dependent variable (payout ratio) explains some explanatory variables. For instance, the 
payout ratio may explain leverage on the basis of arguments used to justify reverse 
causality (e.g. Moh´d, Perry, and Rimbey 1995, 1998). 
Finally, we check for potential misspecification of the models. First, we use the 
Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions in order to test for the absence of 
correlation between the instruments and the error term.Tables IV.4 and IV.5 show that 
the instruments used are valid. Second, we use the m2 statistic, developed by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), in order to test for lack of second-order serial correlation in the first-
difference residual. Tables IV.4 and IV.5 show that there is no problem of second-order 
serial correlation in our models (see m2). Note that although there is first-order serial 
correlation (see m1), this is caused by the first-difference transformation of the model 
and, consequently, it does not represent a specification problem of the models. Third, 
the results shown in Tables IV.4 and IV.5 provide good outcomes for the following 
three Wald tests: z1 is a test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients; z2 is a 
test of the joint significance of the time dummies; and z3 is a test of the joint significance 
of the country dummies. 




IV.3.1 The moderating role of ownership variables 
 
In this section we present the results of our models by incorporating a variable 
capturing investor sentiment, the catering variable, for testing the implications of the 
catering theory by means of several ownership characteristics, four in particular: the 
level of managerial ownership, the equity stocks in the hands of the first shareholder, 
the presence of the second shareholder and the effect of contestability or collusion by 
this second shareholder relative to the first. 
It is worth noting that, as far as we know, there is no prior evidence supporting 
this view, and providing empirical support for this issue is thus one of the major 
contributions of this research.  
Column I of Table IV.4 reports the results of the model that includes the 
interaction of the catering variable with managerial ownership. 93 As shown in the table, 
for firms with low levels of managerial ownership there is a positive effect from a 
firm’s investor sentiment on its payout ratio (γ6=0.00121, significantly different from 
zero; see t). However, the effect turns negative for firms with high levels of managerial 
ownership (γ6+λ=-0.00259, significantly different from zero; see t). That is, our 
evidence suggests that investor demand for dividends translates into higher payout 
ratios only in those firms with low levels of managerial ownership, whereas firms with 
high levels of insiders do not seem to cater to investor preferences. This suggests that 
                                                 
93 The level of managerial ownership is measured by the fraction of closely held shares to common shares 
outstanding (number of closely held shares/common shares outstanding * 100). 
According to the Worldscope variable definition, closely-held shares represent shares held by insiders: (i) 
shares held by officers, directors and their immediate families, (ii) shares held in trust, (iii) shares of the 
company held by any other corporation (except shares held in a fiduciary capacity by banks or other 
financial institutions), (iv) Shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares, etc. 
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receipt of dividends is more important to investors when managers don’t have greater 
ability to expropriate corporate earnings for their private benefit.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, this result corroborates that the higher the 
managerial ownership, the smaller the extents to which firms cater to their investors’ 
sentiments. This idea supports, for instance, the key arguments by Rozeff (1982), or 
Moh'd, Perry and Rimbey (1995), who report that firms with more managerial 
ownership pay fewer dividends. Our results suggest the entrenchment effect that 
predicts that a manager who controls substantial ownership may determine policies 
which are beneficial to him at the expenses of other shareholders, resulting in lower 
payouts (Jensen, Solberg and Zorn, 1992). Also, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
observe that at sufficiently high levels of stock ownership, managerial entrenchment 
may dominate the positive incentive effects of more direct alignment (see section 
IV.1.1).  
The interaction of the catering effect with the variable capturing the ownership 
in the hands of the largest shareholder is tested in the model presented in Column II of 
Table IV.4. As shown in the table, the catering effect is positive in firms with low levels 
of equity concentration by the largest shareholder (γ6=0.00914), whereas this effect 
turns negative for firms with high levels of equity ownership concentration in the hands 
of the largest shareholder (γ6+λ=-0.00185, significantly different from zero; see t). Our 
evidence supports Hypothesis 2, according to which majority controlled firms by the 
first-largest shareholder cater to a smaller extent to their investors’ sentiments.  
Correia da Silva, Goergen and Renneboog (2005) find that, given that strong 
shareholders exert their control power, there is no need for the dividend policy to 
constitute an additional monitoring device. We interpret these findings as further 
evidence of agency conflicts between largest shareholders and minority investors, as for 
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instance, Thomsen (2005). Therefore, it seems that catering incentives (i.e., investor 
preference for dividend-paying stocks) manifest more strongly in firms with low levels 
of ownership in the hands of the largest shareholder. This result intuitively supports 
traditional arguments by Rozeff (1982), who argues that companies with less dispersed 
ownership pay fewer dividends. Our evidence suggests that the dominant shareholder 
has the power to divert corporate resources to himself from other shareholders and that 
translates into investors' smaller incentives for dividends who perceive expropriation 
power by majority controlled firms. 
Our evidence is also consistent with Maury and Pajuste (2002) and Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003), and suggests that controlling shareholders obtain private benefits from 
retaining resources inside the firms and refusing to satisfy the rest of shareholders’ 
preference for dividends. As expected, the positive effect predicted by Ferris, 





























Estimation results of the moderating role of certain ownership characteristics 
(Managerial ownership and ownership concentration in the hands of 
the largest shareholder) 
 I II 
Constant -.0263* (.00074) -.02969* (.00064) 
FCFit .00537* (.00023) .00863* (.00022) 
Dit .01097* (.00032) .01608* (.00038) 
NIit .14767* (.00040) .02017* (.00047) 
TANGit .00665* (.00023) .01142* (.00027) 
Sit .00178* (.00006) .00186* (.00044) 
CATit  .00121* (.00005) .00914* (.00014) 
CATitDVit -.00380* (.00012) -.01099* (.00018) 
t -30.57 -25.97 
z1 323.89 (7) 684.53 (7) 
z2 10735.26 (11) 23577.50 (11) 
z3 90.10 (6) 130.37 (6) 
m1 0.08 -0.03 
m2 -1.24 -1.03 
Hansen 347.25 (392) 391.75 (392) 
The regressions are performed using the panel described in Table IV.2. DVit is a dummy 
variable that takes the following values: a) 1 if the level of managerial ownership is 
above the sample median and 0 otherwise in Column I; b) 1 if the ownership by the 
largest shareholder is above the sample mean and 0 otherwise in Column II. 
The remainder of the information needed to read this table is as follows: i) 
Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; iii) t is the t-statistic for 
the linear restriction test under the null hypothesis of no significance; iv) z1, z2 and z3 are 
Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies, and of 
the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
significance, with degrees of freedom in parentheses; v) mi is a serial correlation test of 
order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation; vi) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments and 
the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses. 
 
In addition to the largest controlling shareholders, we also tested whether the 
presence of other large shareholders has influence on catering incentives of dividend 
policy.  
For testing the joint effect of the first and second-largest shareholders on 
catering incentives, we propose the model presented in Column I of Table IV.5. As 
shown in the table, firms with low levels of ownership by the largest shareholder and no 
second-largest shareholders exhibit a positive catering effect (γ6=0.00943). Our 
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evidence suggests that in firms without a second shareholder, but where the largest 
shareholder does not have the power to control, managers are more encouraged to cater 
to a large extent to investors’ demand for dividends, confirming once more that just for 
high level of ownership the largest shareholder has the power to divert corporate 
resources to himself from other shareholders, resulting in smaller catering incentives to 
dividends (results corroborated by hypothesis 2). In this way, our results suggest that in 
firms with lower levels of ownership by the largest shareholder, dividend payments are 
a substitute monitoring device.  
The catering effect is also positive and larger in firms in which the largest 
shareholder has a majority stake but there is also a second large shareholder 
(γ6+λ6+ 6α =0.02645, significantly different from zero; see t2).  
This result confirms that a second large shareholder has incentives to control and 
monitor the largest shareholder. Under pressure, the controlling shareholder is generally 
expected to pay out more. Thus, the monitoring exerted by other large shareholders 
makes dividends more likely. In other words, when there is a second large shareholder 
in the firm, investors perceive that the largest one cannot so easily expropriate their 
wealth, because the firm caters to a larger extent to their sentiment and higher dividends 
are paid. 
For instance, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) document that the power of the 
second-largest shareholder increases the payout. The second shareholder plays a critical 
role in contesting the control of the dominant largest shareholder in order to reduce the 
extraction of private benefits and improve the firm’s payout ratios. 
More interestingly, the catering effect is even more relevant when the level of 
equity in hands of the largest shareholder is low and there is a second large shareholder 
in the firm (γ6+ 6α =0.03918 significantly different from zero, see t2). Financial literature 
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shows that ownership concentration facilitates the expropriation of wealth from the 
small shareholders by the largest shareholders. However, our evidence points out that if 
the first shareholder doesn't have power to control, the existence of other large 
shareholders comes to reinforce the increase of the investors' incentives for dividends, 
because in those companies there are no reasons to believe that the minority 
shareholders can be expropriated.  
Finally, the catering effect turns negative when the largest shareholder has a 
majority stake that confers on him the power to control the company and there is no 
second large shareholder in the firm (γ6+λ6=-0.0033, significantly different from zero, 
see t1). This result clearly manifests for expropriation reasons, that is, when the largest 
shareholder has the power to control, and the second shareholder is not present to 
contest the control of the dominant largest shareholder in order to reduce the extraction 
of private benefits and improve the firm’s dividend decisions, the first shareholder 
expropriates the minority’s interests.  
These results point out that catering incentives clearly manifest themselves when 
there are no shareholders large enough to control the firm and the dividend decision, or 
when there is a second large shareholder in the company. This evidence confirms 
Hypothesis 3 regarding the role played by a second large shareholder, jointly considered 
with the stake of the largest shareholder, in moderating the catering effect. Additionally, 
our results suggest that the presence of a second large, non-controlling shareholder in 
the firm enhances the monitoring of largest shareholders’ opportunism. In this line, 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) show that firms that have a strong controller tend to present 
lower payout ratios, but this effect is mitigated when there is a second block holder in 
the company (see section IV.1.2).  
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Finally, the influence of a second reference shareholder can be twofold: on one 
hand, the second shareholder can form a controlling coalition with the largest 
shareholder to share diverted profit; that is, controlling owners are encouraged to 
expropriate the remaining shareholders,  and, hence, to reduce the firm’s payout. But on 
the other hand, the second shareholder has incentives to monitor the largest shareholder; 
that is, it is possible that the other major shareholders take actions to avoid the 
expropriation by the larger major shareholders. This effect is called contestability by 
Maury and Pajuste (2005). 
Therefore, we introduce the contestability and collusion effect into our analysis. 
We investigate whether the joint effect of the first and second largest shareholders on 
catering incentives depends on whether there is contestability or collusion between 
them. With this aim, we estimate the model presented in Column II of the Table V.  As 
shown in the table, firms in which the largest shareholder has a low stake and colludes 
with the second large shareholder exhibit a positive catering effect (γ6=0.00967). This 
finding suggests that if the first and second large shareholders have a low level of 
ownership concentration, there is no possibility nor ability to expropriate: that means 
both prevail in catering theory. 
The catering effect is positive and stronger when the largest shareholder has a 
majority stake but there is also a second large shareholder that contests the decisions 
taken by the former. (γ6+λ6+ 6α =0.34798, significantly different from zero; see t2 and 
t1).  
As reported by Maury and Pajuste (2002, 2005), when second shareholder has a 
substantial voting block, he also has the power and the incentive to monitor the largest 
shareholder and therefore the ability to reduce profit diversion and in this case, the 
ability of large shareholders to contest the largest shareholder should be encouraged.  
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Accordingly, our results suggest that the contestability of the second shareholder leads 
to power to limit the expropriation of minority shareholders, resulting in higher catering 
incentives for dividends. 
Once more, the results are still interesting for firms with low levels of equity 
shares in the hands of the largest shareholder and when the second shareholder has the 
power to contest (γ6+ 6α =0.36022 significantly different from zero; see t2). We find that 
when the largest shareholder doesn't have power to control, the contestability of the 
other large shareholder comes to reinforce the increase of the investors' incentives for 
dividends, because in those companies there are no reasons to believe that the minority 
shareholders can be expropriated. Even if it is possible, the second shareholder would 
have power to contest acting as an effective monitor.  
These results corroborate the previous evidence that we had already shown in 
the model (3) with the presence of a second shareholder. Column II of the Table IV.5, 
our model (4), also shows that the catering effect turns negative when the largest 
shareholder has the power to control the decision-making in the company and, 
additionally, there is collusion with the second large shareholder (γ6+λ6=-0.00257, 
significantly different from zero; see t1). Therefore, by colluding, the presence of these 
two blockholders can increase the efficiency of private benefit extraction and it seems 
that catering incentives (i.e., investors’ preference for dividend-paying stocks) lose 
priority in the firm (see Maury and Pajuste, 2002). 
Our evidence suggests that in firms with the power of contestability of the 
second shareholder, and in the situation that the first shareholder does not have 
controlling power, management is more encouraged to cater to the firm’s investors’ 
demand for dividends. As in Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), this result is consistent with 
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the argument that strong minority shareholders demand dividends to avoid being 




Estimation results of the moderating role of certain ownership 
characteristics 
(ownership concentration in the hands of the largest shareholder and 
the existence or contestability of second largest shareholder) 
 I II 
Constant -.02746* (.00056) -.01734* (.00050) 
FCFit .00885* (.00020) .01194* (.00030) 
Dit .01885* (.00037) .01713* (.00038) 
NIit .02068* (.00040) .01708* (.00040) 
TANGit .00779* (.00030) .00777* (.00029) 
Sit .00183* (.00004) .00106* (.00004) 
CATit  .00943* (.00012) .00967* (.00019) 
CATitDVit -.01273* (.00018) -.01224* (.00023) 
CATitSVit .02975* (.00121)  
CATitCVit  .35055* (.01776) 
t1 -36.32 -30.73 
t2 31.32 20.21 
z1 840.57 (8) 420.21 (8) 
z2 16212.29 (11) 15061.86 (11) 
z3 131.29 (6) 150.63 (6) 
m1 -0.08 -0.12 
m2 -0.96 -0.87 
Hansen 397.00 (391) 382.10 (391) 
The regressions are performed using the panel described in Table VI.2. DVit is a dummy 
variable that takes the following values: a) 1 if the ownership concentration by the largest 
shareholder is above the sample mean and 0 otherwise in Column I; b) SVit is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if a second large shareholder exists and 0 otherwise in Column 
I; c) CVit is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if there is contestability between the first 
and second largest shareholders and 0 if there is collusion between them in column II. 
The remainder of the information needed to read this table is as follows: i) 
Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in parentheses. ii) *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; iii) t is the t-statistic for 
the linear restriction test under the null hypothesis of no significance; iv) z1, z2 and z3 are 
Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients, of the time dummies, and of 
the country dummies, respectively, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no 
significance, with degrees of freedom in parentheses; v) mi is a serial correlation test of 
order i using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the 
null of no serial correlation; vi) Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments and 













This study is built upon the predictions of the catering theory of dividends, and 
contributes to the somewhat sparse empirical literature towards understanding the 
implications of catering incentives for dividend policies by examining the moderating 
role played by certain ownership variables, using a sample of large quoted firms in 
Eurozone member countries. In fact, our research makes a further check to see which 
ownership variables moderate dividend payout to managers’ action to cater. This idea 
has not been accounted for in previous studies, either theoretically or empirically, but 
our findings corroborate that the way in which investors appreciate dividend payments 
and the incentives of the companies to satisfy these desires depends on the firm’s degree 
of managerial ownership, ownership concentration by largest shareholder, the presence 
of a second shareholder, and finally, with the possibility of contestability or collusion 
between the largest and second-largest shareholders.  
The results of the empirical analysis reveal, in first place, that investor 
preference for dividend-paying stocks translates into lower payout ratios in those firms 
with high levels of managerial ownership. Second, investor sentiment negatively 
impacts the payout ratio of only those firms with a high degree of equity shares in the 
hands of the first shareholder, for which investors manifest weaker expectations about 
receiving higher dividends. Further, we find that for high degree of ownership 
concentration by the largest shareholder jointly with the presence of a second 
shareholder, investor sentiment positively impacts the payout ratio. More interesting, 
our evidence shows that the catering effect persists and is more evident when the first 
shareholder does not have the power to control the company and the second shareholder 
has equity shares. Once more, our evidence provides empirical support that the second 
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shareholder will influence the extent to which firms cater to their investors’ sentiments, 
because when this second shareholder doesn't exist and the ownership by the first is 
high, the catering effect turns negative. Finally, the results obtained reveal important 
differences in the ability of dividend catering to explain a firm’s propensity to pay 
dividends when the second shareholder has the possibility to contest the ability to 
expropriate by largest shareholder. The results are coherent with the previous ones 
showing that the catering effect of dividends is positively affected by the ability of the 
second shareholder in challenging the first shareholder through contestability; however, 
this effect turns negative with the presence of blockholders, the first and second 



















CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
The purpose of this study has been to examine the influence of the psychological 
factors in determining dividend payout. The study focuses on four important topics: 
first, it investigated the influence of catering theory on payout ratio. Second, it 
explained the sensitivity of various firm characteristics to the catering theory of 
dividends. Third, it compared the impact of different institutional environments on 
catering theory of dividends. Finally, in this thesis it is explained how the different 
ownership characteristics of the companies affect investors’ demand for dividend-
paying stocks. 
In particular, this study demonstrates why psychological factors should be 
definitively integrated into the explanatory models of dividends. The findings of this 
study are consistent with previous arguments that investors’ sentiments can be decisive 
in determining dividend payout. This research reveals that investors’ sentiment 
significantly affects a firm’s propensity to pay dividends across firms for Eurozone 
countries and, as expected, this effect is positive after controlling for traditional 
determinants of dividends, such as the free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed 
assets and size. This finding seems to indicate that dividend policies are driven to some 
extent by investor sentiment, thus revealing the desire of firm managers to cater to such 
preferences. Therefore, our evidence provides empirical support for a psychological 
component in the decision to pay in Eurozone firms, and it thus provides empirical 
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support for the catering model previously documented in US firms. Additionally, our 
study provides further evidence on the moderating role of certain firm characteristics on 
the relation between dividends and investor sentiment. Specifically, we find that 
investor sentiment positively impacts dividends of firms with high liquid assets. 
Furthermore, our results reveal a positive catering effect only for firms with valuable 
investment opportunities. Finally, we show that the catering effect is significantly larger 
in firms with higher levels of free cash flow. 
Based on previous literature that shows a relationship among different 
institutional characteristics and dividend decisions, our study advances empirical 
evidence supporting the argument that when companies belong to different institutional 
environments and the nature of existing agency problems also differs, there will also be 
differences in the relationship between dividend policy and the catering effect. In this 
line of research, we show for a more enlarged sample that includes, besides the 
Eurozone countries, US, UK, Canada and Japan, that the arguments of the catering 
theory are also applicable and that the institutional environments moderate the catering 
theory of dividends. No one has either theoretically or empirically tested the impact of 
institutional characteristics on catering dividends. Our findings reveal that investors’ 
sentiments significantly affect a firm’s propensity to pay dividends and, as expected, 
this effect is positive, after controlling for traditional determinants of dividends, such as 
free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets and size. Therefore, we find that 
companies in Eurozone countries, US, UK, Canada and Japan cater to their investors’ 
sentiments; that is, investors’ demand for dividend-paying stocks encourages firms to 
increase their payouts. Once more, our evidence provides empirical support for the 
existence of a physiological component in the decision to pay, as proposed by the 
catering theory. More interestingly, our findings show an interaction effect between 
The catering theory of dividends: the moderating role of firm characteristics, corporate governance factors and corporate ownership 
 140
catering and institutional factors such as the legal protection of investors; development 
of capital markets and the orientation of the financial systems; the effectiveness of the 
market for corporate control; the level of ownership concentration and the effectiveness 
of boards of directors. In fact, the analysis performed in our study, stressing the role 
played by institutional factors, gives rise to the following conclusions: First, we find 
that firms with higher levels of ownership concentration and with more efficient boards 
of directors cater to a larger extent to their investor’s sentiments. This result suggests 
that the internal mechanisms exert certain pressure on firms to cater to investors’ 
demand, which in turn translates into higher dividends payout. Second, our results show 
that the stronger the legal protection of investors, the smaller the extent to which firms 
cater to their investor’s sentiments, which translates into lower dividends payout: this 
evidence confirms the substitute model. Third, our study provides further evidence for 
the moderating role of the development of capital markets and the orientation of the 
financial systems on the relation between dividends and investors’ sentiments and 
specifically, we find that the investors’ demand for dividends tends to be “ignored” in 
firms operating in market-oriented financial systems.  We next investigate the 
interaction between the catering effect and the contestability of market for corporate 
control, and the results are very similar to those obtained for the previous external 
corporate governance mechanisms; that is, the more active the market for corporate 
control, the smaller the extent to which firms cater to their investors’ sentiments.  
In short, our results suggest a substitution effect between external corporate 
governance mechanisms and dividends. This result suggests the external mechanisms of 
corporate governance support the substitute model in opposition to the outcome model 
in our sample of fifteen countries around the world. Therefore, we find that firms with 
weak corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to cater their investor’s 
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preferences for dividends and pay higher dividends, while the relation between catering 
dividends and governance is stronger for firms with high quality of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
Finally, this study contributes to understanding the influence of ownership 
structure from firms in Eurozone countries on catering theory of dividends. This idea 
has not been accounted for in previous studies, either theoretically or empirically, but 
our findings corroborate that the way in which investors appreciate dividend payments 
depends on the ownership structures. 
The results from the estimation of the model by using the Generalized Method of 
Moments are interesting. Consistent with catering predictions, our findings of the 
empirical analysis reveal that the strength of the sentiment-payout relation is affected by 
ownership variables, particularly the firm’s level of managerial ownership, the level of 
ownership concentration by the largest shareholder, the joint effect of the first and 
second largest shareholder, and the joint effect of the first and second largest 
shareholder on whether there is contestability or collusion between them. 
The results of the empirical analysis reveal, in first place, that investor 
preference for dividend-paying stocks translates into lower payout ratio in those firms 
with high levels of managerial ownership, which intuitively shows the negative 
relationship and the entrenchment effect on dividend policy in previous findings. Our 
evidence also shows that the presence of a large controlling shareholder will influence 
the extent to which firms cater to their investors. Specifically, investor sentiment 
negatively impacts the payout ratio of only those firms with high degree of equity shares 
in the hands of the first shareholder, for which investors manifest weaker expectations 
about receiving higher dividends. This result is consistent with previous studies that 
show that large shareholders have the incentive and ability to expropriate small, outside 
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shareholders and extract rent translating in lower payout ratio. Furthermore, we 
explicitly analyze the effects of the presence of a second large shareholder in catering 
dividends; our evidence shows that the catering effect of dividends is positively affected 
by the ability of the second shareholder in challenging the first shareholder through 
contestability. That is, when a second large shareholder has the power to contest the 
expropriation ability by the largest shareholder, investor demand for dividends 
translates into higher payout ratios. The results also show that in firms with the power of 
contestability of the second shareholder, and in the situation that the first shareholder 
does not, the power of controlling investors’ preference for dividend-paying stocks 
increases. However, it is also necessary to point out that this effect turns negative when 
these two blockholders, by colluding, can increase the possibility of private benefits 
extraction. 
As we can see through our evidence, this study is relevant to managers and 
investors as well as researchers. The managers will benefit from understanding the role 
of and motivation behind investors’ demand for dividends. Moreover, managers should 
take into account the investors’ sentiments, as they translate into a dividend premium. 
Investors, then feel that their motivations are very important for the managers’ 
decisions, which means that they are part of the managerial decision process. The 
immediate implication for all researchers and school community is the understanding 
that the psychological factors are fundamental in determining the firm’s dividends 
policies, and this is related to the catering theory. The investors’ sentiments, moderated 
by certain characteristics of the company and certain institutional factors, should be 
incorporated into the explanatory models of dividends.  
All researchers can use this work as a base for future study, basically looking for 
new paths, for instance, the stock repurchase. 
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To sum up, the thesis proved in this work is as follows: Dividend policies are 
driven to some extent by investors’ sentiments, and this catering effect is moderated by 
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Appendix A-Replacement Value of Total Assets 
 
The replacement value of total assets is obtained as follows 
 ( )itititit BFTARFK −+=  , 
where RFit is the replacement value of tangible fixed assets, TAit is the book value of total 
assets, and BFit is the book value of tangible fixed assets. The latter two variables are 
obtained from the firm’s balance sheet and the first is calculated according to the proposals 













φ  , 
for t>t0, and RFit0=BFit0, where t0 is the first year of the chosen period, in our case 1986. 
On the other hand, δit=Dit/BFit and φt=(GCGPt-GCGPt-1)/GCGPt-1, where GCGPt is the 
growth of capital goods prices extracted from the Main Economic Indicators, published by 
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Appendix B-Market Value of Long-term debt 
 












⎡  , 
where BVLTDit is the book value of the long-term debt, il is the rate of interest of the long-
term debt reported in the OECD-Main Economic Indicators and lit is the average cost of 
long-term debt, defined as lit=(IPLTDit/BVLTDit), where IPLTDit is the interest payable on 
the long-term debt, which is obtained by distributing the interest payable between the short 






it  , 
where IPit is the interest payable, is is the rate of interest of the short-term debt, also 
















 Investment is calculated according to the proposal by Lewellen and Badrinath 
(1997) as follows 
    Let FAit be the gross book value of the tangible fixed assets of the period t, Rit the 
gross book value of the old assets retired during the year t, ABDit the accumulated book 
depreciation for the year t, and BDit the book depreciation expense corresponding to year 
t. We then have the following equalities 
FAit=FAit-1+Iit-Rit                                 
(A.1) 
ABDit=ABDit-1+BDit-Rit .                         
(A.2) 
 If we solve Eq. A.2 for Rit and substitute it into Eq. A.1, we obtain A.3, 
FAit=FAit-1+Iit+ABDit-ABDit-1-BDit  .                        
(A.3) 
Realigning terms, Eq. A.3 is transformed into expression A.4, 
FAit-ABDit=FAit-1-ABDit-1+Iit-BDit  .                       
(A.4) 
As for FAit-ABDit=NFit, i.e., the net fixed assets, the former equation can be rewritten 
more compactly as in Eq. A.5, 
NFit=NFit-1+Iit-BDit  ,                                                                            
(A.5) 
from which we obtain the value of investment 
Iit=NFit-NFit-1+BDit .                                  
(A.6) 
 
